Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia J.K.Cilliers by Groom Helm et al.
Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia
J.K.Cilliers
GROOM HELM
London • Sydney • Dover, New HampshireCONTENTS
©1985J.K. CiUiers
Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row
Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT
Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, First Floor,
139 King Street, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Cilliers, J.K.
Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia.
1. Zimbabwe - History
I. Title
968.91 DT962.5
ISBN 0-7099-3412-2
Croom Helm, 51 Washington Street,
Dover, New Hampshire 03820.USA
Cataloging in Publication Data applied for.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:
84-45702
List of Tables and Figures
List of Abbreviations and Terminology
Acknowledgement
Introduction
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE:
1890 TO 1979
1.1 The Early Years
1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic
Base Area in the North-east
1 , 3 Operation Hurricane
1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction ...
Detente
1976 and Dr Henry Kissinger
The Patriotic Front
1977: ZPRA Intensifies the War ..
The Internal Settlement
1 .5
1 .6
1 .7
1 .8
1 .9
1.10 Lancaster House
COMMAND AND CONTROL
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
The Rhodesian Security Force's
approach to command and control ...
JOC's, JPS and Operation Hurricane.
War Council, COMOPS and NATJOC
Special Forces
Conclusion
PROTECTED AND CONSOLIDATED VILLAGES
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddies Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn
3.1 The Concept
3.2 Initial Attempts at Creating
Protected Areas
1
11
14
18
22
27
33
35
44
55
60
61
66
73
76
79
823.3 Operations Overload and Overload
Two
3.4 Extension of the Protected Village
Scheme
3.5 Opening of Protected Villages
3.6 Guarding Forces ,
3.7 The Rhodesian Approach and Condi-
tions in Protected Villages ,
Conclusion , 3.8
4* BORDER MINEFIELD OBSTACLES
4.1 Cordon Sanitaire
4.2 Rhodesian Cordons Sanitaires
4 . 3 Border Minefields
4. 4 Conclusion
PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
5.1 The Concept
5.2 The Formation of the Selous Scouts.
5. 3 Pseudo Modus Operand!
5 . 4 Conclusion
INTERNAL DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT:
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, POPULATION AND
RESOURCE CONTROL, CIVIC ACTION
6.1 The American Concept of Stability
Operations
6.2 Population and Resources Control,
Psychological Operations and Civic
Action
6 . 3 The Sheppard Group
6.4 Branch of Special Duties (BOSD) and
the Formation of 1 POU
6.5 The Directorate of Psychological
Warfare
6.6 Rewards
6.7 Safe Returns and Amnesty Offers ...
6.8 Interface and Manila Interface ....
6.9 Food Control: Operation Turkey ....
6.10 Psyop: Operation Splitshot
6.11 Use of Spirit Mediums
6.12 Conclusion
EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
7.1 Strategic Base Areas and Insurgent
Sanctuaries
83
90
93
96
99
104
105
112
115
118
120
124
131
135
137
139
145
146
149
150
153
158
160
165
167
172
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
Mozambique
Zambia
Botswana ..
Angola
Conclusion
8. OPERATION FAVOUR: SECURITY FORCE
AUXILIARIES
8.1 Introduction: The Concept
8.2 Operation Favour
8.3 Conclusion
9.
10.
11 .
INTELLIGENCE
9 .1 Introduction
9.2 Organisation and Major Characteris-
tics of the Rhodesian Intelligence
Community prior to 1973
9.3 Revolutionary War and Special
Branch Intelligence
9.4 The Development of Military Intel-
ligence Organisations
9.5 The Role of COMOPS
9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts
and the Special Forces Intelligence
Centre (SFIC)
9.7 Security and Counter-intelligence .
9 . 8 Conclusion
THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979 ....
CONCLUSION
Selected Bibliography
Index
175
185
193
196
196
202
203
213
218
218
221
223
230
231
232
234
238
243
255
258TABLES AND FIGURES
Tables
1.1 Casualty Figures per Operational Area
up to 30 Jan. 1977 36
10.1 Casualty Figures 1973-78 242
Figures
1.1 Land Apportionment 1968 . 2
1.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe ... 8
1.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas .... 29
1.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes 38
1.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers: Dec.
1978 to Jan. 1979 51
3.1 Existing and Planned Protected
Villages: 6 Jan. 1978 91
4.1 Cordon Sanitaire 106
4.2 Modified Cordon Sanitaire 109
4.3 Modified Modified Cordon Sanitaire ... 111
4.4 Border Minefield Obstacles 116
6.1 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 162
6.2 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 163
6.3 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 164
7.1 Mozambique 176
7.2 Zambia 186
11.1 Vital Assets Ground 251ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
Air Force
ANC
Army
BOSD
BSAP
CESC
CIO
Corsan
COMOPS
CV
FPLM
FRELIMO
Frontline States
GTI
insurgents
Internal Affairs
JOG
JPS
JSPIS
JSTC
MID
mujibas
NATJOC
OCC
Rhodesian Air Force/Zimbabwe-
Rhodesian Air Force
African National Congress
Rhodesian Army/Zimbabwe-Rhodesian
Army
Bureau of Special Duties
British South Africa Police, now
the Zimbabwe Republic Police
Civil Executive to the Security
Council
Central Intelligence Organisation
Cordon Sanitaire
Combined Operations Headquarters
Consolidated Village
Army of Mozambique, now known as
FAM
Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique
Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique,
Angola, Tanzania
Ground of Tactical Importance
armed, trained members of either
ZANLA or ZPRA
Department of Internal Affairs,
now the Department of Home
Affairs
Joint Operational Centre
Joint Planning Staff
Joint Services Photographic
Interpretation Staff
Joint Services Targetting Commit-
tee
Military Intelligence Directorate
insurgent local youth supporters
National Joint Operational Centre
Operations Co-ordinating CommitteePACC
PF
Police
POU
PROVOPS
Psywar Committee
PV
RAR
Rhodesia
Rhodesian Front
Rh$
RIC
RLI
SAANC
SAS
Security Forces
SFA
SFIC
situpa
TPDF
UANC
UDI
VAG
ZANLA
ZANU
ZANU(S)
ZANU(PF)
ZAPU
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
ZIPA
Psychological Action Co-ordina-
ting Committee
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. At pre-
sent the PF refers to the former
ZAPU. As used in this study it
refers to the ZANU/ZAPU pact for-
med in 1976
British South Africa Police
Psychological Operation Unit
Provincial Operation Centre
Psychological Warfare Committee
Protected Village
Rhodesia African Rifles
Zimbabwe. Name used for period up
to 1 June 1979
Rhodesian Front party. Now the
Republican Front Party
Rhodesian dollar
Rhodesian Intelligence Corps
Rhodesian Light Infantry, 1st
Battalion of
South African African National
Congress
Special Air Service
Rhodesian/Zimbabwe-Rhodesian
Army, Air Force, BSAP, Guard
Force, Security Force Auxiliaries
and para-military Internal
Affairs forces
Security Force Auxiliaries
Special Forces Intelligence Cen-
tre
registration card carried by
adult black males
Tanzania People's Defence Force
United African National Council
Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence
Vital Asset Ground
Zimbabwe African National Libera-
tion Army
Zimbabwe Africa National Union
Faction of ZANU headed by the
Rev. N. Sithole
Present name of ZANU. PF refers
to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union,
now known as the Patriotic Front
Zimbabwe. Refers to the period
1 June 1979, to April 1980
Zimbabwe Peoples Army
ZNDF
ZPRA
Zambian National Defence Force
Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary
Army. Also known as ZIPRAACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This book is based on a dissertation submitted
in 1981 for a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies at
the University of South Africa. The title of the
thesis was A Critique on Selected Aspects of the
Rhodesian Security Forces Counter-insurgency Stra-
tegy, 1972-1980. Additional information drawn from
subsequent publications has been included where
appropriate but the content remains largely
unchanged.
Grateful acknowledgement is due to Prof D.F.S.
Fourie for supervising the original study, Mr M.A.
Curr for valuable criticism and Mrs A Basson for
typing the manuscript.
J K Cilliers
TsumebINTRODUCTION
On 11 November 1965 the British colony of Southern
Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence.
Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith made this declara-
tion fully confident that his Rhodesian Front Party
could maintain power indefinitely for the white
minority group it represented. Only fifteen years
later on 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe emerged as an inde-
pendent country under majority rule with internatio-
nal recognition. Mr Smith's major adversory, Robert
Mbellarmine Mugabe, became the new prime minister of
this fledgeling state. During the intervening years
a relentless war had been waged. The two black
nationalist armies, ZANLA and ZPRA gained ascendency
over the smaller but technically superior armed for-
ces of Rhodesia. This bitter struggle can be seen as
a classic model of insurgent versus counter-
insurgent strategies. The final outcome permanently
altered the balance of power in the sub-continent of
Southern Africa.
This general study is an interpretative analy-
sis of the counter-insurgency strategy during the
eight crucial years of the war, 1972 tot 1979. Since
1981 a small number of books have been published on
certain aspects of the war, notably D. Martin and P.
Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber,
London, 1981), J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves:
Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (Raven
Press, Johannesburg, 1982) and P. Stiff and R. Reid-
Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Alber-
ton, 1982). Considering the scope of the conflict,
comparatively little that is available to the public
has been written on the war itself.
A large number of primary sources were consul-
ted to obtain the basic historical data for this
study, but the Africa Research Bulletin series was
the single most important reference work used. Theinformation presented by the media was often distor-
ted and based on rumours and speculation divorced
from reality. Details regarding specific operations,
projects, organisations and general modus operandi
of the Security Forces gathered for this study were
collected and cross-checked through numerous and in-
depth interviews conducted both in the Republic of
South Africa where many expatriate Rhodesians now
reside and in Zimbabwe. The subject files at the
offices of the Herald newspaper in Harare also pro-
ved valuable in this research. Numerous officially
classified documents obtained from former Security
Force members were used as well.
Chapter 1 provides a resume of events over the
period 1890 to 1979 with an emphasis on the intensi-
fied confrontation from 1972 to 1979. This is a cen-
tral chapter for evaluating and co-ordinating
aspects of the struggle discussed in subsequent
chapters. Each of the following eight chapters is
concerned with specific organisations or counter-
insurgency strategies which had direct bearing on
the development of the conflict. The second and
ninth chapters are, in particular, devoted to orga-
nisations and systems. Chapter 2 examines the com-
mand and control structures employed by the Rhode-
sian Security Forces, and Chapter 9 discusses the
intelligence organisations and methods employed.
Both aspects are vital for a complete picture of the
Rhodesian Security Forces' counter actions, as the
success of other counter-insurgency activities
depended to a large extent on the successes and
failures achieved in these fields. Chapters 3 to 8
analyse in turn a number of specific counter-
insurgency strategies as employed in Zimbabwe,
namely those of protected villages (strategic ham-
lets) , border minefield obstacles, pseudo-insurgent
activities, internal defence and development,
external operations and the institution of a self-
defence militia system. Chapter 10 briefly describes
the general security situation that had developed by
1979. Only at this point is it possible to comment
on the conduct of the war in general.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE 1965-1979
1.1 The Early Years
By 1890 there were already a number of white sett-
lers inhabiting what was later known as the British
colony of Southern Rhodesia. The impingement of
white interests upon indigenous black customs and
property, however, led to racial tension. So, in
1893 and again in 1895, the Matabele regiments rose
up under their king, Lobengula, in the first free-
dom struggles or Chimurenga against the whites. Al-
though the black warriors were overwhelmingly defea-
ted this did not secure the position of the white
settlers, who remained ill at ease in their isola-
ted outposts across Mashonaland. White military
preparedness was consequently directed towards
securing internal security and remained so for a
number of years.
Gradually, as European influence grew, racial
prejudice against the blacks increased as well,
became established and institutionalized. It was
expressed clearly in the Land Apportionment Act of
1930 by which the country was divided into distinct
areas for black and white habitation. Areas assigned
for black habitation were known as Reserves until
1969 and after that as Tribal Trust Lands until
independence in 1981. Generally these areas lay in
the more arid reaches surrounding the more fertile
white controlled region which ran from southwest to
northeast (see Figure 1.1). This division of land was
made possible by the white referendum of 1922 after
which Britain granted self-government to Southern
Rhodesia in 1923. Faint awareness of a threat other
than that from the indigenous black peoples arose
after 1926, and in response to this a small stan-
ding army was formed. This force was expanded
during the troubled years preceding the Second World
1History of War
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Figure 1.1 Land Apportionment 1968
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War. During this war Rhodesian squadrons served
with distinction in the Royal Air Force. After
1945 the armed forces were demobilized. However,
during 1947 a largely black unit, the Rhodesian
African Rifles, was constituted as the core of a
regular Army. The territorial force, on the other
hand, was almost entirely white and comprised the
IsL and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regi-
ment. The Rhodesian African Rifles saw service in
Malaya from 1956 to 1958.
After the general strike in Bulawayo during
1948, a revision of military policy apparently
occurred, since three additional white territorial
battalions were formed. Recruits into No. 1
Training Unit were formed into the Rhodesian Light
Infantry Battalion in 1961. Two other units esta-
blished were C Squadron of the Special Air Service
and an armoured car unit, the Selous Scouts, named
after Courtney Selous, a nineteenth century explo-
rer. (This name was relinquished by the armoured
car unit and given to a pseudo-insurgent infantry
unit in 1973.)
During 1963 an attempted federation with
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now
Malawi) ended in failure. This politically ambi-
tious scheme was launched in 1953. its failure
could largely be ascribed to the internal racial
policies of Southern Rhodesia and the realisation
that these policies were incompatible with a closer
relationship to neighbouring black states. Black
riots during 1960 increased white intransigence and
made them less willing than ever to consider reform.
Unrest first broke out in the black townships of
Salisbury (now renamed Harare) when three leaders
of the National Democratic Party were detained.
Over twenty thousand people gathered in protest at
Stodart Hall. Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead respon-
ded by ordering the distribution of leaflets from
the air announcing a ban on all similar meetings.
He also ordered the partial mobilisation of the
Army. Further disturbances in Bulawayo were also
dispersed and gatherings were banned.
During December 1962 the new Rhodesian Front
party was elected to power. Since its inception the
party had been committed to the entrenchment and
maintenance of white supremacy without the involve-
ment of a distant colonial mother. The leader of the
Rhodesian Front, Ian Douglas Smith, was elected
Prime Minister on 14 April 1964. He was initially
elected to the Southern Rhodesia legislative assem-
bly as a Liberal Party member in 1948 but becameHistory of Mar
a founder member of the Rhodesian Front party in
1962. He was a dour speaker who had won little
public attention before the formation of the Front.
Once elected Prime Minister, however, he gained
unprecedented popularity among the white population.
This support even endured beyond the war against the
insurgents. Two events in particular strengthened
the resolve of an increasing!" isolated Southern
Rhodesia to 'go it alone
1 in an attempt to maintain
white supremacy: the massacre of whites in Kenya
during the Mau Mau uprising of the early sixties
and the election to power of an unsympathetic Labour
government in Britain in 1964. So, on Armistice day,
11 November 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declared
its independence (UDI). Although aware of the immi-
nent declaration, Rhodesian black nationalists were
totally unprepared to offer any form of organized
protest. The small number of blacks sent for
training in insurgency warfare by emerging nationa-
list movements at the time were apparently intended
for political propaganda rather than to wage a real
revolutionary campaign. Arguably the major nationa-
list insurgent incident before UDI occurred during
July 1964: a group calling itself the Crocodile
Gang killed a white farmer at a roadblock in the
Melsetter area.
Recruitment and training for an insurgent cam-
paign against the Rhodesian Front government star-
ted in 1963. The formation of the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU) in that year in competition
with the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)
acted as a catalyst for armed confrontation between
the black nationalist forces and the white control-
led Rhodesian Security Forces.
The undisputed father and leader of Rhodesian
nationalist movements in the late fifties and for
many years afterwards, was Joshua Nqabuko Nyangolo
Nkomo.He had been elected president of^the newly
formed African National Congress on 1i September
1957, after the Southern Rhodesian African Nationa-
list Congress and the City Youth League had united.
The African National Congress was subsequently ban-
ned in February 1959, but re-emerged on 1 January
1960 as the National Democratic Party. This party,
in turn, was banned on 9 December 1961. It reap-
peared on 17 December 1961, as the Zimbabwe African
Peoples Union or ZAPU.
For some months before the formation of ZAPU,
Nkomo's leadership had come under increased criti-
cism. It was alleged that he spent more time abroad,
canvassing for the nationalist cause, than in
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Southern Rhodesia leading it. Further dissension
broke out among black nationalists after the
National Democratic Party executives agreed to the
proposals of the 1961 London constitutional conference
whereby only 15 out of 65 parliamentry seats were
allocated to blacks. African nationalists reacted
angrily to this agreement and forced the National
DeiuocraLic Party lias Lily Lo repudiate the agreement,
but the damage to the unity of Rhodesian African na-
tionalism had been done. When ZAPU was banned on 20
September 1962, Nkomo was again absent from Rhodesia.
He was persuaded to return only after considerable
pressure from his own followers as well as from Pre-
sident Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. After his release
from 3 months' restriction, Nkomo persuaded the for-
mer ZAPU executive to flee with him to Tanzania and
there form a government in exile. Bitter dissension
about the leadership of the Rhodesian nationalist
movement now arose amongst prominent black nationa-
lists including the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and
Robert Mbellarmine Mugabe. In response, ZAPU Presi-
dent Nkomo suspended his executive council and
returned to Rhodesia to form the interim People's
Caretaker Council. Outside Rhodesia the People's
Caretaker Council retained the name ZAPU. Nkomo
was rearrested and detained until 1974. In spite
of his long detention, he was never again seriously
challenged as ZAPU president.Nkomo's foremost cri-
tics formed the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) on 8 August 1963 with the Reverend Sithole
as interim president and Robert Mugabe as Secretary
General. Both ZANU and the People's Caretaker Coun-
cil were banned in Rhodesia on 26 August 1964. Mugabe
and Sithole we're arrested. Although he was relea-
sed during June of the following year, Mugabe was
restricted to Sikombela until his rearrest in
November 1965. Both Mugabe and Sithole remained in
detention until December 1974.
ZANU sent its first contingent of five men led
by Emmerson Mnangagwa to the People's Republic of
China for military training in September 1963. They
formed the nucleus of ZANU's armed wing, the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, or ZANLA.
Having been actively involved in operations against
the Rhodesian regime since 1964 it was thus under-
standable that Sithole precipitated his own fall
from the ZANU presidency during 1969 when he stated
in the dockHistory of War
I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word,
thought or deed from any subversive activities,
from any terrorist activities and from any
form of violence.'''
Internal dissension within the ranks of the black
nations!isfcs thus brought about the formation of
ZANU. Although Nkomo's vacillation had discredited
him among a large section of the Rhodesian nationa-
list leaders, he still appeared to command
majority black nationalist support within the coun-
try at the turn of the decade. At this stage the
tribal bias of both ZANU and ZAPU was not as
strongly manifested as from 1972 onward.
ZANU and ZAPU, however, increasingly competed
in revolutionary zeal and recruitment. The ZAPU
armed forces later became known as the Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA or ZIPRA)(2)
The insurgents' strategy at this stage was
based on two false assumptions. First, that
Britain could be induced to intervene forcibly in
Rhodesia should law and order seem in imminent dan-
ger of collapsing, and second that
... all that was necessary to end white domina-
tion was to train some guerrillas and send them
home with guns: this would not only scare the
whites but would ignite a wave of civil disobe-
dience by blacks. (')
By 1966, however, ZAPU, still the major black natio-
nalist movement, had realized that the British
government could not be induced to intervene
actively in Rhodesia. ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, also
recognized that it did not have the ability to force
a collapse of law and order. The major task of the
insurgent forces existing at this early stage was
therefore to convince the Organisation of African
Unity and the world at large that the forces to
overthrow the regime of Ian Smith really did exist.
This was vitally important if financial and politi-
cal support was to be forthcoming. It was also appa-
rent that if Rhodesia was to become Zimbabwe,
Zimbabweans themselves would have to take up arms
and fight for it. While leaders of ZANLA and ZPRA
were convinced of this, black Rhodesians as
yet were not. Rhodesian citizens resident in Zambia
and Tanzania were thus forcibly recruited to swell
ZANLA and ZPRA ranks until the trickle of refugees
and recruits turned into a flood.
While ZPRA bore almost the full weight of the
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war effort in these initial years, ZAPU remained at
the same time the major exponent of the 'external
manoeuvre' designed to obtain maximum international
support. ZANLA, trained by China, played a very
limited military role during this period. Both move-
ments also increasingly appeared to represent a major
tribal grouping in Rhodesia. ZAPU had the backing of
the Matabeles, who constitute some 19% of Zimbabwe's
black population, while ZANU had that of the
loosely grouped Shona nations (77%). (See Figure 1.2)
Following UDI the first military engagement
recognised officially by Rhodesia occurred on 28
April 1966 between Security Forces and seven ZANLA
insurgents near Sinoia, 100 km northwest of Harare.
That day is now commemorated in Zimbabwe
as Chimurenga Day - the start of the war.
The group eliminated was in fact one of three teams
that had entered Rhodesia with the aim of cutting
power lines and attacking white farmsteads. A
second of the groups murdered a white couple with
the surname of Viljoen on their farm near Hartley
on the night of 16 May 1966. The insurgents were
subsequently captured by Security Forces. In total
all but one of the original fourteen insurgents were
either killed or captured.
Shortly afterwards a second ZANLA infiltration
was detected near Sinoia. In the ensuing battle
seven insurgents were killed and a number
captured.
During August 1967 a combined force of 90
insurgents from ZPRA and the South African African
National Congress entered Rhodesia near the Victoria
Falls. They miscalculated the attitude of the local
black population and the Security Forces soon knew of
their presence there, in the first major operation
of the war 47 insurgents were killed within three
weeks and more than 20 were captured. The remainder
fled to Botswana in disarray. Fourteen of the Securi-
ty Force members were wounded and seven others killed.
Early in 1968 a second force of 123 insurgents
from ZPRA and the South African African National
Congress crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia into
northern Mashonaland. The group remained undetected
for three months, setting up a series of six base
camps at intervals of 30 kilometers before being
reported by a game ranger. On 18 March Security For-
ces attacked and destroyed all of the six camps.
During the ensuing month 60 insurgents were killed
for the loss of six members of the Security Forces.
During July 1968 a third joint incursion took
place. The 91 insurgents involved formed into three groups.History of War
BEIT BRIDGE
NDEBELE ORIENTATED TRIBES SHONA ORIENTATED TRIBES
Ndebe'le
Kalanga 5%
Rozwi
Korekore
Zezuru
Manyika
Karanga
Ndau
9%
12%
18%
13%
22%
3%
OTHERS
I Tonga
J Venda
K Shangaan
2*
1%
1*
Figure 1.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe
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About 80 insurgents were either killed or captured at
that time and significantly, the first member of the
South African Police deployed in Rhodesia also died
then. Following the entrance of the South African
African National Congress into Rhodesia, members of
South African Police counter-insurgency units were
detached to the Rhodesian Security Forces. In the
ensuing years the Republic of south Africa involved
itself increasingly with the security situation on
the borders of its northern neighbour.
These first insurgent incursions into Rhodesia
all originated from Zambia across the floor of the
Zambezi River valley. This sparsely populated area
was deemed the natural infiltration route as mobili-
sation of the masses did not yet constitute an impor-
tant principle in insurgent strategy. Security Force
counter-measures were thus largely track and kill
type operations. Furthermore infiltrations took
place in relatively large groups, which Security
Forces located more easily.
After a peak during 1968, almost no incur-
sions took place the following year. By the end of
1969 both ZANU and ZAPU had realized that their
military strategy had serious shortcomings. These
problems proved to have less impact on ZANLA than
on ZPRA, for since the latter had borne the brunt of
the insurgency effort up to that stage, the defeats
suffered in the field resulted in a collapse of
morale and the withdrawal of ZPRA from the conflict
for a number of years. On the other hand, Rhodesian
authorities were satisfied with the performance of
their small Security Forces. This later had the
effect of lulling Rhodesia into a false sense of
security, as reflected in the figures for defence
expenditure which remained relatively constant over
this period. It also tended to strengthen the
impression amongst Rhodesians that military action,
to the exclusion of political and other non-military
action, would be sufficient to destroy the insur-
gency threat, for, at this stage, the insurgent
groups had not yet resorted to internal subversion
as a major element in their strategy. This sense of
complacency was further increased by the apparent
economic success of UDI. The economic upswing led to
an influx of white immigrants and increased optimism.
This was in stark contrast to the defeatism and low
morale among insurgent forces.
By 1970 ZANU, under the external leadership
of Herbert Chitepo, emerged as leader of what was
regarded as a liberation struggle. Although
the ZANU president. Reverend Sithole, wasHistory of War History of War
still imprisoned in Rhodesia, this did not have the
divisive and eventual disruptive effect on ZANU that
the concurrent imprisonment of ZAPU leader, Nkomo,
had on his organisation. Within ZAPU a struggle
had been waged between James Chikerema and Jason
Moyo for external leadership. The infighting soon
led to a split between ZAPU as a political wing and
ZPRA as a military wing. In a document entitled
lObservations on our Struggle' Moyo summarized the
situation as follows: ~
Since 1969 there has been a steady decline of
serious (sic) nature in our Military Adminis-
tration and Army. Military rules have been
cast overboard. Relations between some members
of the War Council and the Military Administra-
tion are strained. Accusations of a serious
nature have been made. Military Administration
and War Council meetings are no longer being
held. Planning of strategy is seriously lacking.
There is no co-ordination in the deployment of
cadres in Zimbabwe.(
4)
The clash between Moyo and Chikerema reached a cli-
max in April 1970. From the total number of appro-
ximately four hundred ZPRA insurgents some decided
to side with one of the two faction leaders while
others either stayed in a small neutral group, or
deserted altogether. Chikerema subsequently formed
FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)in
October 1971 with a splinter ZANU group led by
Nathan Shamuyarira. The original objective behind
the creation of FROLIZI was to reunite ZANU and ZAPU
into a single nationalist movement but neither party
was prepared to do so. In 1973 FROLIZI itself split and conse-
quently played an insignificant part in the insurgency campaign.
Even at this early stage the basic differences
in strategic concept between ZANLA and ZPRA were
readily discernable.
By 1971, ZANU's emphasis was on the political
education of the Zimbabwe workers and peasants.
The purpose of this was to elicit support from
the masses and to recruit more people for
guerrilla warfare training. Another significant
factor for this change in strategy was to widen
the areas of combat.(5)
As regards ZPRA, the general strategy adopted relied
principally on military action. As expressed by
W.W. Nyangoni:
10
Since 1970 we have analysed the basis of the
enemy strength and revised our strategy and
tactics so as to be able to strike where it
hurts most.(6)
and further
The strategy pursued by the liberation forces
of ZAPU was that of engaging the enemy largely—
"~~ with series of landmines accompanied by limited
and calculated armed attacks.(7)
From 1970 onwards ZANLA placed a higher premium on
politicizing the population than ZPRA. Rhodesian
intelligence reports indicated that it was only as
from 1978 that ZPRA turned to the politicization of
the local population to the same degree that ZANLA
had been doing. Probably with Russian backing and
instruction ZPRA forces also tended to be more con-
ventionally orientated and trained than those of
ZANLA. The latter took its doctrine from China
that the main object of such a protracted war
is to gain the support of the local popula-
tion.
Regarding the politicization of the Rhodesian
black population in general, the single most signi-
ficant event was the formation of the African
National Council on 16 October 1971, led by Bishop
Abel Muzurewa. In December of the following year the
African National Council succeeded in helping to per-
suade the Pearce Commission to report adversely on
the acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals
for a settlement. Possibly for the first time, the
rural and urban black population of Rhodesia had
been made politically aware en masse. In its report,
the Pearce Commission inter alia noted:
Mistrust of the intentions and motives of the
Government transcended all other considerations.
Apprehension for the future stemmed from resent-
ment of what they felt to be the humiliations
of the past and at the limitations on policies
on land, education, and personal advancement.
One summed it up in saying, 'We do not reject
the Proposals, we reject the Government'.(8)
1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic Base Area in
the North-East
ZANLA chose the Tete province in Mozambique
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as approach route to Rhodesia more by force of
circumstance than by conscious analysis. Both ZANLA
and ZPRA were still based in Zambia, and were forced
to operate from that country as Mozambique was a
Portuguese colony at the time. Yet the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, who had been
fighting against the Portuguese for a number of
years, had been gaining ground steadily in the Tete
province and initially offered ZPRA the use of this
front as an alternative entry route into Rhodesia.
Not least as a result of the continual small scale
Rhodesian operations in support of the Portuguese
forces, FRELIMO had become convinced of the neces-
sity to 'liberate' Rhodesia as well, if the libera-
tion of Mozambique was to be effected. Low morale
and internal strife caused ZPRA to show little inte-
rest in this route. Furthermore it would take ZPRA, a
movement under Matabele control into an area of the
country under Shona control. The use of the route was
thus offered to ZANLA, who eagerly grasped this opportunity.(9)
A number of demographic, historic and geogra-
phical factors favoured the North-eastern border of
Rhodesia for insurgency. The rugged Mavuradonha
mountains presented numerous obstacles to Security
Forces in locating and eliminating known insurgent
groups, while dense vegetation hindered .observation,
especially during the summer rainy season (November
to March). Owing to its vast expanse and relatively low
economic value, the area had furthermore suffered
decades of administrative neglect. The traditional
tribal way of life had been allowed to continue, with
little active interference from Harare. The Shona
tribe in the area, the Korekore, also spilt across
the border into the Tete province of Mozambique,
thus easing the infiltration of insurgents from that
country into the North-east. A final factor was the
lack of a physical impediment comparable to the
Zambezi river on the common national border. With
active FRELIMO cooperation ZANLA was presented with
an excellent opportunity. d°)
As indicated above, ZANLA strategy had shifted
its emphasis markedly since the sixties. In accor-
dance with the teaching of Mao Zedong greater atten-
tion was now given to the politicization and mobili-
zation of the local population before mounting any
attacks on Rhodesian Security Forces or white farms.
Yet at this early stage ZANLA had, in total, only
about 300 trained insurgents. Of these,60 men moun-
ted the infiltrations in the north-east.
Noel Mukona, the head of ZANLA from 1969 to
1973 could later claim with little hyperbole:
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In 1969 it was decided to operate silently ...
We worked underground, training, stocking
equipment and regrouping inside the country.
Special Branch could not find out what was
going on and that we were preparing for a con-
tinuation of the struggle. Much contact was
maintained with the local population to review
the terrain ... In July 1972 ZANU called
together all its forces and met in the bush in
Mozambique and reviewed the situation. We were
satisfied that the preparations were enough and
that enough arms and food had been stashed in
the bush and that we could restart the
onslaught. (11)
In the early hours of 21 December 1972, ZANLA insur-
gents attacked the white homestead of Marc de
Borchgrave in the Centenary district, marking the
resurgence of the insurgent onslaught, indeed of a
new campaign. Most Rhodesians, however, accepted the
news philosophically. Official concern over the dete-
riorating situation in the area had been expressed
some weeks earlier by Prime Minister Ian Smith when
he stated on the radio that the security situation
was
... far more serious than it appears on the
surface, and if the man in the street could
have access to the security information which
I and my colleagues in government have, then I
think he would be a lot more worried than he is
today.(12)
Yet the information available to the government at
this stage was somewhat incomplete. All of the four
traditional intelligence sources, Army, uniformed
Police, Special Branch and the Department of Inter-
nal Affairs (subsequently renamed Home Affairs) had
limited representation in the area, and in the case
of the Army had maintained little more than a token
presence.
At a later stage Prime Minister Smith explained
how the insurgents were able to remain undetected
for such a period of time:
... they were able to move backwards and for-
wards across the border from their so-called
base camps and were thereby able to avoid
detection for long enough to enable them to
subvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereafter
their task was made easy through shelter, food
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and assistance they received from the locals.
This situation has complicated the position as
far as our security forces are concerned. (13)
Not only had ZANLA succeeded in establishing a rela-
tively secure base area inside Rhodesia, but had
also succeeded in obtaining the full co-operation
and support of the black rural population within the
area. This proved a crucial factor in their later
success and in the way the Rhodesian government
attempted to eradicate the threat.
1.3 Operation Hurricane
Before the formation of the operational area in the
North-east that was to become known as Operation
Hurricane, Rhodesian Security Force authorities had
become increasingly anxious about the security
situation in the neigbouring province of Tete in
Mozambique. Although the Security Forces was largely
unaware of the extent of insurgent activities inside
Rhodesia itself, they had, since early 1972, conside-
rably stepped up co-operation with the Portuguese
forces who were then still in control of Mozambique.
The two elite Rhodesian Army units, C Squadron
of the Special Air Service and the 1st Battalion of
the Rhodesian Light Infantry, were operating in Tete
itself on an almost continuous basis. Yet when
insurgent operations inside Rhodesia resumed in late
1972, Army presence in an area of more than 1 000
square kilometers was only at company strength.
The extent of the insurgent penetration at the
turn of 1972 was widespread, ranging from Sipolilo,
west of Centenary, across to Mutoko in the east, and
southwards to the Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust
Lands. In contrast to the Security Force operations
of the sixties, the war for Rhodesia had now entered
a new phase. Previously members of the local popula-
tion had willingly come forward to supply information
on the presence and activities of insurgents, but
within a matter of weeks all intelligence sources in
the North-east dried up. Security Force morale plum-
meted as they failed to meet the enemy face to face.
After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote
For the first time the Rhodesian Security For-
ces were faced with a seemingly insoluble pro-
blem ... after carrying out their attacks the
terrorists had not gone to ground in bush-
camps in uninhabited areas where they could
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eventually be tracked down ... neither had they
gone to ground in inhabited areas where infor-
mation from the local population to the Police
or Special Branch had indicated their where-
abouts. This time there was nothing. No tracks
... no information.(14)
A Joint Operation Centre (JOC) , code-named Hurricane,
(see Figure 1.3} was formed at Army brigade level of
command to counter the internal threat that had
developed. JOC Hurricane was initially situated at
Centenary, was then moved to Bindura and eventually to
Harare as its area of responsibility increased. It
constituted the formalization of a committee system
approach that had already been used to counter the
insurgency threats of the sixties.
With the limited scope of active operations
during 1973-74, JOC Hurricane benefitted from almost
all the available forces of the Army, Air Force and
British South Africa Police. The latter alone could
contribute some 16 companies to the counter-insur-
gency effort. This enabled the Army, nominally in
control of Hurricane, to formulate a strategy based
on two fundamental requirements; first, the necessity
.of stemming the flow of insurgents from Mozambique and
second, that of population control. The vital ele-
ments of JOC Hurricane strategy as developed by 1974
were succinctly summarized by the then brigade major
as follows:
Large external operations to turn off the tap;
a cordon sanitaire with warning devices, patrol-
led and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area;
population control consisting of Protected Vil-
lages, food control, curfews and (eventually)
martial law, and massive psychological
action.(15)
The object was to channel insurgents into designated
areas from which the local population had been remo-
ved. Here the Security Forces could easily track and
eliminate the insurgents before they reached
populated areas. In areas adjoining these depopula-
ted or 'no-go' areas, movement of the local popula-
tion was to be restricted by placing them in Protec-
ted and Consolidated Villages. Strict curfews were
to be enforced within these areas with the aim of
cutting the link between the local population and
the insurgents. Largely due to the limited availabi-
lity of manpower and other resources, and the increa-
sing demands made upon them, the strategy described
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was not employed in full.
In an attempt to reassert control over rural
areas, four new districts were proclaimed in the
north-eastern and eastern highlands, at Centenary,
Rushinga, Mudzi and Mutasa. In an attempt to per-
suade Zambia to desist from aiding both ZANLA and
ZPRA, Rhodesia closed its border at Chirundu,
Kariba, and Victoria Falls to all Zambian traffic on
9 January 1973. Although Zambian copper exports were
exempted from this embargo shortly afterwards, Pre-
sident Kaunda refused to use any of these routes.
Officially the border remained closed until 1978,
when Rhodesian external raids into Zambia forced
President Kaunda to reopen his southern export
routes'.
When the campaign began in 1973 it seemed that
the Rhodesian government was not yet convinced of
the political character of the threat facing it.
Heedless of the possible consequences of such
action,government then empowered Provincial Commis-
sioners on 19 January 1973 to impose collective punish-
ment on tribal communities assisting the insurgent forces in
accordance with the Emergency Powers (Collective
Fines) Regulations. The most extreme case of collec-
tive punishment documented was the resettlement of
nearly 200 members of the local population from
Madziwa Tribal Trust land in the Beit bridge area in
1974 "... as punishment for assisting terrorists."(16)
The extent to which collective punishment was to be
enforced is apparent from the following extraction
from a poster distributed in Marante Tribal Trust
Land and Mukumi African Purchase Area during
January 1978:
as from dawn on the 20th January 1978 the fol-
lowing restrictions will be posed upon all of
you and your TTL (Tribal Trust Land) and Purchase Land
1. Human curfew from last light to 12 o'clock
daily
2. Cattle, yolked oxen, goats and sheep curfew
from last light to 12 o'clock daily
3. No vehicles, including bicycles and buses to
run either (in) the TTL or the APL (African
Purchase Land)
4. No person will either go on or near any high
ground or they will be shot
5. All dogs to be tied up 24 hours each day or
they will be shot
6. Cattle, sheep and goats, after 12 o'clock,
are only to be herded by adults
7. No juveniles (to the age of 16 years) will
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be allowed out of the kraal area at any time
either day or night, or they will be shot
8. No schools will be open
9. All stores and grinding mills will be clo-
sed. (17)
Specifically during the period up to 1976 collective
punishment measures such as those quoted above could
only have had serious negative effects on the atti-
tude of the black rural massas for at this stage the
majority of the local population were not neccessa-
rily supporters of either ZANU or ZAPU.
In execution of the strategy devised for Opera-
tion Hurricane, the first 'no-go' area was proclai-
med along the Mozambique border on 17 May 1973. In
one way or another 'no-go' areas were extended along
vast stretches of Rhodesian border in an attempt to
establish depopulated 'free-fire' zones for Security
Force operations. Government attitude to the infrin-
gement of curfews and 'no-go' areas was well summa-
rised by P.K. van der Byl, Rhodesian Minister of
Information on 31 July 1975 in Parliament when he
stated that "... as far as I am concerned the more
curfew breakers that are shot the better".(18) On 21
June the-Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Mr Wickus
de Kock, told Parliament that there were indications
that the removal of tribesmen from parts of the
north-eastern border to form a cordon sanitaire was
beginning to have the desired effect. The use of the
name cordon sanitaire was however misleading and
should not be confused with attempts to establish a
proper cordon sanitaire some months later (see Chap-
ter 4) .
In July 1973 the first major abduction of
schoolchildren by insurgents occurred. St Albert's
Mission, on the Zambezi Valley escarpment, was ente-
red by a group which abducted 292 pupils and members
of staff, who were then forced to march into the
Zambezi Valley and north towards Mozambique. Secu-
rity Forces intercepted the column and rescued all
but eight of the abductees. Similar abductions were
repeated in years to come and Security Forces were
increasingly unable to prevent these actions.
At the start of the summer rainy season towards
the close of 1973, the insurgent forces intensified
their efforts. In an attempt to cut all links with
the insurgents in subverted areas, Deputy Minister
de Kock announced the initiation of the Protected
Village programme. Four villages were in various stages of
completion as part of a pilot scheme. It was estima-
ted that more than 8 000 blacks would be resettled
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in the Zambezi Valley by the end of December. Thus
started one of the essential elements of Rhodesian
military strategy which eventually led to the forma-
tion of an independent arm of the Security Forces,
the Guard Force, to man and protect these villages.
It placed a heavy strain on the limited resources
available to the war effort, but some 750 000 rural
blacks were eventually resettled in over 200 Protec-
ted Villages. Geographically, the distribution of
these villages gave a very clear impression of the
spread of insurgency, but even when the scheme had
reached its most extended phase, the vast majority
of Protected Villages were still found in the North-
east where ZANLA had set up its original base area.
In general the strategy was not consistently executed
and, as a result, success varied. Eventually the
Security Force punitive approach to the scheme,
limited manpower and finance and bad execution was
to lead to the failure of Protected Villages in
general. (This strategy is evaluated in Chapter 3.)
But by the close of 1973 the number of insur-
gents in Hurricane was estimated at a mere 145 men.
Insurgent casualties for the year stood at 179 while
44 members of the Security Forces and 12 white civi-
lians had lost their lives. All in all the Rhodesian
Security Forces had barely succeeded in holding
their own. As a result Government announced during
December that the period of national service would
be extended from that of nine months instituted in
1966 to one year. Prior to 1966 national service
had consisted of a short 4£ months.
1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction
During 1974 the Rhodesian authorities made a concer-
ted effort to restore law and order. The Minister of
Defence announced in February:
The Government is embarking on a call-up pro-
gramme in which the first phase will be to
double the national service intake. A second
battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles will
be raised to augment the Army ... These arran-
gements by the Ministry of Defence, together
with other actions are designed to eliminate
the terrorists in the shortest possible
time.(19)
Measures introduced included extensing the powers of
protecting authorities in the north-eastern area.
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These authorities had previously consisted of com-
sioned police officers, but legislation was extended
to include certain District Commissioners from the Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs. Protecting authorities could
now order residents to do specified public security
work, which included the building or maintenance of
bridges,, roads, fences, and darns. Detention without
trial was extended to sixty days. A government
statement during April set out a scale of fixed
rewards ranging from Rh$ 300 to Rh$ 5 000 for infor-
mation. This included information leading to the
death or capture of a senior insurgent leader or to
the recovery of insurgent weaponry.
Already, at this early stage of the conflict,
logistics played a major role in the insurgents'
strategy. All weaponry had to be carried in from
either Mozambique or Zambia. While food was readily
obtainable from the local population, the insurgent
forces were not able to capture and thereby arm and
resupply themselves with weaponry from the Security
Forces. In the case of ZANLA, which was supplied by
the People's Republic of China, this problem was fur-
ther complicated by the erratic and limited supply
of arms. ZPRA, in contrast, tended to be better and
more heavily armed by the USSR. Awareness of the
ZANLA problems influenced Army and Air Force plan-
ning for external operations in the years to come.
Operations were almost exclusively confined to
the North-east at this stage. During March 1974,
however, it was becoming clear that the ZPRA reope-
ning of the Zambian front in the North-west was immi-
nent. This was officially confirmed on 6 October in
a government statement which lodged a formal com-
plaint with Zambia over the use of its territory by
insurgents.
On 25 April 1974, the armed forces of Portugal
staged a successful coup d'' etat and overthrew Pre-
sident Ceatano. General Antonio de Spinola became
the new President. On 27 July he recognised the
right of Portugal's overseas provinces
of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea to inde-
pendence. June 1975, was set as date for the trans-
fer of power in Mozambique to FRELIMO. A month after
the coup the revolutionary junta in Lisbon asked
Harare to halt all cross-border operations into
Mozambique. Rhodesia did not immediately feel the
military impact, for it was some months before
FRELIMO leader, Samora Machel, moved south to Maputo
then still known as Lourenco Marques, and assumed the
presidency. Once in power, however, his commitment to
the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was clear. As a result
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construction of the Rutenga-Beit bridge rail link to
South Africa was hastily begun: during the years to
follow it developed into a Rhodesian life-line and
important, insurgent target. The collapse of Portu-
guese colonial control in Mozambique also had a dis-
tinct effect on politically conscious black Rhode-
sians.
In 1974, particularly following the collapse of
Portuguese colonialism, and the impending inde-
pendence of neighbouring Mozambique, sent (sic)
an euphoric wave of high revolutionary hopes
among the masses who now voluntarily sought and
followed the ZANU-ZANLA 'freedom trail' into
the training camps.(20)
A team of Security Force pseudo insurgents, when
posing as members of ZANLA were '... shocked and
disillusioned at the wild sometimes ecstatic,
receptions that ZANLA was getting (amongst the local
population)
1 (21)
Not only did the independence of Mozambique
have a profound effect on the war in Rhodesia, but
also on the independence of Angola, which was prepa-
red to play a large role in the training of ZPRA
forces.
During May 1974, construction began on the
first border minefield obstacle. Known as the Cordon
Sanitaire it was completed in April 1976 and stret-
ched from the Musengedzi to the Mazoe river. As the
name implies, it was planned to establish an impas-
sable obstacle to prevent all cross-border movement
in the areas in which it was erected. Despite the
fact that this soon proved impractical, however, by
1978 border obstacles of various descriptions had
been constructed along virtually the entire eastern
border with Mozambique, as was the section of Rhode-
sian border with Zambia from Victoria Falls eastward
to Milibezi. While all the initial efforts entailed
the use of an electronic alarm system and a reaction
force, these were phased out. Eventually the Cordon
Sanitaire merely became a border minefield obstacle.
Owing to restrictions in manpower and finance, Secu-
rity Forces were unable to cover it by observation or
fire, patrol or even maintain it. In planning and exe-
cution these border minefield obstacles bore clea-
rest witness to a lack of a coherent national stra-
tegy to counter the insurgency, as discussed in
Chapter 5. The pressures of the war were now increasingly
exerted upon white farmers in the affected areas.
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During June a scheme was announced which included
grants of up to Rh$ 3 000 for establishing protected
compounds for labourers. The compounds were to have
floodlighting and wire fences. It was envisaged that
the Department of Internal Affairs would provide
armed guards at a later stage, yet manpower limita-
tions precluded any such plans.
In the latter half of 1974 the first two major
operations to move the total black population of a
Tribal Trust Land into Protected Villages took
place. On 25 July Operation Overload was announced
by Army Headquarters and consisted of moving the
46 960 people of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land simulta-
neously within 6 weeks into 21 Protected Villages.
Although this objective was achieved, it totally
failed to provide the local population with improved
living conditions. Operation Overload Two followed
in Madziwa Tribal Trust Land in August/September/
October and proved to be a substantial improvement.
Both Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands were
seen as key areas in halting the insurgent advance
on Harare. Contrary to established principles it was
decided to relocate the most subverted areas first,
instead of consolidating government controlled areas
as a secure base. As documented in Chapter 4 the Army
viewed the Protected and Consolidated villages
purely as population control measures. Where members
of the local population were concentrated in a
restricted area, the Security Forces could move
freely in the vast depopulated areas. This approach
negated any advantages achieved by the whole scheme
in the long run, although both Operations Overload
One and Two temporarily broke contact between local
population and insurgent forces in the areas concer-
ned. This break enabled Security Forces to regain
the initiative in these heavily infiltrated areas.
Government estimates of defence expenditure
tabled in Parliament on 24 August for the financial
year 1974/75, provided for greatly increased spen-
ding in all the related ministries for the period
ending 30 June 1975. The defence vote was increased
by Rh$ 6,7 mil to a total of Rh$ 46,176 mil.
Intelligence estimates released towards the end
of 1974 put the number of insurgents inside Rhodesia
at between three and four hundred. Nevertheless,
despite the opening of the Zambian Front, Security
Force morale was high and prospects seemed better
than a mere twelve months previously. Since December
1972, 468 insurgents had been killed and only 48
members of the Security Forces lost - a ratio of
nearly 10 to 1. This high kill ratio was also the
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result of a new tactic adopted by the Security For-
ces known as Fire Force. Largely as a result of suc-
cesses obtained by pseudo insurgents in Madziwa and
Kandeya Tribal Trust Lands during which armed heli-
copters delivered fighting troops directly onto or
close to the enemy. The concept was formalized and
honed to a vital element of Security Force action.
The first Fire Forces were formed at Mount Darwin
and Centenary during June 1974. Initially they con-
sisted of three elements: G-cars, K-cars and members
of the Rhodesian Light Infantry as fighting force on
the ground. G-cars were normally helicopters armed
with twin.Browning machine guns and each carried
four troops. K- or kill-cars were Allouette helicop-
ters armed with 20 mm canon to provide fire support.
At a later stage Lynx fixed wing aircraft were
included to provide further close support as well as
a DC-3 Dakota aircraft which could carry twenty
paratroopers to be deployed as stop-groups. Fire
Force call-ups normally originated from Security
Force operation posts on high ground which then
'talked
1 the aircraft onto the target. Yet the high
kill ratio achieved could at best have pointed to
tactical superiority, for insurgent numbers inside
the country continued to rise.
1 .5 Detente
When Rhodesia was pressured to accept the South
African proposals for a detente on 11 Desember 1974,
Security Forces claimed that there were a total of only 70
active insurgents on Rhodesian soil. Although no
troops had been withdrawn from active operations,
offensive and aggressive actions were temporarily
halted. Troops were in fact ordered to desist from
attacking insurgents leaving Rhodesia - although how
this intention was to be measured remained uncertain.
For the hard-pressed insurgents this presented a
welcome reprieve and they stood only to gain psycho-
logically from reduced Security Force actions in the
countryside. Many left Rhodesia to regroup, reple-
nish and retrain.
During the preceding months there had been
intense turmoil within the ranks of ZANU. In Novem-
ber 1974 what was to become known as the Nhari
rebellion had taken place in reaction to the high
standard of living enjoyed by most of the ZANU High
Command members in Lusaka. Although ZANU defence
chief Josiah Tongogara had forcibly repressed the
rebellion, the effects of the Nhari rebellion later
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culminated in the assassination of High Command
chairman Herbert Chitepo on 18 March 1975. This then
led to the imprisonment of all ZANU High Command
members in Zambia. They were released shortly before
the Geneva talks in 1976, The combination of these
confused events rather hamstrung the offensive
efforts of ZANLA for some months. The disruption
within ZANLA ranks presented the Security Forces
with an excellent opportunity to disrupt the insur-
gent effort further. Strangely enough Rhodesian
politicians dreamed of an accord with FRELIMO where-
by access to the ports of Beira and Maputo would be
retained indefinitely. The result was that both
ZANLA and FRELIMO were allowed time to consolidate
their forces without active Rhodesian interference.
This was possibly the major result of the detente
forced onto Rhodesia by its South African ally.
President Kaunda,together with President Machel,
had grown increasingly impatient of the disunity
among nationalist forces both within the movements
themselves as well as between the various parties
and armed forces. Prior to the constitutional talks
in Lusaka during December 1974, the two presidents
had been able to induce ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the
African National Council to join in a united Afri-
can National Congress. The signatories to this
Lusaka Unity Accord of 8 December 1974, were Sithole,
Nkomo, Chikerema and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Bishop
Muzorewa was leader of the only internally based
nationalist movement, the African National Council.
Launched in November 1971 to organize a massive
negative vote against the Pearce proposals, the
African National Council (ANC) was essentially an
internal coalition between ZANU and ZAPU. Following
the rejection of the Pearce proposals, the ANC took
on a more formal political structure. In the years
leading up to the Lusaka Unity Accord Bishop
Muzorewa had been involved in repeated talks with
the Smith regime. The most serious weakness as
regards the African National Council was its lack
of military strength. The latter was an obvious pre-
condition to legal recognition inside Rhodesia.
Although thousands of youths in fact left the coun-
try to fight 'in the Bishop's army' they invariably
ended up fighting for either ZANLA or ZPRA.
Several weeks before the Lusaka Unity Accord,
the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole had still been the
undisputed leader of both ZANU and ZANLA. Even as the
detente initiative was gaining momentum, however,
his fellow prisoner at Que Que, Robert Mugabe, was
elected to the ZANU presidency in a palace coup.
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When South Africa coerced Rhodesia to release impri-
soned nationalist leaders in order to attend the
constitutional conference in Lusaka, both Sithole
and Mugabe then claimed to represent ZANU. (At this
stage Frontline states had, in confusion, refused to
recognize Mugabe as ZANU president.) ZAPU leader
Nkomo was also released on 15 December 1974.
The first sign that there was an imminent col-
lapse of the proposed constitutional talks came on
10 January 1975. The Minister of Justice, Law and
Order, Mr Lardner-Burke, announced that he had stop-
ped the further release of political detainees on
the grounds that neither ZANLA nor ZPRA was obser-
ving the negotiated ceasefire. On average,six inci-
dents were being reported daily during that month.
Furthermore, Martin Meredith could write that
The ceasefire and the release of African lea-
ders had had the effect of convincing the local
population that the guerillas had won a victory
similar to the one which the ceasefire had
brought FRELIMO in Mozambique. All intelligence
sources had dried up and the army's position on
the ground was weaker than it had been since
the beginning of the war in 1972. (22)
The momentum of dStente had now slowed down consi-
derably. The first contact between the African
National Council and the Rhodesian government,
since agreement had been reached in Lusaka on conve-
ning a constitutional conference took place within
Rhodesia on 20 January. Nevertheless, Prime Minister
Smith's reluctance to press ahead with any meaning-
ful agreement with the nationalist forces now led to
the withdrawal of some 2 000 South African Policemen
from forward bases in Rhodesia as a prelude to their
total withdrawal from Rhodesia, which was completed
by August 1975. With the arrest and renewed deten-
tion of the Reverend Sithole in early March, talks
with the Rhodesian government temporarily collapsed.
As stated above, however, it was at this stage that
the assassination of Herbert Chitepo threw ZANU into
a new crisis. Mainly as a result of South African
pressure, Sithole was released during April, osten-
sibly to attend the OAU Ministerial Council meeting
in Dar-es-Salaam. Talks with the African National
Congress were thus resumed. Simultaneously Robert
Mugabe escaped into neighbouring Mozambique in an
attempt to consolidate his supremacy within both
ZANU and ZANLA.
The Chitepo murder and related incidents finally
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tried the patience of Zambian president Kenneth
Kaunda and Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere to
breaking point. Both leaders outlawed ZANU and ZAPU,
recognising only the Lusaka Unity Accord African
National Council as the single and united voice of
all Rhodesian nationalist movements. Yet as the
prospect of meaningful talks with Harare dimmed, so
did the unity of the African National Council.
As Security Forces slowly re-established their
authority and regained lost ground, detente reached
its high water mark during talks held at the Victoria
Falls bridge on 25 August 1975. When this attempt failed,
further dissension within the ranks of the African
National Council was inevitable. Nkomo was now
leader of the Internal ANC and Bishop Muzorewa, in
self-imposed exile,was leader of the External ANC.
Both were competing for control over the middle and
lower structure of the original African National
Council. Externally, Muzorewa, Sithole and
Chikerema formed the African National Congress -
Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ANC-ZLC) with minimum
ZAPU participation. Attempts to obtain control of
ZANLA forces in Mozambique and Tanzania failed, and
the ANC-ZLC finally collapsed when the Reverend
Sithole withdrew his ZANU faction in September 1976.
By then Mugabe could claim effective control of both
the original ZANU and ZANLA. The collapse of yet
another attempt at unity prompted Bishop Muzorewa to
return to a tumultuous welcome in Harare.
On 17 September 1975, Security Force Headquar-
ters in Harare announced that 651 insurgents had
been killed since December 1972. Security Forces
lost 73 members. Although the summer rainy sea-
son was approaching, Army commanders were confident
that the insurgency threat could be contained.
During the rainy season insurgent movement was lar-
gely screened by the thick foilage. At the same time
water was more plentiful. But this was against the
background of reports of increased ZANLA and ZPRA
recruitment, both voluntary and compulsory. Besides
the ongoing Protected Village programme, Security
Force efforts were mainly aimed at easing the acute
manpower shortages facing them.
Government estimates of expenditure tabled in
Parliament on 25 June 1975 for the financial year
ending 30 June 1976, represented the largest
increase in expenditure accountable to Defence yet,
from Rh$ 46 mil to Rh$ 57 mil: an increase of 23,5%.
Security spending was also included in some other
votes. The estimates of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs was increased from Rh$ 4,3 mil to Rh$ 30,94
25History of War
mil which included allocations of Rh$ 1,09 mil for
administration of security measures in border areas,
and Rh$ 3,72 mil for counter-insurgency programmes,
including administrative bases, Protected Villages
and a security corridor. Of the Rh$ 2,11 mil alloca-
ted for road traffic, Rh$ 7,75 mil was earmarked for
•special road and bridge works in border areas'.
A final round of talks between Prime Minister
Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo commenced in December
1975. These recurrent talks with the ZAPU president
had placed a premium on Security Force operations
against ZPRA bases in Zambia, as well as on the num-
bers of ZPRA insurgents infiltrating Rhodesia. It
was becoming increasingly apparent that ZAPU would
soon have to choose between a political settlement
and full-scale war. On the other hand, the Nhari
rebellion, the death of Herbert Chitepo and the
eviction of ZANLA from Zambia seriously affected the
ZANU war effort during 1975.
At this stage, however, Rhodesia was still on a
war footing. Security chiefs and the white popula-
tion as a whole refused to believe that the nationa-
lists could in any way pose a real threat to 'the
best counter-insurgency force in the world'. Natio-
nalist leaders seemed inept in their dealings with
Prime Minister Smith and were in general held in
contempt by their white counterparts. On the other
hand, the lack of combat sense and skills amongst
insurgent forces when faced by Security Forces led
by white officers, caused an even greater underesti-
mation of the nationalist forces in the field. Rho-
desian Security Forces had not yet realized that a
good kill ratio and tactical ability were not the
only determinants for success.
A factor that was discernable at this stage was
the lack of central direction and co-ordination of
the war. The threat was contained on a day-to-day
basis. Few regular Security Force members, and cer-
tainly no Rhodesian Front politicians appreciated
the necessity for a real political settlement as a
means of regaining the initiative on all fronts and
thus towards restoring peace. Nevertheless, the
final stage of the war was fast approaching, for
President Machel had consolidated his hold on Mozam-
bique and totally backed ZANLA. In Zambia, President
Kaunda had finally concluded that force alone could
solve the problem. In the west, Botswana, although
not actively committed to the struggle, could not
halt the use of its soil as a transit route to and
from western Rhodesia under Matabele domination. In South
Africa the spirit of detente had gained general
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support, and Prime Minister Vorster had decided to
pressure his ally into a settlement in the
interests of a peaceful and stable sub-continent.
Although not yet evident, the relative quiet of
1975 was at an end. The military intervention of the
Republic of South Africa into Angola early in 1976
had foreshadowed the end of detente. As expressed by
Anthony Wilkinson:
The effect of South Africa's military involve-
ment was to undermine the limited basis of
trust which had been achieved by her apparently
ready acceptance of Mozambique's independence
and which had paved the way for the joint ini-
tiative with Zambia on Rhodesia.(23)
1.6 1976 and Dr Henry Kissinger
The extent to which President Machel was committed
to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was soon evident.
Rhodesian Security Forces continued to conduct hot
pursuit raids into Mozambique. In addition,Rhodesia
effectively halted all rail traffic into that
country in retaliation against the arrest of
Rhodesian employees at Malvernia. On 3 March 1976,
President Machel closed the borders of his country
with Rhodesia, banned all land, air and communica-
tion links, confiscated Rhodesian property and
assets in his country and in effect prepared for
war. Prime Minister Smith had again underestimated
the commitment of the Frontline states to the
struggle.
Security Forces had already been confronted by
a series of renewed incursions from Mozambique,
which reportedly included approximately 150 men. If
final proof of the extent of the Mozambican commit-
ment was still needed, it was provided a mere three
months later when Harare confirmed on 27 July that
Security Forces had clashed with FRELIMO troops
inside Rhodesia. In response, a government official
disclosed on 28 January that call-ups would be
extended to bring force levels up to their former
high levels in the North-east. During January to
April 1976, three waves of insurgents crossed into
Rhodesia. The first group of about 90 crossed the
border south of Nyamapanda. A second group infiltra-
ted the Melsetter area and a third group the south-
east.
In a broadcast on 6 February Prime Minister Ian
Smith warned that Rhodesia was facing the most
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serious insurgent threat since the start of the war
in 1972. He also warned of the increased burden that
would have to be placed on the civilian sector as
skilled manpower had to be withdrawn for long
periods of operational duty. Some indication of this
was received three days later when a Security Force
communique disclosed that a total of 32 insurgents
had been killed inside Rhodesia during the precee-
ding few days. To the public at large it was also
becoming clear that 1976 would be a difficult year.
Reports indicated that 1 000 insurgents were active
inside the country with a further 15 000 in various
stages of preparedness in Mozambique. A second ope-
rational area, Operation Thrasher, was designated in
February, followed by a third, Operation Repulse, in
May. (See Figure 1.3)
For some time ZANLA had been engaged in expan-
ding its area of operations, and had slowly shifted
its offensive southwards. The main infiltration
routes now ran through the Gona Re Zhou game park in
the South-east. Partly as a result of the Cordon
Sanitaire in the North-east that was now nearing
completion, ZANLA needed to extent its operations
over as large an area of Rhodesia as possible.
Severely hampered by white manpower shortage and
politically hesitant to increase the black contin-
gent of the Army, Rhodesian forces lacked the
manpower resources to consolidate their authority in
the ever-increasingly subverted areas. ZANLA also had
other, more specific, objectives. These included
threatening the main Rhodesian rail link across Beit
bridge, which would also have great symbolic value.
A second objective was the ZANLA attempt to encroach
on the traditional ZAPU power base in Matabeleland.
During April it was evident that a second wave of
ZANLA insurgents, some 450 in total, had followed
this route. Both the Rutenga-Beit Bridge railway and
the Fort Victoria-Beit Bridge road link were attac-
ked. These attacks came as an acute blow to Harare,
which had remained relatively complacent, even
though rife with rumours. The introduction of selec-
tive censorship on 26 April and the imposition of
strict controls on visiting foreign journalists in
July indicated the extent of government concern
about the effect that a deteriorating security
situation could have on white morale.
On 15 April 1976, Finance Minister David Smith,
announced an interim budget to raise Rh$ 60 mil by
higher taxes on luxury items to help meet the rising
costs of the war. This followed supplementary defence
estimates of Rh$ 3,245 mil tabled in the House of
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Figure 1.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas
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Assembly on 12 February 1976, which had raised the
total defence vote by 5,7% to Rh$ 60,259 mil for the
financial year 1975/76.
Between 1971/72 and 1975/76 direct defence
expenditure had risen by 280%, while related expen-
diture also rose dramatically - that of the Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs by 320%, the British South
African Police by 199%, Roads and Traffic by 357%.
By 1976/77 defence related expenditure accounted for
23% of the total expenditure.
Extended call-up and the extension of the ini-
tial period of uninterrupted national service from
12 to 18 months with immediate effect signalled the
start of a counter-offensive. But April had shown a
marked increase in the number of whites leaving the
country with a nett loss of 817 for the month, com-
pared to 40 for March. In Lusaka, President Kaunda
was threatening to open a new front in the near
future. By the end of May, the total death toll for
that month stood at a record 231. ZANLA forces were
reported to number 1 500 internally and the pre-
vious record 11 to 1 kill ratio had dropped to a
relatively poor 6 to 1. It almost seemed that the
Security Forces had also lost their tactical edge
over the insurgents.
It had become clear that white morale was the
primary target of the insurgents, while the military
aim was to overtax the capabilities of the Rhodesian
Security Forces. The continued call-ups were already
having a distinctly detrimental effect on white
morale. Attacks on politically sensitive targets
such as the southern rail and road links forced the
government in Harare to divert further forces
towards protecting these key installations. A fur-
ther strain was consequently placed upon the already
limited manpower available. A total of 63 Army com-
panies were already deployed at this stage (7 560 men)
together with about 10 000 members of the British
South African Police.(24) Escalating attacks on the
estates and plantations in the Eastern Highlands
were part of this onslaught. By striking at white
commercial farmers, insurgents were given the added
incentive of hitting the Rhodesian economy at its
most vulnerable point.
An attack on the Bumi Hills airstrip in north-
western Rhodesia on 5 June made it known that ZPRA
forces were ready to reopen the long dormant Zambian
front in all earnest. Since talks between the leader
of the Internal ANC, Joshua Nkomo, and Prime Minis-
ter Smith had failed, the last restraint on ZAPU was
lifted. For some years ZPRA had been bitterly
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accused by ZANU of intentionally holding its forces
at bay and leaving ZANLA to do all the fighting.
While the talks between the Rhodesian Front and ZAPU
had been in progress, ZPRA recruitment and infiltra-
tion into Rhodesia had been curtailed, while Harare
refrained from striking at the main ZPRA base camps
in Zambia. Now that this tacit agreement had failed,
there were signs that the whole western front with
Botswana was gradually being activated after nearly
18 months of relative peace and quiet.
For some months Security Force commanders had
been deeply concerned about intelligence reports
that indicated a mass of 6 000 ZANLA insurgents pre-
paring for an offensive of between 1 000 and 2 000
men into Rhodesia at the start of the annual summer
rainy season. This would have been the third large
influx of insurgents within a period of ten months.
Some doubt existed as to whether the Security Forces
had the ability to contain this threat. Within the
ranks of the military there had long been support
for external raids to eliminate insurgents, where
they presented a viable target in base and transit
camps. Political caution had tended to forestall any
such large scale raids which could not reasonably be
categorized as 'hot pursuit'. Zambia's membership of
the Commonwealth further complicated the problem.
Already hard pressed to contain the 1 200 insurgents
operating inside the country, the security chiefs
were not confident of their ability to deal with a
further influx of several thousand. Largely as a
result of the visit of the American Secretary of
State, Dr Henry Kissinger, and his peace initiative
in general the South African government was vehe-
mently opposed to Rhodesia launching external opera-
tions against its neighbours. Nevertheless the
Selous Scouts were ordered to go ahead with the
first attack of this kind on the Nyadzonia training
base in Mozambique on 8 August 1976. This unit,
which specialized in pseudo tactics, had been formed
in 1973. It adopted the name Selous Scouts which had
been relinquished by the Armoured Car Regiment. The
Nyadzonia raid marked the start of a new phase in
the struggle for Rhodesia. Later it spread to
Zambia, Angola and Botswana ending as a limited
interdiction campaign during 1979. Besides imme-
diate relief to the security situation, external
operations proved an important factor in bolstering
white morale. White emigration for November was
already running at 1 200.
South African Prime Minister Vorster was, however
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not amused.Similar attacks could only serve to finally
scuttle all attempts at reducing tension in the sub-
continent. As a result South African military air-
craft were withdrawn from Rhodesia while inexplica-
ble congestion hampered the railway line to the
south.
Daring the final months of 1976, food control
measures were instituted on an experimental basis as
a further element of total population control. These
measures were known as Operation Turkey and were
first introduced in the Mtepatepa farming area
between Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands.
Although emergency regulations empowering the con-
trol of food supplies were only introduced on 28
January 1977, the concept had gained relatively wide
support. Owing to lack of manpower and the absence of
concurrent population control measures such as total
movement control, Operation Turkey was, however,
limited to white farming areas where the farmer
could ration the supply of food to his black workers
in the compounds. The rationale behind food control
was closely related to that of Protected Villages.
Food in the Tribal Trust Lands had become less rea-
dily available to insurgent forces owing to a gene-
ral drought and the movement of locals into Protec-
ted Villages. The insurgents had in some areas thus
resorted to obtaining sustenance from farm com-
pounds. The intention was to further limit even
these supplies by rationing the farm labourers to
that which was needed, and no more. In general the
scheme was ineffective as it relied almost exclu-
sively on farmer compliance and regulation, which in
some areas such as the ranching farms of Matabele-
land, white farmers found impossible to implement.
During a twenty-minute nationwide broadcast on
24 September 1976 Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian
Smith calmly announced the acceptance by his
government of majority rule within two years. This
marked the high water mark of the Kissinger peace
initiative. That Smith's acceptance was less than
total is clearly illustrated in a classified psycho-
logical directive issued on 15 October 1976
The National Aim remains unchanged ('To sustain
a united and sovereign Rhodesia which guaran-
tees a permanent home and equal opportunities
for all its communities, which maintains
responsible government and civilized stan-
dards.) (25)
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Only a few days previously South African Prime
Minister John Vorster, had reprimanded his Rhodesian
counterpart in Pretoria. The extent of South African
pressure is best illustrated by the confidential
notes of a speech given to a closed white audience
by Ted Sutton-Pryce then Deputy Minister in the
Rhodesian Prime Minister's Office. Inter alia
these read:
Vorster is the bad guy. The reason for the RF
(Rhodesian Front) failure was because of pres-
sure put on Rhodesia ... Fifty percent of the
Rhodesian defence bill was paid by South Africa
up until June. A reply had not been given since
then as to whether they would support it for a
further year. There has been a delay on war
items for as long as 2i years. The railway sys-
tem is moving very few goods - reported conges-
tion. The border was closed over the period of
the Kissinger talks, 1-4 days. Fuel supply down
to 196 days. It is difficult to prove these
facts as we cannot afford to antagonize South
Africa by exposing her ... Against this back-
ground they had no alternative but to accept
the Kissinger package deal.(26)
The Kissinger initiative soon ran into difficulties;
chiefly as a result of the American Secretary of
State's high risk diplomacy in promising everything
to everyone, simply to break the deadlock, while
simultaneously wielding as much political and econo-
mic pressure as possible. The various parties star-
ted voicing their respective interpretations of the
proposals before settling down to talk, thus preju-
dicing the Geneva conference that was to convene
under the chairmanship of Britain's Ivor Richards
on 28 October 1976.
1.7 The Patriotic Front
As a prelude to the negotiations, various nationa-
list leaders went through what was by now an almost
ritualistic scramble for power in an effort to com-
bine personal ambitions with the strategic necessity
of presenting at least a facade of unity in the inter-
national area. The unity now achieved under the ban-
ner of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front (PF), however,
proved more enduring than any previous attempt.
Although both ZANU and ZAPU changed their names
several times they had remained essentially
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unaltered. As recounted above ZAPU had already
attempted to establish an internal base within Rho-
desia by attempting to gain control of the middle
rank structure of the African National Council.
Having less of a single tribal basis than either
ZANU or ZAPU, the Council was still the party most
representative of the black Rhodesian population as
a whole. ZANU had become increasingly dominated by
the Karanga tribe - a process completed in the High
Command by March 1975, when all five of the elected members
were from the Karanga tribe. ZAPU, on the other
hand, had fallen almost completely under Ndebele
dominance. To both Nkomo and Mugabe the Patriotic
Front was thus a unity of convenience. For, while
Robert Mugabe lacked his co-leader's international
political standing, ZANLA had by far the largest
armed force. As each party represented a major power
block within Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front was
structurally complementary. Nkomo had in fact been
taking part in tentative talks with the external ANC
in Botswana on the establishment of a united front.
The tumultuous welcome accorded Bishop Muzorewa at
Harare airport by some 100 000 blacks on 3 October
led to Nkomo leaving Rhodesia for Lusaka and then
Dar-es-Salaam, where the formation of the Patriotic
Front was jointly announced on 9 October. Within
Rhodesia Nkomo desperately needed to improve his
tarnished nationalist political image which had been
damaged after his talks with Ian Smith ended in
failure during March.
Unified in name only, ZANLA and ZPRA were
jointly to be known as ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army)
which had already been formed during November 1975
by the so-called Frontline states (Zambia, Angola,
Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana) and the Organiza-
tion of Africa Unity's African Liberation Committee.
This was an attempt to bypass the nationalist poli-
tical leaders and unify the armed struggle. ZIPA was
also known as the Third Force.
As explained by Dr Masipula Sithole,
Originally, ZIPA had a High Command of 18 men,
9 from ZANU and 9 from ZAPU. Clashes ensued.
After a few weeks of joint operations, the sur-
viving ZAPU men withdrew from ZIPA in Mozambi-
que and fled to Zambia, where they have largely
remained. Thus, ZIPA, as a joint ZANU-ZAPU
enterprise remained in name only. The frontline
states and the Liberation Committee encouraged
and endorsed the creation of the Patriotic
Front with (sic) the hope that political
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leadership would cement ZANU-ZAPU guerrillas in
ZIPA. But this did not work. The ZAPU army ...
(ZPRA) remained in Zambia, while the ZANU army
(ZANLA) remained in Mozambique.(27)
Even as the ill-fated Geneva talks continued into
December, it was clear that the insurgent onslaught
on Rhodesia was intensifying. During October 131
insurgents had been killed, one of the highest
monthly totals since 1972. Once again it had become
obvious that a concerted effort was being made to
undermine white morale as white farms and government
buildings had become prime targets for insurgents.
On 4 November Ian Smith returned to Harare,
stating that if the Geneva talks failed, he would
attempt an internal settlement with moderate black
leaders. Geneva had already failed, however, and the
official Christmas recess which started on 14 Decem-
ber only served to confirm the impasse.
1 .8 1977: ZPRA intensifies the War
Within weeks the new year provided evidence that the
war was rapidly intensifying. Incidents along both
the Botswana and Mozambique borders gave a clear
indication that 1977 would be particularly difficult.
The five Frontlines states met in Luanda on 9
January and declared their full and unqualified sup-
port for the Patriotic Front. In effect this endor-
sed the armed struggle as a vehicle for settlement
and forced Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole into political obscurity. As the
year progressed it became clear that Nkomo was des-
perately trying to match his political stature with
an equal military capability. ZANU's armed wing,
ZANLA, had been carrying by far the greater burden
of the war effort against the Smith regime, as can
clearly be seen when comparing casualty figures for
the various operational areas (see Table 1.1). The
figures for ZANLA's traditional areas of influence,
Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse are much higher
than those for Tangent, ZPRA's established domain.
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Insurgents
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875
1 269
3 549
405
366
532
1 303
315
167
207
689
31
44
76
151
TABLE 1.1; Casualty figures per Operational Area up
to 30 January 1977
Note: Operation Tangent was only officially designa-
ted during August 1977.
The disparity between their respective war efforts
had led to considerable friction between ZANU and
ZAPU. The attitude of the Frontline states had made
it clear to ZAPU president Nkomo that any political
future and power had to lie within the confines of
the Patriotic Front, as such armed forces were the
decisive factor. Nkomo thus forfeited his negotia-
ting power vis-a-vis Harare and wasted little
time in building up the ZPRA armed forces from an
embryo liberation movement into a fully trained and
capable army of a largely conventional nature.
February saw the first sign of this; reports indica-
ted increased recruitment by ZAPU in western
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Rhodesia, via Botswana. The most dramatic example
was the abduction of approximately 400 pupils from
the Manama Secondary School in south-western Rhode-
sia. Only 51 of the 384 students elected to return
to Rhodesia after personal appeals by their parents.
This was followed on 16 February by the proclamation
of the first 'no-go' area along the border with
Botswana. Although Botswana did not become an active
training area for insurgents as did Zambia, Mozambi-
que, Angola and Tanzania, it was slowly developing
into an established transit area from which recruits
and abductees were forwarded (mostly by air) to
training camps in Zambia and Angola. The return
route into Rhodesia was usually back through Bots-
wana, down the Grove road and into western Rhodesia.
Although Sir Seretse Khama did not choose to bring
Botswana from Frontline status into the front line
itself, his commitment to the armed struggle
strengthened perceptibly. While there was no prima
faci
e case to be made against Botswana as to the
harbouring and training of insurgents, Rhodesian
authorities hesitated to open an active third front
in view of the burden already imposed upon their
Security Forces.
Until 1978, ZPRA infiltration into Matabeleland
had been relatively limited, for Nkomo had decided
on a risky strategy. As from 1977, ZPRA was
divided into two forces, a smaller insurgent
force, and a large, mostly external, conventional
army stationed in Zambia. The relative cohesion of
the Matabele ethnic grouping was reflected in the
cohesion of ZAPU as against the divisions within
ZANU. Nkomo's traditional tribal base was secure
and, aware of the historical animosity that existed
between Shona and Matabele, he appreciated the dif-
ficulty of making inroads into Shona territory.
Since the Matabele represented only twenty percent
of the Rhodesian black population, it seemed
obvious that ZAPU would have to resort to other
means to reassert its dominance over the Shona majo-
rity. This could only be effected by force of arms.
In contrast to ZANU, which had committed all its
forces to Rhodesia, consolidating its power base and
even attempting to infringe on that of ZAPU, Nkomo's
forces were training and waiting en masse in Zambia
and Angola. Had the war reached the final stage of
insurgency, that of mobile warfare, the outcome of
the Lancaster House talks might have been quite dif-
ferent. By early 1978 ZPRA was reported to be 8 000
strong, and growing, with Cuban instructors based
in Angola responsible for much of the training. In
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SUBDIVISION OF ZPRA OPS AREAS
AREA 1 - Beira
Kariba
Chirundu
AREA 2 - Binga
Victoria Falls
- Mupane
AREA 3 - Bulawayo
- Gwanda
Nuanetsi
SUBDIVISION OF ZANLA OPS AREAS
TETE - Nehanda
Chamnuka
Takawira
Chitepo
MANICA
Confirmed Insurgent Infiltration
Routes
Tangwena
Monomotapa
Musikavanhu
Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4
Figure 1.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes
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Lusaka a number of high ranking Soviet offi-
cers had,taken control of ZPRA strategy.
Prime Minister Ian Smith was apparently influen-
ced by the strong stand taken by his security chiefs and
rejected Ivor Richards' final proposals on 24
January 1977, which effectively ended the Kissinger
initiative. The British envoy had already given an
indication of future trends the previous day by
ruling out British recognition of any internal set-
tlement - even one elected by means of a landslide
victory. Both Nkomo and Mugabe had also made it
clear that they were no longer interested in the
proposals made by Richards and the latter had no
choice but to end his mission. In the meantime,
across the Atlantic, the rise to power of President
Jimmy Carter and that of his United Nations repre-
sentative, Andrew Young, indicated a significant
shift in American foreign policy concerning the sur-
viving white regimes in Black Africa.
Within Rhodesia the bush war had reached a new
intensity with the massacre of Roman Catholic mis-
sionaries on 6 February at St Paul's mission,
Musami. The onslaught against the morale of the
whites was about to be intensified to an unpreceden-
ted level bringing the war closer to the urban white
communities than at any time before.
For the first time since the start of the war,
cracks seemed to appear in the cohesion of the Rho-
desian Front Party as a result of the intensifying
war. During February Minister of Defence Reginald
Cowper resigned,ostensibly as a result of the con-
troversy surrounding new call-up measures. The tight
rein kept on the running of the war by the Prime
Minister, sometimes to the exclusion of his Minister
of Defence, later proved to be the real reason for
Cowper's resignation. Further dissension occurred
when Prime Minister Smith forced through the Land
Tenure Amendment Bill during March, whereby white
agricultural land was opened for purchase by all
races. A group of twelve dissident Rhodesian Front
members opposed the Bill and Smith had to rely on the
votes of six African Members of Parliament to have it
passed. Predictably this led to a cabinet reshuffle
on 10 March.
By late March 1977 the Rhodesian government
admitted that the insurgency had developed into a
full scale revolutionary onslaught. This was confir-
med by the formation of Combined Operations Head-
quarters (COMOPS) and the announcement on 23 March
that the senior army officer at each Joint Opera-
tions Centre (JOC) would assume command of counter-
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insurgency operations in his designated area.
Against a background of strenuous efforts to tighten
the call-up system, the announcement was made that
the death toll in the four year campaign had passed
the four thousand mark and stood at 4 044. Of these,
79 were white civilians, 1 394 black civilians, 292
Security Force members and 2 279 insurgent fatali-
ties (inside Rhodesia only) . By 6 April official
estimates totalled some 2 500 insurgents operating
inside Rhodesia with 520 in Operation Hurricane,
1 000 in Thrasher, 650 in Repulse and 220 in Tan-
gent. The latter operational area encompassed the
south-western and much of the western area of Rho-
desia. It was officially proclaimed during August
1977, to counter ZPRA infiltration from Botswana.
The Protected Village programme was gradually
extended along the eastern border with Mozambique.
Meanwhile, in a nationwide address on 3 April the
new commander COMOPS , Lieutenant-General Peter Walls
announced the start of a fresh 'hearts and minds'
campaign among the black population. Although a
small number of territorial officers had been enga-
ged in promoting both civil action and psychological
action, very little success could be claimed within
the ranks of either regular or territorial members.
Their efforts, however, were formalized in the crea-
tion of 1 Psychological Operations Unit on 1 July
1977. In general, however, psychological operations
executed in Rhodesia proved a failure. They were
aimed at convincing the blacks to support the white
regime instead of attempting to change white racial
views as a prelude to any such support. That Rhodesia
entirely lacked any grasp of the dynamics of the
revolutionary threat facing her is nowhere more per-
fectly evidenced than by the statement of the then
Minister of Information P. K. van der Byl in which he,
in hindsight, said
I wanted to step up the use of the bayonet
that's the most effective propaganda - the
bayonet . (28)
Van der Byl was, as Minister of Information, in con-
trol of the majority of psychological operations.
In the meanwhile the roving Owen-Young settle-
ment initiative had been gaining momentum. Despite
some alarmingly naive political views, Ambassador
Andrew Young did, however, see that: 'if you want to
stop the fighting you have to talk to the people
with the guns .'(30)
Both Young and British Foreign Secretary Dr
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David Owen had toured the Frontline states to gain
impressions and to gather support for their propo-
sals. Dr Owen arrived in Harare on 15 April to pre-
pare for the Anglo-American consultative team which
was to arrive on 26 May. These talks soon ran into
difficulties. As the year progressed it became appa-
rent that neither Ian Smith nor the Patriotic Front
was interested in what could be offered. Smith
favoured an internal settlement with moderate black
nationalist leaders. To this end the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole was allowed to return to Rhodesia
on 10 July. This followed talks with Rhodesian
Government officials in Malawi regarding a coalition
between himself and Bishop Muzorewa.
It seemed that Prime Minister Smith had at last
become convinced of the necessity for a political
settlement, although with defunct black nationalist
figures. By now the Reverend Sithole had lost all
effective control over both ZANU and ZANLA, as well
as any backing he might have had from members of the
Frontline states. Following both Organisation of
Africa Unity and Frontline endorsement of the
Patriotic Front and its leadership, Bishop Muzorewa
had also been left without any external support. The
white general election fought in Rhodesia on 31
August was also aimed at obtaining a mandate for a
possible internal settlement, as well as crushing
the right wing Rhodesian Action Party.
In a White Paper dated 1 September 1977, the
British government published Anglo-American propo-
sals for a Rhodesian settlement. Field Marshal Lord
Carver was nominated as resident commissioner desig-
nate for the transition period. Prime Minister
Smith's response was characteristic:'We have had
crazy proposals before and managed to shrug them off
and go on.
1 (31 )
Yet the proposed internal settlement was
delayed in view of the new proposals. At the same
time a third prominent black nationalist leader
returned to Rhodesia, the veteran James Chikerema.
He subsequently became Vice-president of Bishop
Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC).
In an effort both to divide the Patriotic Front and
to obtain the concurrence of 'the men with the guns'
a highly secretive approach by Smith to Nkomo failed
during October.
During this time Lord Carver and the United
Nations appointee, General Prem Chand, had run into
distinct difficulties on their tour of Southern Africa.
Finally disillusioned with the Anglo-American propo-
sals, Prime Minister Smith announced on 26 November
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that he accepted majority rule as a preliminary to
beginning internal settlement negotiation. Thus
ended the last attempt at a negotiated international
settlement before the Lancaster House deliberations.
Inevitably, the war for Rhodesia had forced
Smith's hand in the intervening months. By the mid-
dle of 1977 it had spread across the entire country.
Although large scale external operations into Zambia
only began during 1978, Smith had, to President
Kaunda's extreme chagrin, used the 'good offices' of
the British government to warn Zambia, some months
earlier, that pre-emptive strikes could be laun-
ched against insurgent bases in his country. The
Zambian leader promptly responded on 16 May 1977, by
placing his country on a war footing. Tension along
the common Rhodesian-Zambian border rose dramati-
cally, as was also the case along Rhodesia's eastern
border. In the case of Mozambique, external opera-
tions had now come to be accepted as a primary ele-
ment in Security Force strategy. As with the Mapai
and Tembue raids on 24 and 25 November the main jus-
tification from a military point of view was the
elimination of the potential threat before the start
of the annual summer rains. In the case of both
countries, the initially spectacular results obtai-
ned from external operations did not last indefi-
nitely. After the first Chimoio raid into Mozambique
(1976), and as from late 1978 in Zambia, insurgent
forces were quick to adapt their base camp strategy
to counter the methods used by Rhodesian Army and
Air Force elements during these raids.
Internally, sporadic insurgent activity surfa-
ced around the central plateau towns of Que Que,
Gweru and Shangani, and even the major urban centres
of Harare and Bulawayo no longer seemed entirely
safe. Facing the grim prospect of urban terrorism,
precautionary measures became a way of life. New
operational areas flourished. The great tourist
attraction and holiday resort of Lake Kariba was
designated Operation Splinter, for ZPRA infiltration
across the lake in rubber dingies had become too
widespread to ignore. During August the central pro-
vince of Midlands officially became Operation Grap-
ple, bearing silent witness to the spread of insur-
gency across the country. Largely as an administra-
tive and logistic unit, the urban area surrounding
Harare was designated Salops (Salisbury Operations).
In rural areas the local administration was fast
approaching almost total collapse. Insurgent forces
had launched a concerted campaign to close all
schools, hospitals, clinics, and in fact all local
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representation or symbols of government authority.
By July some 300 schools, mostly in Operation Hurri-
cane, had already been forced to close, leaving more
than 40 000 children without schools. The most deva-
stating success by ZANLA unsurgents was a bomb
explosion at a Woolworth store in Harare on 7 August
1977. Eleven people were killed and more than 70
injured. Although nearly all casualties were black,
the war had become a sudden reality to people in the
cities. As a barometer of white morale, white emigra-
tion during August exceeded immigration by 1 006.
By November 1977, insurgent strengths within
the various operational areas were as follows:
Operation Hurricane 904
Operation Thrasher 1 500
Operation Repulse 1 650
Operation Tangent 932
Operation Grapple 180
Salops 50
Total Insurgents 5 216
With the onset of the annual summer rainy season,
monthly incidents had risen from 479 (October), to
540 (November) to 642 (December) and 763 (January
1978). During February 1978 the monthly tally fell
to 579 and stabilized at well over 500 incidents per
month. While the total number of trained insurgents
both inside and outside Rhodesia had almost trebled
between early 1976 and late 1977, internal insurgent
casualties for 1976 were 1 244 killed and 160 cap-
tured against 1 770 killed and 219 captured for
1977. Purely statistically, the security situation
was deteriorating with each passing month. The most
critical Security Force commodity was manpower and
that seemed dangerously limited. The major source of
manpower remained the mobilisation of reserves. The
call-up eventually encompassed all able-bodied white
men between 18 and 60 years of age. All white youths
between 18 and 25 were liable for conscription which
increased from 12 to 18 months. Eventually the eight
battalions of the Rhodesia Regiment with a strength
on paper of 15 000 provided the backbone of the Ter-
ritorial Army. Its counterpart in the British South
Africa Police, the Police Reserve, became a reposi-
tory for less able and older men.
In April 1977 conscription was extended to the
38 to 50 age group and exemptions were severely
reduced. The maximum call-up for those under 38 was
increased to 190 days a year: those older than 50
were asked to volunteer for police duties. In
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September of the same year a short service scheme
was introduced whereby the government encouraged
national servicemen to stay on for another year by
offering a Rh$ 100 a month bonus. But even such
inducements could not solve the problem of a dwind-
ling white reservoir of manpower and an ever increa-
sing enemy.
The year 1977 ended in a spectacular way for the
insurgent forces with a bold although unsuccessful
attack on Grand Reef Air Base near Mutare on 18
December.
1.9 The Internal Settlement
Meanwhile internal settlement talks had duly begun
on 9 December 1977, against a background succinctly
described in the Financial Times:
Yet a combination of factors now makes an
internal settlement appear more possible than
at any time in the past ... perhaps most impor-
tant of all, the four parties engaged in the
discussions fear that if they fail, they will
become increasingly irrelevant to the out-
come. (32)
The internal talks in Harare resumed on 3 January
1978, after a Christmas recess and the Patriotic
Front sought desperately to thwart the momentum that
seemed to be building up from Prime Minister Smith's
projected settlement with moderate black leaders.
Talks ensued in Malta with both British and American
representatives, while the threat of losing the
international initiative led to attempts by both
Nkomo and Mugabe to solidify their two factions
within a single political and military structure. As
before, however, politics, personalities, tribalism
and ambition precluded any really integrated struc-
ture.
On 15 February Harare announced that an eight
point agreement had been reached as a basis for a
majority rule government. This was followed by fur-
ther discussions concerning the composition of the
future defence force and the structure of the con-
stitutional government. Against the background of
British scepticism, American comdemnation and
Patriotic Front rejection, Ian Smith, Bishop Abel
Muzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Cheri-
miah Chirau signed on 3 March 1978, what was to
become known as the Internal Settlement Agreement.
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White minority rule effectively came to an end in
Rhodesia with a Transitional Government ruling the
country until majority rule was instituted on 31
December 1978. In the interim an Executive Council
consisting of the four signatories governed the
country with black/white parity in the Ministerial
Council. Although the internal leaders had left the
door to negotiations with the Patriotic Front ajar,
it was evident that a final effort was under way
towards a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.
The Agreement of 3 March was based on two pri-
mary objectives: the first was the achievement of
international recognition; the second an end to the
war. Recognition was to be achieved by presenting the
outside world with the results from a free and fair
election which bore witness to the support these three
black parties had amongst the black population.
On the one hand an end to the war flowed from
the internal political initiative, and on the other
from the support Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend
Sithole claimed to have within the ranks of the
insurgents. The two aims were closely linked. When
the one failed to materialize so did the other.
In an attempt to benefit at an early stage from
the momentum of the settlement talks, the first full
scale safe return programme, including an amnesty
offer, was announced by Harare on 20 January to be
repeated on 2 May. Both proved futile gestures.
Intelligence reports indicated that the achievement
of majority rule under an internal settlement could
lead to possibly hundreds of insurgents making use
of the amnesty offer. It soon became apparent that
conclusive proof would first have to be given that
the agreement was to achieve international recogni-
tion and the lifting of sanctions. Any such
offer of leniency had of necessity to be made from a
position of strength and at a time that insurgent
defeat seemed only a matter of time. This was hardly
the case within Rhodesia at the time. During
February, when the eight point plan agreement was
announced, insurgent strengths were as follows:
Operation
Operation
Operation
Operation
Operation
Salops
Total
Hurricane
Thrasher
Repulse
Tangent
Grapple
ZANLA
1
1
4
710
920
610
240
140
25
645
ZPRA
110
-
10
570
238
25
953
TOTAL
1
1
5
820
920
620
810
378
50
598
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By March, the total stood at 6 456. At the same time
black nationalists, who had now obtained both execu-
tive and Cabinet status, realized that having linked
their fortunes to that of their former enemies, the
forces of their external nationalist 'allies' would
at least have to be held at bay until the political
initiative overtook events. To this end external
operations against Botswana and Zambia were stepped
up, and it almost seemed that the new black/white
government in Harare was set to fight an even more
ruthless war than had the previous all-white regime.
Nevertheless, reports indicated that ZAPU recruit-
ment in western Matabeleland was continuing unaba-
ted, with more than 10 000 recruits airlifted from
Botswana to Zambia. The abduction of 420 black chil-
dren from the Methodist School at Tegwani once
again provided substantiating evidence to this
effect. By June, Prime Minister Smith was publicly
expressing his disappointment over the results
achieved by the Internal Settlement, and appealed to
Britain for recognition.
Despite the repeated demands of the internal
black leaders, very little was done for five crucial
months towards the removal of discriminatory measu-
res, owing to Rhodesian Front resistance. Much of
the international momentum gained towards recogni-
tion of events in Harare was thus lost. Only on 10
October was an announcement made, envisaging an end
to racial discrimination in schools, hospitals and
residential areas. In the first of yet another
series of shocks to white morale, twelve missiona-
ries were massacred by ZANLA insurgents at the Elim
Pentecostal Mission on 3 June. In what seemed part
of a concerted campaign, officials from Bishop
Muzorewa's United Africa National Council attemp-
ting to explain the internal agreement to the rural
black population were also killed. In the period
January to June alone, some 20 000 black Rhodesians
fled into Botswana, while figures released during
September indicated that 4 664 insurgents had been
killed since the start of the war in December 1972.
Nearly 550 members of the Security Forces had also
lost their lives during the same period. On 4 Sep-
tember white morale received its second shock when
it was reported that an Air Rhodesia Viscount had
been shot down by a SA-7 ground-to-air missile and
that ten of the eighteen survivors had subsequently
been massacred by ZPRA insurgents.
This incident had two direct results. On 12 Sep-
tember it was announced that martial law was to be
introduced. People in the affected areas had hence-
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forth to comply with and obey all regulations,
orders and instructions issued by officers of
government and the Security Forces. Special military
courts-martial were empowered to impose any sentence,
including capital punishment, on any person who com-
mitted an act relating to what was simply described
as 'terrorism
1 within the martial law areas. This
also applied to those who impeded the suppression
of insurgency or the maintenance of law, order and
public safety.
Executive officers of the Government, the mili-
tary forces and other security forces of the
Government and its other servants employed to
assist the Government are hereby vested with
full and complete powers and authority to do
all things in their judgement proper and neces-
sary. (33)
By early November almost a half of Rhodesia had been
placed under martial law. Three weeks later this had
been extended to roughly 70% of the country. By Sep-
tember 1979, 90% of the country was under this law.
Although Security Forces were accorded wide
discretionary powers by the institution of martial
law, the Rhodesian armed forces were no longer able
to enforce compliance. Having delayed the institu-
tion of martial law, the security situation had been
allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that the
available manpower was totally inadequate to cope
with the threat.
The second, and potentially the most serious
result of the Viscount massacre, was that resentment
amongst the white population forced Prime Minister
Ian Smith to halt all talks with Joshua Nkomo, lea-
der of ZAPU, at a time that these had seemed on the
verge of success. An agreement with Nkomo at this
critical stage could possibly have tilted the
balance of international recognition in favour of
the Transitional Government. The massacre had occur-
red the day after Smith and Nkomo admitted they had
met in secret.
Internally, the momentum gained from the inter-
nal settlement seemed to be slipping away slowly as
an increasing number of reports told of a general
black apathy towards the Transitional Government. A
scheme to open Protected Villages soon ran into dif-
ficulties as it became evident that this only served
to further loosen the precarious grip the government
had on the rural populace. The latter, in fact, bore
silent witness to the general failure of the
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Protected Village programme. Standards of living
among the local population had declined instead of
rising while they were concentrated in these villa-
ges, resulting in a general belief that life outside
the Protected Village was better. The reverse was
the only guarantee for the success of the Protected
Village scheme as a whole. The inability of the new
government to abide by the 31 December target for
the achievement of majority rule seemed further to
underline the relatively leisurely pace at which
Rhodesia's leaders were seeking an internationally
recognised settlement. On 29 October an official
announcement was made setting a new timetable for
achieving majority rule. Black elections were now
scheduled for April 1979. According to Ian Smith the
delay was entirely due to 'mechanical problems'. But
1978 had seen one promising development, that of the
Security Force Auxiliaries. Although not in accord
with the initial idea, the Auxiliary scheme encom-
passed the formation of private political forces
loyal to Bishop Muzerewa and the Reverend Sithole
respectively. When Special Branch initiated the
scheme the idea was to provide villages with their
own local militia for protection. After a pilot
scheme started in Msana Tribal Trust Lands early in
1978 proved highly successful the scheme was expan-
ded. By the end of that year the Security Force
Auxiliaries numbered over 2 000 men.
Although some serious mistakes were made during
the execution of the Security Force Auxiliary scheme,
this represented the first broad attempt by the
authorities to regain and consolidate their hold on
the Tribal Trust Lands. This vital element of provi-
ding permanent and participatory protection at local
level had always been lacking in Security Force
strategy. Numerous 'search and destroy' operations
were conducted, but a 'clear and hold '-type opera-
tion had never been introduced in a satisfactory
manner. In the months preceding the April 1979 elec-
tions, every possible effort was made to field,
recruit, train and deploy as many Security Force
Auxiliaries as possible. Their success was validated
in no uncertain terms by the April 1979 election
results.
Those insurgents considering support for the
internal settlement were encouraged to join the
Security Forces. To facilitate this, an intensive
propaganda campaign was launched to present these
forces as consisting of ex-insurgents that had deci-
ded to support the Transitional Government. While
this was initially the case to a certain extent, the
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majority of Auxiliary members were recruited by the
political parties themselves.
Following the Viscount massacre any agreement
with ZAPU was now ruled out and amidst increased
reports of an alarming build-up of ZPRA forces within
Zambia as from 21 October. Rhodesian armed forces
launched their deepest air raid yet on insurgent
bases at Chikunbi, Mkushi, Old Mkushi and Mborama.
The reasons for these operations before the summer
rains lay in the extension of martial law announced
on 31 October to include most of Matabeleland, the
traditional ZAPU power base. These areas were being
infiltrated on an increased scale from the bases
mentioned above.
White morale was obviously declining rapidly.
During December white emigration recorded a nett
loss of 2 771 emigrants, while the total loss for
1978 stood at 13 709. On 11 December ZANLA insur-
gents attacked the central oil storage depot in the
heart of Harare's industrial site. The resulting
fire lasted six days and destroyed tens of million
litres of precious fuel. Harare was aghast. Guaran-
tees as to white pensions, property, jobs and the
like that Prime Minister Smith had extracted from
his three black co-leaders and detailed within the
proposed constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia seemed
of little consequence to a white population having
to fight an increasingly desperate war.
A concise statement of the eminently successful
insurgent strategy that had been followed during
1978 reads as follows:
The PF strategy is to undermine government con-
trol over the population in three ways. First
is disruption of internal administration and
governmental services ... The second ... is
complete intimidation of the populace. One
objective is to break down the traditional
authority, with its implied replacement, ulti-
mately by some new form of social organisation.
The other objective is to demonstrate govern-
ment inability to provide security ... The
'third part of PF strategy is to render the
entire counterinsurgency effort of the govern-
ment cost ineffective.(34)
The year 1979 held little hope for the whites in
Rhodesia. Black conscription produced a poor 300
recruits out of 1 544 drafted. Call-ups for whites
were extended to all men aged between 50 and 59,
each of whom had to serve 42 days of the year, while
49History of War
History of
government announced ^at it was examining^wa^ ^
tightening deferment and exempt F fc Qf yiew only promising news from the se * Auxiliaries
was the success that the Securi y ^ Manyeni
were having in
 M"
na'
C^
nSruary a second Air Rho
Tribal Trust Lands . On l£ ** * gA_7 missile desia Viscount was brought down y ^ board>
resulting in the_death of all F *8 to January
in the short period from Decem had risen
1979 insurgent numbers msa.de Kno %) _ Jrom 8 954 to 11 1J3 an x ncr ease Jf ^ ^
indicated .below, the whole o± * insurgent
divided into °P
era^°^Lr
rhad the highest density
forces. Operation Thrasher haa u5)
of insurgents at *J" ***
9vis-a-vis the newly publi-
shed cons^ion^af wfll-^iTHed by Martin
Meredith:
The welfare of the whit es wa, .Smiths cancan-
He did not perceive <*
 fche tim black
the internal se ttlement P^f f^urable enough leaders needed to win term biack popu_ for them to be *ble to conv ™f was taking lation that a real transf er °£ P Instead he place which merited their supp & ^ Q^_
^rone-vote^it'wasthe turn of the nationa-
lists to make concessions. (35)
This was
seats^
=5
dhfd Scur^fa aeto for white power for
3 ^Sifst^hfbackground of a
attack
gon the ZPRA training base
the Security ^rce apparatu « J had witnes-
gest build-up
 ofD
f°"^1c Front threats to disrupt
sed. To counter Patriotic^ rron duled for Aprii, the elections tnat nau ^^ "^ :ged to unprecedented Security Force number s w ere r in fche six years levels, in fact for the £ir whifce populatlon of war, at least in terms or regulars and
Rhodesia was mobilized Leave r ts was can- civilians with Security Force co 6() Q00 Curfews were extended . oy ^ March
Personnel were in th e ^
do£fer was once
S March provided
\
,•* GWANDA ~* \tec-Jan
S\^ ^^. — ^^
\ Dec-Jan 5,0-50 ""^ SECTOR 2 \
1 340-230 ^ ""- -*Dec-Jan
, ^^^SECTOR 3 A624_11
""-- SECTOR 4 ^^%^;
Jf^4 \ /
( Dec-Jan ^b4-l<; 4 ^ /
*^v 340-230 \ J>
ZPRA
ZANLA
TOTAL
TOTAL
DEC
1 696
7 256
8 952
TOTAL
JAN
1 906
9 277
11 183
INCREASE
210
2 021
2 231
Figure 1.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers:
Dec. 1978 to Jan. 1979
51
50History of War History of War
a rare public example of the personality clashes
that were so prevalent within the ranks of the
senior Security Force commanders. The Commander of
the Army, Lieutenant-General Hickman was dismissed
for 'disciplinary
1 reasons. Ostensibly this was as
the result of a clash between General Hickman and
Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, the commander of the
Selous Scouts. In fact, however, the reasons were
rooted more deeply than the bugging of the colonel's
telephone as part of investigations on an alleged
charge of game poaching. This kind of clash was
quite common among senior Army commanders as well
as amongst Internal Affairs, Special Branch and Bri-
tish South African Police officials. This bickering
hampered the smooth functioning of the defence appa-
ratus as a whole.
Prior to the elections, Rhodesian forces laun-
ched a daring Land Rover raid into Lusaka on 13
April. Although Nkomo was not killed in the attack
on his home, the operation was a definite blow to
both ZPRA and Zambia. At the same time the Kasangula
Ferry, the only link between Botswana and Zambia, was
sunk in the most audacious raid yet into Botswana.
Then, during the first days of April, having delayed
the announcement for as long as possible for secu-
rity reasons, Harare announced that polling would
begin on 17 April. Although Patriotic Front forces
attacked 18 of the 932 polling stations, none was
closed.
When the final results of the election were
announced on 24 April Bishop Muzorewa's United Afri-
can National Council had taken 67% of the total
vote, the Reverend Sithole's ZANU 16,5% and Chief
Chirau's ZUPO, 6%. An astounding 64,45% of the
voting population had cast their votes. (35) Inter-
national recognition seemed only a hairsbreath away.
Insurgent casualties internally had shot up from 208
during February 1979, to 423 for March and nearly
reaching 650 during April. Intelligence reports
indicated that the massive electoral support obtai-
ned by Bishop Muzorewa had led to literally hundreds
of insurgcntc v.'aiting for an indication of interna-
tional recognition before making use of the amnesty
offer. Yet the momentum that had been restored to
the floundering internal solution slowed down almost
immediately. With nearly all available white man-
power mobilized, the Rhodesian economy was approach-
ing stagnation. The result was that demobilization
of forces commenced very soon after the elections.
The intense pressure that had been brought to bear
on insurgent forces eased, and as it did, so did the
incentive to make use of any amnesty offer. The
Security Forces were, however, themselves totally
misled by the election results. Instead of realizing
that essentially the black people had voted for
peace, a classified Army briefing document simplis-
tically stated:
Subversion. The high election poll (63,9%)
indicates that the terrorists have not subver-
ted the African population to the degree some-
times believed. As 65% of the African popula-
tion live in the rural areas, and 60% of the
total vote came from rural areas, the indica-
tion is that only 5% of adults in the rural
areas support, or are totally dominated by the
terrorists. Most of their support in rural
areas seems to come from irresponsible youths
(Mujibas).
The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, astounded by the
lack of support for his party, condemned the elec- -
tion as a fraud and refused to participate in the
government. Prior to the elections, Special Branch
had predicted the number of seats he would win with
amazing precision. Convinced, however, of his own
prowess and stature as nationalist leader, Reverend
Sithole had rejected these alarming findings. The
Reverend saw himself as the natural alternative to
the rather inept and bumbling Bishop, but in reality
he had lost all control over both ZANU and ZANLA.
His sole support was amongst that of his own tribe,
the Ndau, along the eastern border.
In reaction to the election results, the lea-
ders of the two most committed Frontline countries,
Presidents Kaunda and Machel met in Maputo to dis-
cuss the fragile unity of the Patriotic Front. Lit-
tle resulted, although the two Patriotic Front co-
leaders did announce in Addis Ababa during May the
formation of a single constitution and joint command
for military operations.
Once political initiative had started to ebb,
the weight of the 2 500 to 3 000 ZPRA and 10 000 to
ii uuu ZANLA insurgents inside the country again
began to take its toll. To counter this, COMOPS
stepped up the frequency of external operations.
Raids into the heart of Lusaka and deep into Mozam-
bique appeared to become an almost weekly occurrence.
While the election of President Carter had
announced a US foreign policy severely hostile to
the Smith regime, the election of Mrs Margaret
Thatcher as British Prime Minister on 3 May, seemed
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to indicate a less hostile British policy. The
choice, however, of Lord Carrington as Foreign
Secretary instead of Francis Pyra was the first sign
that a Conservative Government of Britain might not
necessarily be sympathetic to Rhodesia. Further
indication of this was received during the Common-
wealth Heads of State Conference held in Lusaka
during August. It soon became apparent that Conser-
vative government policy regarding the government of
National Unity in Rhodesia was based on expediency
rather than principle. Yet the release of the Boyd
and Drinkwater reports on the Rhodesian elections
encouraged optimism as to the chances of British
recognition. Meanwhile, at one minute past midnight
on 1 June, the Republic of Rhodesia ceased to exist
as the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution came into
effect, to last a total of 195 days.
Other internal developments were also having
their own effects. Disciplinary problems within
Security Force Auxiliaries loyal to the Reverend
Sithole led to Security Forces killing 183 Auxilia-
ries in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land during June. Within
the ruling United African National Council (UANC)
Prime Minister Muzorewa had also run into difficul-
ties. During July James Chikerema and 7 UANC Members
of Parliament broke away to form the Zimbabwe Demo-
cratic Party (ZDP) as a Zezuru tribal grouping. This
effectively stripped the UANC of Parliamentry con-
trol, reducing its share of the total 100 seats to
44. Prime Minister Muzorewa was once again dependent
on the 28 white Members of Parliament as the second
largest voting block. The Reverend Sithole had occu-
pied his 12 seats after his Security Force Auxilia-
ries power base had been shut down by a UANC govern-
ment. By favouring his own Manyika tribe in the com-
position of the Cabinet, Bishop Muzorewa further
hastened the loss of united political and local sup-
port.
The security situation in the post election
period had deteriorated. During July 1979 the deploy-
ment figures for Security Forces were roughly as follows:
33 Infantry companies deployed
(8 companies each in Hurricane,
Repulse and Tangent, 7 in Thrasher
and 2 in Grapple)
3 Rhodesian Light Infantry
commando's as reaction force
2 squadrons Grey Scouts
Special Air Service
Selous Scouts
3 300
240
80
250
420
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Security Force Auxiliaries
Guard Force
Internal Affairs
Defence Units
British South Africa Police
British South Africa Police
Reservists
8 000
7 000
5 000
6 900
9 000
30 000
Note: The figures indicate actual deployment and not
total strength of unit(s).
The total number of officially recorded monthly
incidents had increased from an average of under 600
in late 1979 to 935 during March 1979. By April this
figure increased to 1 110, and totalled 1 706 for
May. The majority of these incidents consisted of
reported cases of intimidation and contacts between
Security Forces and the insurgents. The latter,
especially in the case of ZANLA, were exacting a
terrible revenge for the local support given to
Bishop Muzorewa. By September 1979 the UANC popular
base had vanished.
1.10 Lancaster House
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had by
now decided on a last attempt at resolving the Rho-
desian problem. Not very confident of success, his
approach differed in one important aspect from pre-
vious British initiatives. He was prepared to reas-
sert Britain's responsibility for devising a solu-
tion, including active British participation in the
process. The basis of the Tory solution was agreed
upon through discussions among Britain, Zambia,
Tanzania, Nigeria, Jamaica and Australia during the
Commonwealth conference in August. Instead of prima-
rily talking to the Patriotic Front as was the case
with the Owen-Young initiative, the proposals first
were directed at Mozambique and Zambia as the coun-
tries serving as hosts to the insurgents. Both coun-
tries were economically desperate for an end to a
war that was threatening to engulf them. With inter-
nal dissension rife in Mozambique, President Machel
was in particularly dire straits.
Thus the first Rhodesian constitutional confe-
rence on British home soil opened on 10 September
1979. As if to underline the Zambian need for a set-
tlement, Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces bombed three
bridges on the Beira-Moatize railway line in Mozam-
bique and blew up the Chambeshi railway bridge in
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northern Zambia. Both Zambia's eastern outlets to
the Indian Ocean had thus been severed. The Benguela
railway line through the west was also closed by UNITA
insurgents operating in Angola, with the result that Zambia was
virtually strangled. To forestall any possible con-
ventional ZPRA attack from Zambia, four bridges on
the Lusaka-Chirundu and Lusaka-Victoria Falls were
also destroyed. In effect Zambia was denied the use
of road or rail to move their imports or exports.
Even the Kasangula ferry had been sunk the previous
year. Zambia was now almost totally dependant for
all her imports and exports on the remaining link
through the south.
By a shrewd combination of brinkmanship and
diplomacy, Lord Carrington forced through his set-
tlement plan. With the majority of his forces still
based in Zambia, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo ordered
his ZPRA forces to infiltrate Rhodesia in an effort
to consolidate his internal power base to the extent
that had already been achieved by the ZANLA forces
of Robert Mugabe. COMOPS still pursued a forward
defence posture as regards Zambia. Special Air Ser-
vice, Selous Scouts and Rhodesian Light Infantry
forces were pushed across the Zambezi river with the
aim of halting all movement southwards from Lusaka.
Some success was achieved but British pressure
brought to bear on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian delegation
at Lancaster House forced the withdrawal of these
forces from Zambian soil. With the vast majority of
his forces already committed, Mugabe and ZANLA were
potentially in a much stronger position than Nkomo.
Although the negotiated ceasefire called
for the movement of all insurgents inside Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia to 16 selected assembly points and a stop
to all cross-border movement, neither ZANLA nor ZPRA
were to pay much more than lip service to the latter.
Against the background of continual external raids
by Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces, Lord Carring-
ton, in a desperate gamble, sent British appointed
governor Lord Soames to Harare on 11 December. His
appointment and despatch to Harare were directed
more towards supplying momentum to the stop-start
talks at Lancaster House than at the exercise of any
real authority, for on 15 December Mugabe had walked
out. Pressure mainly brought to bear by Mozambique
forced him to return to the negotiating table. Thus,
at midnight, 21 December, all cross-border movement
was to stop and efforts were initiated towards
informing all insurgents of the ceasefire arrange-
ments. A Commonwealth monitoring force under command
of General John Acland was to supervise the movement
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of all Patriotic Front insurgents to 16 Assembly
Points and then keep them there. Only 1 300 men
strong, by 6 January 1980 the force had assembled
15 730 insurgents. Within days this number swelled
to about 22 000, Of these about 16 500 were ZANLA
and the remainder ZPRA. Several thousand distrustful
insurgents chose, however, to remain outside the
Assembly Points and sent mujiba's instead. Officially
this marked the end of the war, yet the poli-
tical war was only finalized with the announcement
during April 1980 that ZANU, now known as ZANU(PF),
had against all predictions had an overwhelming vic-
tory of 63% of the national vote; Mugabe's party was
thus entitled to 57 of the 80 black seats in Parlia-
ment. Voting was clearly divided between the Shona
and Matabele groupings, with Nkomo receiving the
overwhelming vote in the latter areas. (37) On 18
April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent with Robert
Mugabe as its premier.
The war that had been fought so tenaciously by
the whites in Rhodesia for almost 15 years ended
with their worst fears being realized. Robert Gabriel
Mugabe, a self-avowed Marxist, was undisputably the
next Prime Minister. The Rhodesian Front was reduced
from a position of strength to one of impoverishment
and impotence in which they no longer had the power
to effect a compromise. Ian Smith and his inflexible
colleagues had been entirely circumvented in a revo-
lutionary struggle of classic proportions fought on
a total frontage. It could be proudly asserted that
Rhodesia had never lost a single battle but had most
ignominously lost the war.
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COMMAND AND CONTROL
2.1 The Rhodesian Security Force's approach to Com-
mand and Control
At the start of insurgency activities immediately
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
1965, the British South Africa Police quite correctly
insisted that the Army was in support of the Police
and not vice versa. The type of operation conducted
during this period tended, however, to emphasise
military rather than police actions. Since incur-
sions were conducted in large groups across rela-
tively uninhabited areas, counter-insurgency opera-
tions required tracking and pursuit operations that
seemed to fail more within the military domain than
within that of the Police. The attitude, particu-
larly amongst middle and lower ranking Rhodesian
Army officers, as well as that of the Department of
Internal Affairs (now Home Affairs), was not condu-
cive to an effective, total counter-insurgency
effort.
Within the Army more than fifty percent of
small-unit training was devoted to counter-insurgency
tactics such as patrolling, ambushes, cordon and
search and pursuit (follow-up) operations. All of these
represent an adaptation of conventional military doc-
trine to meet the threat of armed insurgency. While
the above tactics constitute a vital element of
counter-insurgency operations, both in eliminating
insurgent forces and in dominating an area, the
emphasis of Army operations have to change. Since
the majority of military forces become involved in
operations amongst the inhabitants of various
regions, and probably in population control measures,
they represent a further extension of administration,
thus assuming a partly policing rather than a strict-
ly military role. Obedience to both the spirit and
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the letter of the law is essential for the execution
of this role within a balanced counter-insurgency
campaign. Training and the total approach to coun-
ter-insurgency should be supportive rather than
punative. From their experience of the war up to
1972 white Rhodesians believed that the insurgency
problem was primarily a military threat. This per-
ception remained a hallmark of the Rhodesian approach
to counter-insurgency. Coupled with a sincere belief
that the unsophisticated black African was incapable
of choosing between alternative political systems,
Rhodesian Security Forces and in particular offi-
cials from the Department of Internal Affairs con-
tinued a paternalistic tradition irksome to an
increasing section of the black population.
The whole Rhodesian concept of counter-insur-
gency warfare suffered greatly as a result of the
pre-1972 phase of isolated terrorism and banditry.
This image was perpetuated in the command and con-
trol structures and mechanisms that were developed
to counter the insurgent threat of post 1972. They
were largely unsuited to meet the serious threat.
2.2 JOG's , JPS and Operation Hurricane
Before 1972 the Army had divided Rhodesia into three
temporary brigade areas. These corresponded with
Matabeleland, Mashonaland and Manicaland/victoria/
Harare Police Provinces respectively. The school of
Infantry at Gweru was responsible for the initial
planning and co-ordinating of operations in Midlands
Province. Were an insurgent threat to develop in any of
these areas, Joint Operations Centres were formed at
the appropriate level to counter the threat. This
could either be at company, battalion or even bri-
gade level of command. It consisted of the senior
Army British South Africa Police, Special Branch and
Air Force officers, and the appropriate Commissioner
of the Department of Internal Affairs.
According to the official Rhodesian Army defi-
nition, a Joint Operational Centre is:
A joint agency set up by the Security Forces on
the authority of Government'for the conduct of
operations when no single service is solely
responsible.(1)
Since the Army representative was normally the high-
est ranking officer, he assumed chairmanship of the
Joint Operational Centre at the start of operations.
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Discussions of counter-insurgency measures and plan-
ning of action were essentially done on a committee
basis. Execution remained strictly departmental.
Split decisions, or those possibly in conflict with
existing policy, were referred to higher authority
for decision. Lower Joint Operational Centres repor-
ted to one of the Provincial Joint Operation Centres
(PROVOPS), namely SALOPS (for Salisbury Operations),
MASHOPS (for Mashonaland), MANOPS (for Manicaland),
MIDOPS (for Midlands), MATOPS (for Matabeleland) or
VICOPS (for Victoria). PROVOPS roughly corresponded
to Army Brigade levels of command but were effec-
tively controlled by the Police. When operations
were not being conducted in the specific province,
they were usually dormant.
Within the Security Forces, co-ordination was
effected via Joint Planning Staffs (JPS) which con-
sisted of a small secretariat and the Operations Co-
ordination Committee (OCC). The latter was the
senior security planning council immediately below
political level. Its members included commanders of
the Army and Air Force, the Commissioner of Police
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Organi-
sation (CIO). (2) The secretariat to the Operation
Co-ordination Committee was supplied by the Joint
Planning Staffs and members usually met in person,
which lent it considerable weight. As a joint deci-
sion-making body, however, the Operation Co-ordina-
tion Committee had little authority. An impasse
could only be resolved at a higher (political) level.
The chairman of the Joint Planning Staffs was
also the secretary of the Operation Co-ordination
Committee. This appointment alternated between the
Army and Air Force. Initially the post carried the
rank of colonel, but was later upgraded to that of
brigadier.
At the political level the Deputy Minister in
the Department of the Prime Minister was responsible
for co-ordinating the civil side of the war and for
liaising with the military (i.e. Joint Planning
Staffs) on matters of mutual concern. This post was
initially held by Wickus de Kock, but on appointment
as Minister of Information in 1974, he was succeeded
by Ted Sutton-Pryce. The Deputy Minister was chair-
man of an increasing number of committees, the most
important of which were the following: Civil Execu-
tive to the Security Council (CESC); Roads; Air-
fields; Anti-Mine Measures; Psychological Warfare;
Protective Forces and Cordon Sanitaire. The Civil
Executive to the Security Council was the most
important of these, dealing with all matters relating
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to the protection of the civilian population in
general, but particularly with white farmers within
operational areas. It included responsibility for
civil/military co-ordination of Protected Villages.
(See Chapter 3)
The Prime Minister headed the Security Council
at cabinet level. Members included the Ministers of
Finance, Internal Affairs, Law and Order, Defence,
Information, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs,
Commanders of Army and Air Force, Commissioner of
Police and Director of the Central Intelligence
Organisation. Upon the formation of the Guard Force
its commander became a member of both the Security
Council and Operation Co-ordination Committee. In
1977 Combined Operations Headquarters (COMOPS)
replaced the Joint Planning Staffs and the name of
the Security Council was changed to that of War
Council. The newly appointed Commander COMOPS also
gained representation on the War Council.
The fact that senior officials were able to sit
on the Security Council, enjoying equal status with
their political superiors gave these officials
direct access to the Prime Minister. This allowed
Ian Smith to exert direct control over the war but
weakened the Operations Co-ordination Committee.
This lack of real authority rather than a controver-
sial call-up system led to the resignation of Minis-
ter of Defence Reginal Cowper in 1977.
As long as the Army commander was sufficiently
capable the Joint Operations Centre system at bri-
gade level (PROVOPS) worked effectively, but at
lower levels some friction developed. This was
mainly due to Police resentment of the senior role of
Army officers. Initially, Joint Operation Centres at
the lowest level included the local Army company
commander, an Air Force pilot or flight commander
and the local Police station commander. Normally
rank would determine that the Army representative
assumed chairmanship.
British South Africa Police and Army approaches
to the problem of insurgency, as well as law and
order in general, differed. As a result the Police
attempted to match the rank of the senior Army offi-
cer present to avoid Army domination. Thus district
policemen came to represent Police at these Joint
Operation Centres. It was soon found, however, that
this 'over and above' task was too time consuming.
British South Africa Police officers, whose sole
task was Joint Operation Centre liaison, were then
provided. The Police eventually fielded assistant
commissioners equavalent to the Army rank of
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colonel, but did not succeed in obtaining gene-
ral Joint Operation Centre control before
1977 when Army chairmanship was formalised. To pro-
tect their own interests, and in reaction to what
was seen to be Army domination of a Police problem
(at least initially), the British South Africa
Police representatives at some Joint Operation Cen-
tres insisted on referring decisions taken by the
Joint Operation Centres to Police headquarters for
ratification.
Permanent Air Force representation at the
various levels of the Joint Operation Centres also
replaced initial ad hoc representation by pilots.
Thus, by the time the Army took over the dominant
role in Operation Hurricane in 1973, the concept of
joint planning and co-ordinated execution had
already been established, if somewhat tentatively.
With the launching of Operation Hurricane in
1973, it became necessary to establish a permanent
Joint Operation Centre at brigade level. Two Brigade
Headquarters had shifted from Harare, first to Cen-
tenary and then to Bindura. The Joint Operation Cen-
tre (JOC) at brigade headquarters became JOC Hurri-
cane while the brigade commander retained the nomi-
nal function of MASHOPS chairman in Harare. As the
operational areas were established, PROVOPS was
superseded by brigade Joint Operation Centres and
fell into disuse by the end of the war.
By 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was divided into four
major operational areas, namely Hurricane, Thrasher,
Repulse, Tangent and Grapple (see Figure 1.3, Chap-
ter 1}. For a number of years the insurgent threat
was confined to Operation Hurricane (Two Brigade)
area, making it the most well known sector.
During 1972 the only Joint Operation Centre
existed within Two Brigade at Centenary (Rhodesian
Light Infantry). As a result the first birgade-level
Joint Operation Centre was also stationed there with
two sub-centres at Mount Darwin (Rhodesian Light In-
fantry) and Guruve, formerly Sipolilo (Rhodesian Af-
rican Rifles). At the end of 1973 the Rhodesia Afri-
can Rifles took over the sub-centre at Centenary, the
Rhodesia Light Infantry stayed at Mount Darwin and
the main Joint Operation Centre moved to Bindura. Sub-
Joint Operation Centres were also later formed at Mu-
toko, Chinhoyi (formerly Sinoia), Bindura, Karoi,
Guruve, Lomangundi and Marondera (formerly Marandellas).
The headquarters of Two Brigade later shifted to
Harare. The battalion responsible had its main headquar-
ters within the sub-centre while the rear battalion
headquarters remained at the units training base.
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Operation Thrasher (Three Brigade) was proclaimed
in February 1976 with headquarters at Mutare (for-
merly Umtali) and sub-centres at various stages at
Rusape, Nyanga (formerly Inyanga-) and Chipinge.
Operation Repulse (Four Brigade),was launched during
May, initially as 'One Brigade Tactical Headquarters,
Operation Repulse' with headquarters at Masvingo
(Fort Victoria). It was officially designated as
Four Brigade at the end of 1977. Repulse sub-centres
were at Masvingo, Chiredzi and briefly at Rutenga
and Beit Bridge. Their main responsibility was to
combat the threat in the South-east. Operation Tan-
gent (One Brigade) was formed in August 1977. Bri-
gade headquarters was at Bulawayo and sub-centres
were at Hurange (Wankie), Bulawayo, Gwanda and Gweru
(Gwelo). Operation Grapple was constituted concur-
rently with Tangent and covered the Midlands area.
Sub-Joint Operation Centre Gweru was subsequently
transferred to Grapple. Midlands was initially com-
manded by an Army colonel and when the latter was
transferred, by the officer commanding, School of
Infantry, Gweru.
The two final operational areas, SALOPS (for
Salisbury Operations) and Splinter differed from
those mentioned above: SALOPS was controlled by the
Police and formed mainly for logistical and
administrative reasons. Operation Splinter was a
maritime command to counter ZPRA infiltration across
Lake Kariba.
By 1978, however, ZANLA and ZPRA incursions across
the length and breadth of Rhodesia were threatening
to destroy the system of Joint Operation Centres.
In a secret document entitled 'Hurricane Strategy
1
prepared in June of that year, the following recom-
mendations were made inter alia:
With the spread of operations and the decreased
force levels the sub JOC system no longer works
efficiently. Commanders are not able effec-
tively to influence operations in their exten-
ded areas. The local control of operations in
certain areas is now a fact and has become the
responsibility of the OIC (Officer in Command)
and DC (District Commissioner) in that particu-
lar area ... JOC members are unanimous in
recommending that Hurricane aim at a District
JOC system for future command and control. Dis-
tricts should operate directly to Hurricane.
Above all, the preceding also bears silent witness
to the lack of central direction in the war.
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While the system of joint Planning Staffs had
worked well during more stable conditions, the
intensifying war demanded a more authoritarian
command structure with powers over all civilian
agencies involved in activities related to security.
2.3 War Council, COMOPS and NATJOC
•When the extent of insurgent penetration in the
North-east had become clear, Army Commanders realised
the need for a Director of Operations. Veterans of
the Rhodesian forces who had fought in Malaya were
familiar with the idea. Lacking an overall strategy
to combat the threat at national level Security
Forces badly needed somebody in a post powerful
and influential enough to direct their efforts.
This need was nowhere deemed more important than
in the lack of enforceable co-operation between
different government departments.
During the comparative peace of the sixties
the leisurely pace of co-ordination and discussion
at various ministerial levels aimed at achieving
a uniform approach to counter-insurgency had led
to a history of wavering and indecisive action.
Thus each ministry took a different view both of
the threat itself and any countermeasures to be
taken. A system of unempowered committees had
therefore led to slow and apathetic attitudes to a
problem in need of urgent and speedy decisions and
execution.
Since the Department of Internal Affairs had
resisted attempts in 1972 by the Army to step up
its force levels along the Rhodesian border of the
Tete province in Mozambique, much blame for the
situation that had developed was placed on Internal
Affairs. (3) Army commanders and Special Branch offi-
cers felt vindicated only months later when Opera-
tion Hurricane was launched. At a fairly early stage
the need was thus recognised for a strong, central
executive with power to enforce compliance from all
services related to security. To the Army this
became further apparent in their efforts to obtain
sufficient numbers of territorial soldiers on
call-up.
The calls for a 'supremo' became loud enough to
force Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, then Army Com-
mander, to draft a signal to all units towards
the end of 1973 forbidding the use of the word.(4)
Yet as the war intensified, these calls were repea-
ted from both inside the military as well as from
66
Command and Control
prominent Rhodesian Front politicians. The idea was
also mooted in a number of Joint Planning Staff pa-
pers. When put forward to Prime Minister Ian Smith
it was rejected on the grounds that he, as the Prime
Minister, was the "supremo
1 who would make policy
decisions and enforce compliance. The Operations Co-
ordination Committee could thus refer controversial
decisions to him if necessary.
This response was given at an early stage when
the need for a supreme commander was not as obvious
as it was to become at a later stage. Yet Smith
failed to appreciate the complexities of this type
of command. It was impossible to refer a large num-
ber of decisions to him in addition to his exacting
task as head of government. On the other hand, the
Rhodesian Prime Minister was reluctant to
delegate the running of the war to someone else who
could possibly become a challenge to his own autho-
rity. This had apparently already started to happen
with the appointment of P.K. van der Byl as Minister
of Defence during August 1974. He was subsequently
relieved of his defence portfolio in September 1976
after the execution of the Nyadzonia raid into Mozam-
bique. This operation had caused both Prime Minister Smith and
Prime Minister Vorster from South Africa some acute
embarrassment at the height of the Kissinger initia-
tive. To a number of politicians and senior govern-
ment officials there seemed a lack of suitable can-
didates for such an appointment, while the Prime
Minister was wary of the political ambitions of the
most likely candidate, Lieutenant-General Walls.
Eventually bowing to both military and Rhode-
sian Front pressure, Smith took a first step towards
better co-ordination of the Rhodesian war effort.
Having relieved Van der Byl of the Defence port-
folio, he approved Reginal Cowper as the new incum-
bent, while also announcing the formation of a War
Council in charge of defence matters on 9 September
1976. As discussed,this was largely limited to the
renaming of the existing Security Council.
The next step was taken some months later on 3
March 1977, when Roger Hawkins was appointed to the
newly created post of Minister of Combined Opera-
tions.
On 23 March 1977, Smith announced that, in
accordance with the recommendation of his security
chiefs, a unified command was to be formed to stream-
line the control of Security Forces in the field.
Accordingly it has now been decided to appoint
a Commander, Combined Operations, who will be
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responsible to the Minister of Combined Opera-
tions and will have the authority to exercise
command over all elements of the security for-
ces, as well as civil agencies directly invol-
ved in the prosecution of operations against
terrorists. This will be implemented with mini-
mal disruption of the command functions of
individual service headquarters. He will have
the assistance of a Deputy Commander, who will
be the executive officer responsible for the
control of a small Combined Operations Head-
quarters staff, all of whom will be drawn from
existing organisations. In order to complete
the chain of command under this system the
senior army officer at each joint operations
centre will assume command of counter-insur-
gency operations in his designated military
area.(5)
The authority, functions and intentions underlying
the formation of COMOPS are best illustrated by the
following quotations from an extensive article that
appeared in the Rhodesia Herald on 8 May 1977.
This means that again all problems affecting
the sub-JOC's and JOC's will flow to a single
source and not, as previously from the repre-
sentatives of the various components of the JOC
such as Army and Air Force, Police, Intelli-
gence and Internal Affairs having first to be
fed into their separate Ministerial channels ..
Included in the General's authority will be all
such matters as the allocation of force levels
to main JOC's and considerations of the changes
in force levels coming from them. Also, he will
have the direction and co-ordination of Special
Force Operations such as the Selous Scouts,
Grey's Scouts and PATU.(6)
The most important of these, central authority, was
never vested in COMOPS.
In terms of rank, Lieutenant-General Walls held
no superiority over his counterparts in the Army,
Air Force, Police and the Central Intelligence Orga-
nisation. He had not been promoted to full general
and the post that he held amounted to little more
than chairmanship of the National Joint Operations
Centre (NATJOC). The composition of NATJOC was simi-
lar to that of the now defunct Operations Co-ordina-
tion Committee with no real authority conferred on
the Commander COMOPS to enforce compliance from his
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NATJOC members. All COMOPS directives had to be
issued in the name of NATJOC and not COMOPS (i.e.
endorsed by the relevant head of the department) to
ensure compliance. In the case of the Departments of
Internal Affairs and Law and Order, COMOPS made no
provision for either control or inclusion of their
planning staffs. Each continued to plan and execute
within traditional departmental constraints.
By way of comparison, NATJOC became a looser
organisation than the Operations Co-ordination Com-
mittee had been. Commissioner of Police Peter Allum
did not attend in person (as had been the
case with the Operations Co-ordination Committee) but
sent one of his two deputy commissioners. The
Director General of the Central Intelligence Organi-
sation sent his Director External Affairs, a retired
Commissioner. Although those seconded were given
wide discretion and delegated much power, this ten-
ded to weaken COMOPS in comparison with the Opera-
tions Co-ordination Committee, rather than streng-
then the central co-ordination. Lieutenant-General
Walls approached the Prime Minister on repeated
occasions to obtain clarification on his own autho-
rity but never met with any success.
In very broad terms COMOPS was organised as
follows:
NATJOC
i
COMOPS
COMMANDER
DEPUTY COMMANDER
Operations Staff
Director General Operations
Operations Intelligence
Secretariat and
Planning Staff
Projects Secretariat
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Initially the services of Air Marshal M.H. McLaren
were retained as Deputy Commander COMOPS after his
retirement from the Rhodesian Air Force. Lieutenant-
General John Hickman succeeded Lieutenant-General
Peter Walls as Commander of the Army, while Major-
General A.L.C. Maclean became Army Chief of Staff
Operations. Brigadier Herbert Barnard became COMOPS
Director General Operations. Air Commodore John
Rodgers was appointed Director Operations. The Bri-
tish South Africa Police was represented by Senior
Assistant Commissioner Gardner while the Central
Intelligence Organisation and Special Branch were
both represented by Assistant Commissioner Edden.
Internal Affairs was represented by Provincial Com-
missioner J. H. Tapsen.
The task of the operations staff was to prepare
operation orders for operations that fell under
COMOPS authority, i.e. involving the use of so-
called Special Forces (Special Air Service troops,
Selous Scouts, etc.). The intelligence section exis-
ted only to gather all relevant intelligence and
information from members of the intelligence commu-
nity, but initially had no evaluative or other
intelligence function. As from 1979 the Army Chief
of Staff also fulfilled the functions of the Direc-
tor General Operations at COMOPS, and thus had a
dual role. The secretariat was mainly concerned with
providing secretarial services and with representing
COMOPS in other government departments. While the
planning staff was earmarked for long term military
strategic planning, this remained a paper function.
Organisationally COMOPS did not meet the
demands of the war. Although Comops and Army head-
quarters were two separate entities, Army headquar-
ters was almost solely involved with the administra-
tion and logistics of COMOPS
1 decisions. While this
was an unavoidable side-effect of the co-ordinating
machine decided upon, it was exacerbated by personal
animosity between Lieutenant-General Walls and Army
Commander-Lieutenant General Hickman. The latter had
lost many of his command functions, but retained his
staff.
COMOPS thus obtained control over the opera-
tional planning functions of the various services
(Army, Air Force and to a lesser extent Police and
Internal Affairs) without incorporating their
various planning staffs. For example, in the case of
the Army and Air Force, the G (operations) staffs
were not incorporated. Planning was thus done with-
out the necessary supportive staff work. By exclu-
ding these various staffs, COMOPS should have limited
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itself to the determination of broad planning guide-
lines. The resulting problems were especially nota-
ble as regards logistics, intelligence and most
important, broad strategic planning.
The initial COMOPS organisation made no provi-
sion for a logistic staff component to be incorpora-
ted into the planning process. Each service in ques-
tion was relied upon to do its own logistical plan-
ning. With the shortage of personnel and material,
it invariably led to serious problems and to a less
than optimum use of available resources. In a few
select cases external operations had to be cancelled
owing to the logistical problems encountered in the
execution of COMOPS planning. But as the war pro-
gressed, both COMOPS and the logistical staff at
Army Headquarters became more adept at meeting each
others' needs.
The lack of a central body for co-ordinating
intelligence at COMOPS also had a decidedly negative
effect on the total intelligence effort. Initially
the section consisted of a single member, providing
further evidence regarding the perpetuation of gene-
ral military neglect of intelligence inherited from
the Joint Planning Staffs (see Chapter 9). This neg-
lect had also led to an almost total lack of mili-
tary intelligence officers capable of control and
co-ordination of intelligence at top level and to
the neglect of military intelligence as a serious
challenge at lower levels.
Largely as a result of the lack of a Special
Forces Headquarters on the one hand, and the removal
of the Rhodesian Special Force units from Army con-
trol on the other, COMOPS involved itself both in
the detailed planning and in the execution of exter-
nal operations. It became practice towards the con-
clusion of the war for Lieutenant-General Walls to
command external operations from his distinctive
command Dakota, instead of leaving it to the field
or sub-ordinate formation or unit commanders. The
tradition started during the first raid on Chimoio.
It almost led to disaster during the attack on
Freedom Camp at Westlands Farm in Zambia during
October 1978, when enemy aircraft were scrambled and
in a position to attack the command Dakota. Such
practices led to repeated complaints by the various
Joint Operation Centres that while COMOPS involved
itself to a great extent with the everyday conduct
of the war, no formal war strategy ever saw the
light.
After much prompting, COMOPS eventually formu-
lated a national strategy in the period prior to the
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3 March Agreement. For security reasons it was never
put before the whole national executive, but appro-
ved by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the white
Co-minister for Defence, Hilary Squires. The Reverend
Sithole and James Chikerema only received the natio-
nal objective and were not given the guidelines for
execution. After his triumphant election, Prime
Minister Muzorewa ratified this strategy. Internally,
it revolved around the Security Force Auxiliaries
and an offer of amnesty to any insurgents prepared
to lay down arras now that a black majority govern-
ment had been achieved. Externally it held the eco-
nomies of the insurgent host countries hostage as a
means of ending the war.
The final step in an attempt to co-ordinate the
Rhodesian war effort was the combination of the
Defence and Combined Operations portfolios under
Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins on 18
September 1977. Henceforth the portfolios most
involved in the war were Defence and Combined Opera-
tions, Justice, Law and Order, and Internal Affairs.
Throughout the period 1972 to 1980, neither the
Operations Co-ordination Committee nor COMOPS gained
a free hand in the running of the war. At all stages
Prime Minister Ian Smith kept a tight rein espe-
cially on external operations: this led to conside-
rable friction between the Prime Minister and Lieu-
tenant-General Walls and was seemingly perpetuated
after Bishop Muzorewa
!s election to power. In his
cabinet announcement of 30 May 1979, he reserved the
portfolios of Combined Operations and Defence for
himself. In practice, however, he had little real
authority over the Armed Forces for all senior
appointments were still held by whites who owed
allegiance to the Rhodesian Front party rather than
to a black government.
Under the Transitional Government effective
control of the military was retained in white lands.
On the same day that Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend
Sithole and Senator Chirau were sworn into govern-
ment, Smith quietly created his own unofficial War
Council. It had six permanent members, namely Walls,
Chiefs of the Army and Air Force, the Commissioner
of Police, the Director-General of the Central
Intelligence Organisation and co-opted ministers as
the need arose. After Bishop Muzerewa became Prime
Minister COMOPS increasingly ran the war with
decreasing reference to the politicians.
In the final months of the war and in the bit-
ter post-Mugabe election period, many military com-
manders pointed to the undue limitations on external
72
Command and Control
raids into neighbouring insurgent host countries
that emanated from the War Council, and, to a lesser
extent, NATJOC. In both cases criticism was often
directed at the influence of the Director General of
the Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken Flower,
As member of both bodies he played a major role in
decisions and would point to the political problems
involved in external operations. Yet in many cases
the veto for external operations was as a result of
pressure from South Africa, especially as regards
Gaza, the southern province of Mozambique. Inside Rho-
desia there were very few political constraints.(7)
Although this element of national strategy was
very important, it tended to overshadow the more
mundane and less dramatic task of consolidating inter-
nal security. Apparently the initial intelligence
failures (detailed in Chapter 9) of the 1972 to 1976
period were major factors in limiting external ope-
rations and attacks on insurgent base camps.
In the final instance the smooth functioning of
NATJOC was also hindered by personality clashes
between the Commissioner of Police, Commander COMOPS
and Secretary for Internal Affairs. This provided
further evidence of the lack of forced co-operation
and compliance that was a hallmark of Rhodesian
counter-insurgency efforts.
2 . 4 special Forces
Within the Rhodesian context, Special Forces consti-
tuted what was initially known as the offensive com-
ponent or cutting edge of Army troops. These units
included Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Rhode-
sian Light Infantry and in some cases even the Grey
Scouts (a mounted unit). Initially, they owed alle-
giance only to the Commander of the Army. When Lieu-
tenant-General Walls was appointed as Commander
COMOPS, he retained this relation. The newly appoin-
ted Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Hickman, only
retained command of black regular units such as the
Rhodesia African Rifles and units of the Territorial
Army.
Largely as a result of the need for absolute
security in the planning and execution of Special
Forces operations, planning must be centralised at
the highest level, with strict limitation on the
distribution of information. In the case of Rhodesia
the operations section at COMOPS, and the battalion
headquarters of Special Force units involved, jointly
planned external and other Special Force operations.
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As the war progressed, COMOPS became ever increa-
singly involved in the detailed planning of an increa-
sing number of operations, particularly external
operations.
Owing to the limited staff available within the
operations section, the detailed planning of external
operations precluded any other activity, such as the
formulation of a coherent military strategy for the
country as a whole. This was to become possibly the
major criticism that the four brigade commanders
levelled at COMOPS; the lack of overall strategy
guidelines to combat the worsening internal security
situation .on a country-wide basis. Lieutenant-Colo-
nel Reid-Daly would subsequently state
It was indefensibly ridiculous for General
Walls or his Staff to concern themselves with
which village in the bush, a three-man stick
from the Special Air Service, or the Selous
Scouts should be deployed, and who should
release the helicopters to support them. This
was, and should have stayed the sole responsi-
bility of the Army and Air Force Commanders and
their Staffs, whose plans would have been the
logical follow-on from the strategical guide
lines put out by COMOPS. The immediate result
of COMOPS taking overall physical, as well as
the detailed day to day control of the Army's
running of the war, was that the Army Commander,
General Hickman, lost his rightful operational
command. ... The only command left to him was
purely an administrative one. ... His staff at
Army Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff,
were allowed nothing further to do with his
planning of the war and were only able to con-
cern themselves with new organisations, amend-
ments to staff tables and training matters.(8)
A second, and almost equally important problem
regarding Special Force operations was the lack of a
section that could gather and process all the rele-
vant intelligence and information that had a bearing
on external operations. This problem had been evi-
dent for a number of years as a result of the lack
of intelligence fed back to brigade Joint Operation
Centres prior to and after Special Force operations
within a Joint Operation Centre area. In the case of
the Selous Scouts this was especially significant.
The latter were arguably the major source of opera-
tional intelligence inside Rhodesia, yet the flow of
intelligence from the Selous Scouts to local Army
commanders was very limited. At this stage (prior to
1978) development of military intelligence as embo-
died by the Directorate of Military Intelligence was
still in its infancy.
At various stages the establishment of a Special
Forces headquarters had been proposed to NATJOC and
COMOPS. It was eventually approved by the issue of
Formation Order No 4: Headquarters Special Forces,
which read:
AIM
1 . The aim of this order is to lay down the
formation and roles of Headquarters Special
Forces.
TITLE
2. This headquarters is to be known as Head-
quarters Special Forces. Its abbreviated title
is HQ Spec Forces.
FORMATION
3. HQ Spec Forces was formed on 1 July 1978.
ROLES
4. The roles of HQ Spec Forces areas follows:
a. To formulate Special Forces strategy
b. The planning, execution and co-ordination
of Special Forces operations
c. The operational command and control of
Special Forces
d. Co-ordination of Special Forces training.
ESTABLISHMENT
FIThe establishment for HQ Spec Forces has
been issued under Establishment Table No 20/4.
As will 'be.noted, no mention was made of intelli-
gence co-ordination, although a Special Forces
Intelligence Centre, (SFIC), started at Inkomo Bar-
racks, had lasted a total of 4-6 months before being
closed down.
When nominations were made for headquarters
Special Forces posts, there were immediate difficul-
ties. Competition and mutual dislike between the
commanding officers of the Selous Scouts and the
Special Air Service represented the first problems.
The latter refused to shift his battalion headquar-
ters to Inkomo Barracks where the Selous Scouts were
stationed. A further problem was the appointment
of a Commander, Special Forces, who proved
unacceptable to both the Selous Scouts and the Spe-
cial Air Service. Finally, the concept did not have
the support of the Commander, COMOPS, who would con-
sequently have lost his direct control over these
forces.
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Special Forces Intelligence Centre, the brainchild
of the Commander of the Selous Scouts, also flounde-
red. The Director General of the Central Intelli-
gence Organisation was thus threatened with the
eventual loss of the Scouts, who were one of his
prime sources of operational intelligence. In the
second place, the Special Forces Intelligence Centre
would have been in direct competition to the fledge-
ling Directorate of Military Intelligence which had
a lack of suitable personnel. It was only after the
collapse of the Centre and the transfer of its
officers to Military Intelligence that the latter
developed into an intelligence section of real
value. (Also see Chapter 9)
After only seven weeks in total, headquar-
ters Special Forces became the headquar-
ters of the Security Force Auxiliaries. No satisfac-
tory solution was found for the planning and co-
operation of Special Force operations, nor for long
term strategic planning.
2.5 Conclusion
A number of officers who attained key positions
within the Rhodesian Security Forces had served in
Malaya during the Emergency. When insurgency reared
its head in Rhodesia after UDI,the isolated terrorism
experienced prior to 1975 did not seem to constitute
a comparable revolutionary threat. In the years to
follow the Malaya clique belatedly realized that the
threat was essentially the same.
But lower ranking men in the field and those
not experienced in the subtelties of a coherent
counter-insurgency campaign, did not come to this
realization at all. History and combat experience in
a different continent hardly seemed applicable to
Black Africa. The majority of whites refused to
believe that 'their' black populace was capable
of a general nationalism and political awareness.
A communication gap developed between high com-
mand in Harare, and men in the field. Equally
important was the fact that experience before
1972 led to an over emphasis of the role of the
military. This became ingrained in the thinking of
Security Force members and influenced their politi-
cal superiors who were dependant on the former's
advice for policy decisions regarding the conduct of
the war. , .
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The foregoing approach to a problem that is
essentially not military, but rather socio-economic
and political, had a decisive influence on the Rho-
desian military strategy. Some of these effects have
been dealt with, but the major one is the lack of a
coherent total national strategy. Without a viable
political objective and at least rudimentary policy
guidelines a vast number of counter-insurgency mea-
sures become difficult to execute coherently. Two
specific examples discussed at length are psycholo-
gical operations (Chapter 6) and the recruitment and
training of an own politically orientated local
militia for defence purposes (Chapter 8) .
Possibly the major shortcoming within the Rho-
desian structure of command was the lack of firm,
decisive command at the highest level. This was not
limited to the military, but also included the
Police and Department of Internal Affairs. The lack
of a unified high level command that could enforce
compliance over the total range of counter-insurgency
activities was a severe limitation indeed. The Rho-
desian Front politicians who took the decisions
regarding the employment of existing resources can
hardly be blamed for this deficiency. Yet the rather
informal approach adopted to the war was merely a
product of the preceding years. From the start of
incursions in the sixties, no formalised co-ordina-
ting machine was established. Local commanders and
officials were left to 'sort out' co-ordination
between themselves on an informal basis, which often
led to inter-service clashes and personal animosity.
In effect, the Joint Operations Centre system as
employed relied heavily on the personal rapport that
was established between its members, and it is to
Rhodesia's credit that there was close co-ordination
and support in the majority of areas.
NOTES /
1. Rhodesian Army, Military Support to the
Civil Power (MCP), (restricted, as amended, dated 1
May 1976), p. xvi.
2. Later to become the Director General of the
Central Intelligence Organisation.
3. Special Branch had reported a build up of
FRELIMO and ZANLA insurgents in the area.
4. See, for example, the report on the Commit-
tee of Supply debate in the revenue vote for defence
Rhodesia Herald (25 Aug. 1976) and the editorial
comment of the same newspaper dated the 26 Aug. 1976.
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5. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Mar. 1977),
p. 4372.
6. Rhodesia Herald (18 May 1977).
7. With little exception, senior and middle
ranking military officers remain convinced that a
serious security leak existed at COMOPS, and, most
possibly, within NATJOC itself.
8..P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:
Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), pp. 272-
273.
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Chapter 3
PROTECTED AND CONSOLIDATED VILLAGES
3 . 1 The Concept
Recourse to the use of Protected Villages is
closely aligned to the concept of a total revolu-
tionary war. It entails the concentration and reset-
tlement of the local population into defendable vil-
lages . The theory of insurgency divides a country
into three categories: first those base areas con-
trolled by the insurgent forces, second the areas
under firm counter-insurgent control, and finally
the intermediate or 'grey' areas contested by both
sides. The two opposing forces each seek to expand
their base areas. Such expansion not only provides
visible proof of success, but forces the contestant
to disperse his available manpower over increa-
singly threatened areas. The case for the insurgent
forces is adequately summarised by John J. McCuen:
By slow, creeping expansion, the territories
held by the governing power are converted into
guerrilla areas, and the guerrilla areas into
base areas until the entire country has been
won. (1)
This is termed the 'oil spot' approach and holds
true for both insurgent and counter-insurgent stra-
tegy. Specifically of importance to government for-
ces is the consolidation of control over its own
base areas as a firm foothold from whence it can
encroach onto the grey areas. This governmental base
normally corresponds to the more urbanized and eco-
nomically active areas where counter-insurgent control
is not only more evident but easier to maintain. The
consolidation of this area is almost exclusively
achieved by political, socio-economic, administra-
tive and policing measures.
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The second factor of importance regarding the employ-
ment of a strategy of population concentration and
resettlement is closely aligned to physical control
of the rural population. Sir Robert Thompson stated
it thus:
The government must give priority to defeating
the political subversion, not the guerrillas ...
Unless communist subversive political organisa-
tion in the towns and villages is broken and
eliminated, the insurgent guerrilla units will
not be defeated. If the guerrillas can be iso-
lated from the population ... then their even-
tual destruction becomes automatic. (2 )
The emphasis is thus not towards providing depopula-
ted areas in which Security Forces can roam freely in
search of insurgents, but in denying the insurgents
access to the local population. This is critical
since the war is essentially waged for control of
the population. If contact between the rural popula-
tion and the insurgent forces is effectively cut,
the latter are denied food, intelligence, recruits
and access to their primary objective, people. In
practical terms this leads to a number of conclusions.
In the first place it is not possible for Protected
Villages to be particularly successful in those
areas falling within an insurgent base area. In
theory it is possible for heavily armed and well
trained Security Forces to enter these areas in
strength with relative impunity, but they can expect
to meet with little more than sullen hostility from
the local population. Placing these people in Pro-
tected Villages is then akin to concentrating an
already subverted population with its established
clandestine insurgent organisation into select loca-
lities. 'Foreign' Security Forces, are then required
as guards to prevent the inmates physically from
either overt acts of subversion, support of the
insurgents or simply disobedience. In such circum-
stances Protected Villagers are neither willing nor,
in fact, able to provide intelligence or co-opera-
tion under the threat of death or pubishment.
It is further imperative that the insurgent
organisation within a community is broken before or
concurrently with such a programme. Should this not
happen and what is termed the insurgent parallel
hierarchies continue to function relatively unsca-
thed within the villages, the authorities would have
partially failed in their objective.
In the third place it should be evident that
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effective control of the population placed within
the Protected Villages is essential if contact with
the insurgents is to be broken and not restored. In
practical terms this indicates strict control of
movement. This can be obtained only by a foolproof
identity system, the institution of no-go areas, and
curfews, to name but a few of the more traditional
methods of population control.
There are, however, a number of further factors
that have proved enduring in the efforts towards
making a Protected Village programme advantageous in
the long term. In the first instance it should be
recognised that, with limited exceptions, the insti-
tution of such a programme meets with at least a
measure of passive resistance from the majority of
the local population. In many cases even active
resistance is encountered.
It is thus vitally important that such a scheme
is seen to be to the personal benefit of the local
population as a whole. In short, living conditions
in Protected Villages should be demonstrably better
than outside them. This could either entail the pro-
vision of running water, electricity, access to
schools and clinics or even the private ownership of
land. Failing such advantages the whole programme
could easily rebound to the government's detriment.
Instead of providing at least a neutral community,
it results in one which is actively hostile and
sympathetic to the insurgent cause. Simply herding
people behind barbed wire and uprooting their tradi-
tional lifestyle with no material compensation pro-
vides an extremely fertile area for insurgent
recruitment. Unfortunately, this seemed to have been
the Rhodesian practice.
A further factor is protection, security and
personal safety. In spite of the propaganda campaign
waged by both insurgents and counter-insurgents for
the capture of their 'hearts and minds', the local
members of the population are less concerned with
grandiose theories and promises than with personal
safety and protection. This concern is largely
dependent on the real physical pressure brought to
bear on them by the insurgents, i.e. intimidation and
on the government's capability or ability to defend
the local inhabitants against these dangers. To a
large extent both entail the perception, or convic-
tion, as to who will eventually 'win
1. In the con-
text of a strategy of Protected Villages it is thus
vitally important that the local population is pro-
vided with adequate protection against insurgent
attacks. This should preferably entail self-defence
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by means of militia type units which involve the
local populace in their own security. In all cases,
a quick-reaction force should bo available to pro-
vide the hard muscle behind the protection of Pro-
tected Villages within any specific area. The ele-
ment of involvement is of specific importance and
the Security Forces should thus endeavour to obtain
local participation to the maximum extent. Not only
does this provide additional manpower but once com-
mitted to such a scheme, the local members are in
fact committed to the government cause.
What then, should be the aim of any Protected
Village strategy? According to Sir Robert Thompson
it is threefold:
The first ... is the protection of the popula-
tion ... the most vital aspect of protection,
however, is the elimination within the hamlet
of the insurgent underground organisation ...
The second objective ... is to unite the people
and involve them in positive action on the side
of the government ... This can only be done by
involving the people in a small way in national
politics which both affect and benefit them,
first in the defence of their community and
secondly in its development ... The third
objective ... is ... development in the social,
economic and political fields ... It is at this
stage that the regrouping of houses, which at
first sight might have seemed a hardship, has
compensating advantages.(3)
Let us now turn to the events in former Rhodesia.
3.2 Initial attempts at creating Protected Areas
The first official public indication of a strategy
of Protected Villages in Rhodesia was given by
Deputy Minister of Law and Order Wickus de Kock
during December 1973. Significantly, the need for
the establishment of these villages was given as
arising out of the policy of creating 'no-go'
areas.(4) The proclamation of the first such area was
promulgated on 17 May 1973. It ran along 300 km of Rhode-
sia's northern border with Mozambique in the Cente-
nary and Mount Darwin districts. The majority of the
local population living in these areas were to be
evacuated, screened and resettled in other areas. A
number of people were also moved to a new area as
punishment for assisting insurgents. In the nearby
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Mzarabani area, however, the local population were
allowed to stay in their traditional villages. Fol-
lowing the- evacuation, the Commissioner of Police had
the power to confiscate, seize or destroy any pro-
perty in these areas that could possibly be of use
to the insurgent forces. Within such designated no-
go areas, Security Forces were empowered to shoot on
sight. Bulldozed strips of clear ground were used as
aids to demarcation. Regular patrols along these
strips searched for indications of tracks leading
into or out of the no-go zones.
Four protected areas were established from
October 1973 onwards in Gudza and Mukumbura Tribal
Trust Lands in the Zambezi Valley. By 10 January
1974, it was reported that more than 8 000 people
had been moved, of whom 1 607 were resettled in pro-
tected areas. The rest of the valley became a no-go
area. These first protected areas were not constitu-
ted as proper Protected Villages, but entailed the
concentration of the local population around the
main centres of each reserve to facilitate freedom of
movement for the Security Forces.
The armed forces were not involved in these
schemes, as it was the Department of Internal Affairs
which first proposed the concept of concentrating
the local population in specific areas for ease of
control and protection.
3.3 Operations Overload and Overload Two
The military justification given for both Operation
Overload in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land and Operation
Overload Two which followed in Madziwa Tribal
Trust Land,was that the insurgent threat seemed to
be approaching Harare itself. Chiweshe Tribal Trust
Land specifically thrusts deep into the white farming
areas of the Umvukwes, Centenary and Mount Darwin.
ZANLA forces had succeeded in establishing
themselves solidly to the north of Bindura. From this
base they were increasingly subverting the areas
southwards into Msana and Masembura Tribal Trust
Lands and from there to Chinamore Tribal Trust Land
just north of Harare. Drastic action was apparently
required to block this thrust. The major ZANLA
infiltration route ran directly through the Madziwa
and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands which lay to the
north and north-west of Bindura. The local popula-
tion in these areas were known to be actively assis-
ting the insurgent effort. During March 1974 the
situation in Chiweshe was already serious enough to
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prompt Lieutenant Colonel Reid-Daly to write later
The apparent support for the ZANLA cause in
Chiweshe though was, without doubt, overwhelm-
ing and while this made things easy for Selous
Scouts pseudo operations, it was very distur-
bing in a broader sense.(5)
Previously, a large scale attempt to punish the
local population and dissuade them from aiding the
insurgents had failed in 1973.
Largely on Rhodesian Army insistance, the first
major operation towards the establishment of Pro-
tected Villages, code named Operation Overload, was
officially announced on 25 July 1974. Four weeks of
planning preceded the simultaneous movement of
49 960 people into 21 Protected Villages in Chiweshe
Tribal Trust Land within a period of six weeks.
According to an official statement the intention of
the operation was
to deprive terrorists of their vital contact
with the civilian population, particularly at
night, when they force tribesmen to accommodate
and feed them as they move through the area. (6)
Particular emphasis was placed on the retention of
tribal groupings during the resettlement of the
local population into Protected Villages. As far as
possible,villages were sited near to existing agri-
cultural fields. Each family was allocated a plot of
fifteen square metres on which to construct a home.
Rhodesian Army and Police units supplied transport
to the new villages.(7) Families had to construct
their new homes from those materials that they had
removed from their old ones. Following their move-
ment Security Forces destroyed all remaining huts in
the Tribal Trust Land.(8) As the people living in
the northern part of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land had
been subject to a considerable degree of intimida-
tion by insurgent forces, many moved into Protected
Villages voluntarily. This was not the case to the
south, however, where resistance to the move was
encountered.
The resettlement of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land
was preceded by a High Density Force operation las-
ting 4 to 5 days.About 17 companies of troops were
deployed clandestinely through the adjacent white
commercial farming lands to seal off the Tribal
Trust Land. Although the operation was not an unqua-
lified success, it was an attempt to saturate
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Chiweshe with Security Forces, thus either elimina-
ting or forcing the flight of all insurgent forces
in the area. Following this, 21 construction teams
were moved in to construct the villages. They were
followed by transportation, intelligence and fencing
teams that enabled the total resettlement to be exe-
cuted simultaneously. This was concluded on 15
August 1974, according to schedule.
Deputy Secretary of Internal Affairs Louis de
Bruin, subsequently admitted that the speed of the
operation had caused many problems. At first the
Protected Villages merely consisted of security fen-
cing around an area that had been marked out in
smaller plots, one per family. At the centre of the
Protected Village was a second security fence and
sheltered housing for armed guards. This was the
'keep' upon which the defence of the village was
based. Some of the 21 villages were, however, too
big and lack of sanitation and facilities led to
disease. De Bruin also said that conditions had
sometimes been hard, which he explained as follows:
'All I can say is that the operation was extremely
urgent. ' (9) In fact the Department of Internal
Affairs had provided no sanitation facilities. The
local population had to rely on open latrines which
proved an obvious health hazard.-An adequate supply
of fresh water had been provided in only one or two
villages prior to completion of the resettlement. (10)
Little aid had been extended by the government
towards the building of new homes except for the
transportation already mentioned.
Although criticism regarding Operation Overload
must have been both foreseen and expected, the majo-
rity of this criticism tended to be emotional rather
than based on counter-insurgency theory. A black mem-
ber of Parliament, Aaron Mungate did, however, point
to a number of valid shortcomings in the execution
of the operation. His major objections were as fol-
lows :
1. The only people who were protected were
those in the keep itself (i.e. the guards).
2. In the majority of Protected Villages no
timely and adequate water supply had been installed.
3. People had been forced from their tradi-
tional, and in some instances, substantial homes
with no compensation and no aid towards buying mate-
rials to erect new ones.
4. Because only the gates of the Protected Vil-
lages were quarded, the fences around the village
did not prevent communication between the villagers
and the insurgents.
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To a number of Security Force personnel the opera-
tion seemed an immediate panic reaction to insurgent
success in 1973. In the short term, benefits seemed
substantial as insurgent activities were severely
disrupted in Chiweshe for the following six months.
In the medium and long term the lack of emphasis on
concurrent socio-economic conditions within the Pro-
tected Villages proved a decisively negative factor.
Based on the experience gained during Operation
Overload, Operation Overload Two in Madziwa Tribal
Trust Land, some weeks later proved to be an improve-
ment in a number of respects. Instead of the massed
movement of the total population into Protected Vil-
lages, the movement was extended over several weeks.
The operation consisted of four phases. Phase one
entailed a High Density Force operation, during
which a single contact resulted in the elimination
of virtually the total insurgent presence (16 insur-
gent casualties out of a total group of about 18).
Phase two ensured that the local population could
move about freely and thus accomplish the resettle-
ment with little insurgent harassment. To this end
roads were patrolled and cleared of mines. Phase
three entailed the provision of rudimentry shelters
and amenities within the envisaged Protected Villa-
ges. Phase four covered the period 9 September 1974,
to 31 October 1974, which was the compulsory moving
period.
A total of 13 500 ad to be moved into
8 Protected Villages. Two villages had already been
voluntarily completed by the local population while
the Salvation Army's educational centre, the Bradley
Institute, became the eleventh Protected Village.
The total number of people in Protected Villages was
about 16 500, with an average village population of
between 1 300 and 1 900 (in Chewishe a Protected
Village contained as many as 5 000 inhabitants).
Madziwa Tribal Trust Land was, however, smaller than
Chiweshe and had its population already concentrated
around developing centres. These conditions facili-
tated the execution of the project as a whole. In
place of those schools that had to be closed, 10 new
schools, one each in or adjacent to a Protected Vil-
lage were opened. In contrast to Chiweshe, 23 000
head of cattle were also moved into protected pens
outside each village. At the time reports also sur-
faced regarding blacks obtaining title to residen-
tial stands and permanent right of occupation within
and adjacent to Protected Villages. This idea had
specifically been forwarded by the so-called Shep-
pard group who were the fore-runners of the later
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1 Psychological Operations Unit as detailed in Chap-
ter 6. In a scheme presented to the Deputy Minister
in the Department to the Prime Minister they called
for the division of Chiweshe, Madziwa and all subse-
quent Protected Village areas into acre or even
half-acre plots to which a family could obtain free-
hold title. Any such scheme was strongly resisted by
the traditional black chiefs as it would have eroded
their main source of authority, the allocation and
distribution of land. Since Rhodesian Front policy
placed great emphasis on the role of the chief in rural
black life, this resistance proved a crucial factor. Even-
tually very little came of these attempts that could
have contributed significantly towards making Pro-
tected Villages more acceptable to the local black
population.
For its part the Department of Internal Affairs
seemed unable to adjust from a rural administration
to the increased demands being made by a suddenly
urban situation. In both cases finance remained a
severe limitation. By the end of the war, however,
Chiweshe and Madziwa had both stabilized and provi-
ded facilities of a generally higher standard than
was to be the case elsewhere. In broad strategic
terms Operations Overload and Overload Two did pro-
vide a number of precedents. The first was the
emphasis on the physical isolation of the local
population from the insurgents as an end in itself.
The second was the establishment of Protected Villa-
ges in areas that had already been subverted as an
impediment to insurgent logistics. The third was the
lack of sustained development projects to better
living conditions within Protected Villages and to
promote these as viable growth centres. Lastly, the
lack of attempts to involve the local population in
their own defence and developments, including
attempts to counter the negative influences that
crowded urban existence, had a negative effect on the
social cohesion of formerly rural black African communities.
Partly as a result of the initial success of
both operations, Security Forces.could claim that a
mere 70 insurgents were still active inside Rhodesia
by early 1974. Since these Protected Villages were
constructed at a time when maximum military and
other public sector resources could be directed
towards their implementation, they were to be the
most successful and effective in the country.
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3.4 Extension of the Protected Village scheme
In the year following the execution of Operations
Overload and Overload Two, Consolidated Villages,
that were to form a second line of defence to Pro-
tected Villages were introduced. Consolidated Vil-
lages were formed by simply grouping 4 to 8 kraals
together. No security fence, lighting, control of
movement or armed detachments were provided. Curfews
were only enforced where necessary. The financial
burden imposed by the Protected Village programme
seems to be the major motivation for the introduc-
tion of this concept.
Movement of about 4 500 permanent residents and
3 000 occasional residents in Maramba Tribal Trust
Land, Mrewa district officially began on 2 June 1975
as a first experiment. Although Consolidated Villa-
ges were only to be established in areas of 'inci-
pient insurrection' continuity planning entailed
their conversion to Protected Villages should this
be warranted by the security situation.(11) In many
cases, in fact, the first phase in the establishment
of Protected Villages entailed the concentration of
the people into Consolidated Villages. Following
this, protective measures were added thus converting
the Consolidated Villages into Protected Villages.
By May 1976, Consolidated Villages had, amongst
others, been established in Uzumba and Pfungwe Tri-
bal Trust Lands as well as near Chipinga.
Having no protection, Consolidated Villages
were prime targets for insurgents. Both ZANLA and ZPRA
forces burnt huts and forced the local population to
abandon the new villages. One such act occurred on
New Year's Eve, 1977, when about 20 insurgents
burned 212 of the 380 huts of Kandeya Consolidated
Village in the North-east. Forcing the local popula-
tion to resettle in these unprotected areas could
only have resulted in extremely negative reactions
on their part since the move entailed the disruption
of an established community with no material or
security benefit.
Apparently the policy of establishing Consoli-
dated Villages was discontinued in the following
year. Although heralded as a 'new concept' these
villages were very similar in the final analysis to
the 'protected areas' that had been established by
the Department of Internal Affairs in 1973.
On 9 March 1976, Deputy Minister in the Prime
Minister's Office Ted Sutton-Pryce stated that
between 175 000 and 200 000 members of the local
population had been resettled in Protected and
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Consolidated Villages. Throughout the eastern opera-
tional areas the extension of Protected Villages
continued unabated. The entire population of Honde
Valley was placed in Protected Villages early in
1977. On 30 May 1977, the Rhodesia Herald reported
that since the beginning of that year there had been
more than 70 insurgent attacks on Protected Villa-
ges. The number of villages were claimed to be in
the region of 200, housing 250 000 people. Each Pro-
tected Village was reported to cost between
Rh$ 35 000 and Rh$ 45 000 to construct. Further
reports indicated that the population of Kandeya,
Chiswito Tribal Trust Lands and Karuyana Purchase
Area as well as Chiredzi and Makoni had been placed
in Protected Villages.
At this time the Catholic Commission for Jus-
tice and Peace published Rhodesia: the Propaganda
War which contained a detailed but inaccurate break-
down of Protected Villages in Rhodesia, claiming the
existence of 203 villages housing 580 832 people.
Replying to the publication, the Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs stated that there were, in fact, 178
villages housing 260 000 people.
A report in the Sunday Mail of 9 October 1977,
provided an indication as to the effectiveness of
both Protected and Consolidated Villages. It stated
that about ten percent of all such villages had been
burnt down by insurgent forces. The main areas
affected were Mrewa and Mtoko with a few cases in
the Mount Darwin area. The majority of burnings had
taken place in the preceding ten months as a result
of which thousands of former inhabitants fled into
the bush. Insurgent forces actively attempted to
prevent the local population from being placed in
Protected Villages as in Sengwe Trust Tribal Land
where only 60% of the 12 000 people had moved into
the six villages designated. The Chiredzi District
Commissioner stated at the time
There is a strong terrorist presence in this
area. The people are being intimidated against
going into the villages.(12)
When fully extended, the introduction of both Pro-
tected and Consolidated Villages represented the
basic approach to the strategy already mentioned,
i.e. aimed at disrupting insurgent logistics. Pro-
tected Villages were established in those populated
areas as near to Rhodesian borders as possible
through which insurgent infiltration routes ran.
Large stretches of the border were eventually
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covered by means of border minefield obstacles (see
Chapter 4); the object being that insurgents ente-
ring Rhodesia would first have to negotiate these
and then cross no-go areas where Security Forces had
absolute freedom of movement and action to pursue
and eliminate them. In those areas bordering on no-
go zones, the local population would be placed in
Protected Villages thus still affording Security
Forces a large degree of freedom. Insurgent forces
would in this way be denied food, water and informa-
tion, forcing them to be continually on the move and
facilitating their location.
This broad strategic approach was put to best
effect in the Operation Repulse area. Entering Rho-
desia from the Gaza Province in Mozambique, ZANLA
forces had to cross the Gona Re Zhou game park and
the border minefield obstacles erected along the
south-eastern border. In this relatively arid area
the local population in the Tribal Trust Lands sur-
rounding the game park had all been placed in Pro-
tected Villages (Diti, Chipese, Sengwe, Matibi No 2,
and Sangwe Tribal Trust Lands). The majority of the
sources of water outside the Protected Villages were
destroyed. Insurgent forces wanting to penetrate to
the populated areas around Masvingo (formerly Fort
Victoria) were thus faced with a formidable physical
obstacle consisting of depopulated and semi-depopu-
lated areas with little access to food and water.
Eventually about three quarters of a million
blacks were concentrated in Protected Villages. A
list of all planned and existing Protected and Con-
solidated Villages as on 6 January 1978, amounted to
a total of 234 villages.(13) The salient points men-
tioned above regarding the geographical distribution
of Protected Villages are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3.5 Opening of Protected Villages
Since the strategy of Protected Villages was intro-
duced in 1973 it had been a particular point of con-
tention between black leaders and the Rhodesian
Front government. The social disruption resulting
from forced resettlement led to highly emotional
reactions to the strategy on the part of moderate
black nationalist leaders. This attitude changed
radically when, as members of the Transitional
Government, they came to grips with the counter-
insurgency problems facing Rhodesia.
Once Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau and the
Reverend Sithole had reached agreement with Prime
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AREAS WHERE THE LOCAL POPULATION
HAD BEEN CONCENTRATED IN PV'S
TRIBAL TRUST LANDS
Figure 3.1 Existing and Planned Protected Villages:
, 6 Jan. 1978
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Minister Smith on an internal settlement in March
1978, substantive proof had to be provided to both
the black people at large and the insurgent forces
in the country that majority rule had been achieved.
The president of the Chiweshe Residents' Associa-
tion, Mathias Chitauro, made this quite clear when
he stated that
Unless the Transitional Government quickly
dismantled protected villages, residents of
keeps would never take the internal settlement
seriously. (14)
The black 'members of the Executive Council were con-
vinced of their majority support amongst the rural
population. They were adamant that substantive proof
had only to be provided that the war was over to
induce numerous insurgents to lay down their weapons.
Although the war was still continuing unabated in
the rural areas, it was judged that the symbolic
reopening of Protected Villages could provide just
the 'substantive proof needed. It was also judged
that it would influence the attitude of the local
population to support moderate black nationalist
leaders. Thus, on 8 September 1978, the first three
Protected Villages were declared open in Mutoko Tri-
bal Trust Land. The inhabitants were free to leave
and return to their previous locations.
The opening of Protected Villages, however,
also reflected the failure of the socio-economic
development of these villages. Chief Mutoko had told
the co-Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry,
Ernest Bulle, that 'More of us are dying inside the
villages than outside.'(15) This was a sentiment
that had also been expressed by Mr Chitauro some
months earlier when he stated that people in the
Protected Villages were poorer than they were before
the establishment of the villages. By 11 September
1978, 70 Protected Villages had been opened in the
North-east.
By October it was clear that the opening of
Protected Villages had failed to achieve the objec-
tives set. Opening a further 9 Protected Villages in
Mount Darwin area. Bishop Muzorewa encountered sul-
len resentment. The attitude was well reflected by
an elderly male inhabitant as reported in the Rhode-
sia Herald who stated that
. .. The government had forced the people into
the PV's in the first place, and now turned
around and expected them to return to their
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homes'where the terrorist threat was still a
real.thing.(16)
Reports indicated that insurgents were fining people
returning from Protected Villages Rh$20 for deser-
ting the struggle. By 8 December 1978, all Protected
Villages in the Murewra, Mutoko and Mudzi districts
and 20 villages in the Mount Darwin district had
been opened.
By October of the following year Herbert Zimuto,
Minister of Home Affairs (formerly known as Internal
Affairs) said the following in reply to questions
put to him by The National Observer
In the early part of last year there was much
criticism of the protected villages which had
resulted in the Government agreeing to disman-
tle PV's in the Mtoko area. But a sad lesson
was learnt at Mtoko (now Mutoko) ... a lot of
people lost their lives because of that deci-
sion. They fell victim to terrorism because
they were no longer protected.(17)
The opening of Protected Villages had been stopped
some months earlier, but had resulted in a deterio-
rating security situation in those areas affected,
as well as in public humiliation of the vaunted
Internal Settlement. In some cases Protected Villa-
ges were opened after having functioned for only 15
months; hardly enough time to become established as
potential growth points. Such practices could only
have led to the total alienation of the rural popu-
lation affected.
In fact, admitting their failure to consolidate
the support of the local population, Security Forces
lifted all restrictions on the movement of inhabi-
tants in those Protected Villages where they had
previously proved least successful. (This was gene-
rally termed as 'opening PV's
1) This was in contrast
to the normal practice of relaxing population con-
trol measures in white or government base areas. A
feasibility study conducted by Joint Operation Cen-
tre Hurricane prior to the opening of Protected Vil-
lages had in fact recommended the relaxation of mea-
sures in Madziwa and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands as
a first step.
3.6 Guarding Forces
At the start of the Protected Village scheme, the
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Department of Internal Affairs was given the respon-
sibility of defending these villages. At this stage
the department had no military or paramilitary func-
tion and had to draw personnel from other areas to
assist in manning Protected Villages. Villages in
Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land were in some instances
also manned by members of the South African Police.
To meet this new commitment, the Department of
Internal Affairs established a new category of offi-
cial termed District Security Assistants who were
distinct from the career District Assistants that-
performed normal administrative duties. Furthermore,
the Department was ill-prepared to train District
Security Assistants. Early training programmes were
thus carried out by the British South Africa Police
and the Prison Service. In time the Army took over
the training of District Security Assistants at the
Department of Internal Affairs training depot at
Chikurubi near Salisbury. The first intake of Dis-
trict Security Assistants concluded their training
at Chikurubi in July 1975 and were subsequently
deployed in Protected Villages.
As the need for protection forces grew, the
Department of Internal Affairs was allocated a num-
ber of National Servicemen for their normal 18 month
period of service. The first intake passed out early
in 1975. Known as 'vedettes' upon completion of
their training, they were posted out to Protected
Villages as superintendents-in-charge. In many cases
a vedette was the only white official within a Pro-
tected Village. His major responsibilities entailed
the welfare and discipline of his 15 to 20 District
Security Assistants, and the safety and protection of
the Protected Village. Youth and inexperience played
a major role in the problems that these first vedet-
tes encountered. Thus, in late 1975, it was decided
to extend call-ups to those men who had no security
commitment in the age group 25 to 38. Henceforth men
in this category performed their call-up duties
within the Department of Internal Affairs. The matu-
rity of these men led to an improvement in the role
of the first intake that graduated in November 1975.
In spite of the increased manpower made availa-
ble to Internal Affairs, it was apparent that the
department's primary administrative role was incom-
patible with protective or paramilitary activities.
Furthermore, during 1975 and 1976 large areas of
Rhodesia were being resettled, placing an increased
strain on Internal Affairs as regards training, com-
, mand and control, and logistics. Since the Army and
Police were loath to perform this function as part
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of their normal operations, it was eventually deci-
ded to form an autonomous force, the Guard Force.
This force was to be exclusively responsible for the
security of Protected Villages. First officers
and senior non-commissioned officers were recruited
during August/September 1975. The Guard Force was
officially gazetted as an autonomous Force under the
Ministry of Defence on 1 February 1976.
Half of the Department of Internal Affairs
National Service allocation and the Chikurubi train-
ing base was transferred to the Guard Force.(18)
Some District Security Assistants also joined the
force, although Internal Affairs retained responsi-
bility for the protection of a number of Protected
Villages such as in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land.
During May 1977, the Guard Force was given a 'new
look
1. From a previously static and defensive role
the force henceforth engaged in active patrolling,
ambush and anti-ainbush techniques, night patrols,
etc. From 1978 the duties of the Guard Force were
further extended to the protection of white farms.
At a later stage the protection of key installations
and lines of communication was also taken over from
the Police. In May 1978, the 1st Battalion of the
Guard Force was formed and committed to an infantry
role. By late 1979 the total Guard Force establish-
ment numbered 7 000 men.
Up to September 1978, the newly formed Security
Force Auxiliaries (see Chapter 8} had only been
deployed in areas where the local population had not
been resettled. Largely as a result of the increased
deployment of the Guard Force to protect railway
lines and white farming areas, it was decided that the
numbers of Security Force Auxiliaries would be increa-
sed to take charge of a number of Protected Villages.
By early October 1978, villages were taken over in
the Beit Bridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa and
Mount Darwin areas. The success achieved differed
widely from area to area, and even from village to
village. Although the concept of Auxiliaries was
sound, it was hampered by training and recruitment
policies employed in the execution of the strategy.
When the war ended in 1979, a number of forces
had thus been involved in guarding Protected Villa-
ges, South African Police, Internal Affairs, Guard
Force and Security Force Auxiliaries. In the majo-
rity of cases these forces were foreign to the local
population and did not involve them in their own
defence on a planned basis. The short training
period, calibre of manpower recruited and the static
role initially accorded the Guard Force also led to
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morale and disciplinary problems. Acts of lawless-
ness towards the local population did not endear
these forces to the people. The proliferation of
forces also led to personnel management problems
since conditions of service differed. (19) In the case
of the Guard Force that had specifically been formed
to defend Protected Villages, a number of additional
duties had been added. The result was widely diffe-
ring standards of efficiency between villages guar-
ded by different forces. No uniform approach existed on
a countrywide basis. Proof of this is provided by
the fact that Joint Operation Centre Hurricane
recommended the creation of a "protection brigade
1
during June 1978. This force was to comprise
a combination of Rhodesia Defence Regiment (i.e ter-
ritorial) troops and members of Guard Force in an
effort to utilize more mature leadership in the former
group to improve the standard within the Guard
Force.
3.7 The Rhodesian Approach and Conditions in Protec-
ted Villages
The Rhodesian government approach to the resettle-
ment of people into Protected Villages is contained
in the following extracts from an interview with
Internal Affairs Minister, Jack Mussett in late 1974
By taking tribesmen to protected villages we
are saving their lives. I don't think we can be
expected to do more than help them to help
themselves.(20)
After stating that difficulties had been met regar-
ding the implementation of farming schemes in Chiwe-
she Tribal Trust Land, Mussett added
But we are not going to feed these people. They
must grow their own crops ... those who have
had to leave permanent buildings or property
will be able to move back when the terrorist
threat is over.(21)
The major problem confronting Security Forces and
other ministries involved in the execution of this
strategy was lack of funds. Although various efforts
were launched to develop Protected Villages as
growth points, manpower, finance, political con-
straints and lack of imagination led to their early
demise.
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Conditions in Protected Villages differed from
area to area. Malnutrition and disease had always
been features in black rural life for numerous
decades.' The concentration of people into such vil-
lages tended to exacerbate these problems. To the
blacks, resettlement into these villages entailed a
move from a rural to an urban community, with a
concurrent increase in prostitution, delinquency,
vagrancy and malnutrition.
The physical uncertainty of turmoil upset the
traditional family basis of community life. Young
men carrying arms entered these villages and chal-
lenged the authority of tribal elders so disturbing
the established hierarchy. Within families the
local insurgent youth supporters, or mujibas,
started to challenge the authority of the
traditional senior members.
Commenting on the increase of malnutrition in
Protected Villages, Dr Jim Watt, superintendent at
the Salvation Army's Howard Hospital in Chiweshe
Tribal Trust Land, stated that several factors con-
tributed to this
The protected villages were too large to be
self-supporting, the tribesmen had to walk too
far to get to their fields every day, people
could not keep guard on their crops because of
this and cattle, its and other animals were
eating their crops and vegetables.(22)
As stated, Chiweshe and Madziwa Protected Villages
were the most effective in the country due to the
resources that initially could be allocated to their
establishment and development. Yet by 1978 only 60%
of the arable land in those Tribal Trust Lands was
being cultivated again.(23) On the other hand, Dr
Watt was also to admit that certain advantages had
become apparent. Health care was much easier, while
the Ministry of Education had succeeded in maintai-
ning continuity of education.
An official classified Rhodesian Army study on
the effectiveness of Protected Villages in Chiweshe
and Madziwa stated that
The "growth point" concept is showing definite
signs of development ... The civil population
in the PV' s (Protected Villages) appear reaso-
nably adjusted. The unpopularity of the PV's is
directly related to the restrictions placed on
the population, eg. food control, curfews, etc.
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While Chiweshe and Madziwa represented the most suc-
'cessful schemes, the majority of Protected Villages
were in a worse state. Two case studies within Ope-
ration Hurricane serve as illustrations.
The same Army document quoted above states the
following as regards Kandeya and Bushu Tribal Trust
Lands, and Chesa African Purchase Area (52 villages)
Kandeya was the hub of the war (in the North-
east) and major killing ground from the begin-
ning of Hurricane ... With the implementation
of the PV's (Protected Villages) and the main-
tenance of a reasonable force level, CT (Commu-
nist Terrorist) activity was de-escalated con-
siderably. Because of the speed in which the
PV's were erected in this area, social reper-
cussions on the population were considerable.
Again because of the speed ... manpower require-
ments for the programme have not kept pace and
the training of INTAF staff has been minimal.
Command and control has almost collapsed due to
the poor standard of junior leadership. Because
of the inadequate manpower and junior leader-
ship the CT's have regained freedom of movement
including easy access to the population and
food. Chesa has reverted to a traditional R & R
(rest and recreation) and RV (meeting) area for
CT groups.
A final lengthy quotation from this study represents
a typical example from the worst cases. The areas
concerned were Mudzi Tribal Trust Land (15 villages),
Mutoko Tribal Trust Land (22 villages) and Murewa
Tribal Trust Land (23 villages).
PV's (protected Villages) in these TTL's (Tri-
bal Trust Lands) have generally failed to
achieve their objectives for the following
reasons:
i. Lack of manpower
ii. Lack of equipment
iii. Dissipation of effort
On average 40% of the population are living in
PV's. The remainder are living in the bush,
other TTL's or Salisbury (Harare). The CT's
(Communist Terrorists) have total control over
the population and because they have to control
it is virtually impossible to move the people,
who are living in the bush, back into PV's,
without a major military exercise. This would
be costly in manpower and equipment. To enforce
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the move back into the PV's, drastic measures
would have to be taken, eg. the complete kil-
ling of isolated pockets of the population. To
ensure the retention of the people in the PV's
it would require a sustained military effort in
the area for at least six months. The military
problems of the area are magnified in that one
must find the local population first before one
can find the CT. Intelligence gathering is vir-
tually impossible. The civilian population is
totally alienated against the Government. Nor-
mal civil administration had collapsed with
consequent breakdown of law and order.
The "drastic measures' referred to and illustrated
above bear witness not only to a basically punitive
approach to the Protected Village programme, but
also to a dismissive attitude amongst the white
population in general towards the rural black popu-
lation .
3.8 Conclusion
Although evidence has been presented as to the broad
failure of the strategy of Protected Villages, this
is not to suggest that Rhodesian officials were per
se insensitive to the medium and long term goals of
these villages. In a planning document issued by the
Department of Internal Affairs it was concluded that
The short term objective is the removal of the
African people from terrorist influence for the
sake of national security, but the full attain-
ment of this short term aim must surely result
in our reaching the ultimate goal of more con-
centrated and more rapid development of the
African people and the areas which they inhabit.
The balance of available evidence rather suggests
the execution of the strategy of Protected Villages
suffered two major shortcomings. First there was
an over-emphasis on the short term goal of physi-
cally concentrating the local population and the
freedom of action this would give the Security For-
ces. In the second place there was a lack of sus-
tained effort in the allocation of resources to the
development of Protected Villages and the increase
of the general standard of living in them. In those
areas such as Madziwa and Chiweshe Tribal Trust
Lands where such a sustained effort had occurred,
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the results were correspondingly better than else-
where .
As stated in the introductory remarks to this
Chapter, and borne out by an examination of the geo-
graphical distribution of Protected Villages, these
villages were erected across insurgent infiltration
routes as near to the border as possible. The aim
was to deny insurgent forces food, intelligence and
contact with the local population during the first
stages of their infiltration into Rhodesia. Little
evidence could be found regarding the objective of
gaining the support of the local population by
resettlement and development, or of involving the
local population in their own defence. In the light
of the acute Rhodesian manpower and budget con-
straints the lack of attempts to involve the locals
in defence of Protected Villages is especially note-
worthy.
At a time when the insurgent onslaught on Rho-
desia was nearing its final intensification (mid
1977) it did appear to government officials that
Protected Villages had been successful in a number
of respects. In a document entitled Value of Protec-
ted and Consolidated Villages the advantages provi-
ded by the strategy were listed as follows (June
1977)
(a) release of operational forces for use in
other areas;
(b) protection of Government supporters from
terrorist attack ...
(c) the opportunity (of) having a captive
audience, to mobilise the masses on Govern-
ment 's side ...
(d) the chance for planned development of the
Tribal Trust Lands concerned together with
the people through their tribal leaders, in
order to get the economic return to help
pay for the vast security bill and to speed
up the move into the cash economy ...
(e) closer contact between the people and the
administration and between the people and
security forces such as the Police ...
(f) provision of facilities for the people ...
within easy reach ...
Disadvantages included:
(a) complete disruption of the normal kraal
life ...
(b) tying up of large numbers of European and
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African staff on protective and administra-
tive duties ...
(c) great drain on Government resources finan-
cially and materially.
The document concludes
... protected villages have
1 not been completely
successful because we have not gone all the
way; we have not detained the troublemakers; we
do not completely control the movements of the
inhabitants by day and night; we do not control
agricultural activity and our protective mea-
sures are limited. The same applies even more
so to consolidated villages . . .
As the insurgent onslaught developed from early 1978
onwards, the effectiveness of Protected Villages
declined further to the extent described in the
'worst case
1 example of Mudzi, Mutoko and Murewa
Tribal Trust Lands.
In broad terms the strategy of Protected Villa-
ges as employed in Rhodesia was not a success. The
initial results obtained by operation Overload and
Overload Two were encouraging, but the subsequent
execution was found wanting. The primary short-term
objective, isolation of the insurgent forces, was
not achieved. This was not only the result of poorly
trained and unmotivated protecting forces manning
the keeps, but also as a result of the fact that the
insurgent parallel hierachies mentioned previously
were not broken prior to or concurrently with the
resettlement of people in Protected Villages.
Although Special Branch did screen the local
population during relocation, this was executed in a
rudimentary fashion. As the war intensified and
resettlement became widespread this limited screen-
ing was reduced even further.
In the final instance protective measures
employed in Protected Villages proved inadequate.
Not only were the physical security devices rudimen-
tary, but the manpower allocated to each Protected
Village was the bare minimum. In combination they
could not prevent intimidation of the people by
insurgent forces. Under these circumstances the sup-
port of the local population for the Security Forces
could not easily be obtained.
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1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutio-
nary War (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 53.
2. R. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency
(Chatto and Windus, London, 1966), p. 56.
3. Ibid, pp. 124-5.
4. According to the Rhodesian Army manual Mili-
tary Support to the Civil Power (MCP) (restricted,
as amended, dated 1 May 1976), p. xvi, a no-go area
was
... one from which all civilians are excluded
by an order of the Protecting Authority, in
terms of Section 4(1)(b) of the Emergency
Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) regula-
tions as published in Government Notice 739/73,
as amended in order to ensure that they do not
become involved in operations conducted by
Security Forces against terrorists.
Only authorised members of the Security Forces,
on duty, will move in no-go areas and no action
may be instituted against them for any death or
injury caused to any persons within the area by
any act performed in good faith in the course
of operations conducted during the time whilst
the order is in force.
5. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts:
Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 89.
6. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Jul. 1974),
p. 3311.
7. According to District Commissioner Bill
Johnstone 63 000 truckloads of personal possessions
in 5 ton lorries were used. Rhodesia Herald (13 Dec.
1974).
8. It is interesting to compare the approach
used by the British in Malaya, where squatter fami-
lies were compensated for their movement. For buil-
ding new homes, each family received a cash grant
eventually totalling $100 (US) with the timber and
thatch for new huts being supplied at cost price.
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Chapter 4
BORDER MINEFIELD OBSTACLES
In the period 1974 to 1979, Rhodesia invested
nearly Rh$ 10 million in capital expenditure alone
to establish border minefield obstacles. Although
the strategy was only vaguely defined at national
level, it did constitute an important element of
military strategy at Joint Operational Centre and
Army brigade level of command. At these levels the
construction of such obstacles was linked, in vary-
ing degrees, to the establishment of no-go areas,
curfews and the resettlement of the local population
into Protected Villages. This was specifically the .
case in 'Operations Hurricane and Repulse along
Rhodesia's eastern borders with Mozambique.(2)
L
4 . 1 Cordon Sanitaire
To be effective any border control system must ful-
fill three related functions, namely detection,
delay and neutralization.
Simply stated, border control operations should
impede movement of insurgents across the area
under surveillance and cause them to commit
acts that will lead to detection. During the
delay, firepower and intercepting forces can
destroy the insurgents.(1)
Undoubtedly the creation of an impenetrable cordon
sanitaire is almost impossible. More recent examples
that have, however, proved effective are those
dividing the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic, and along the Israeli
borders with Lebanon and Syria. As was the case in
Algeria with the Morice line these barriers repre-
sented a major undertaking and massive capital
expenditure.
The basic characteristics of such cordons are
1. Physical obstacles that delay any breaching
operation.
2. An alarm system indicating the location of
any attempt at breaching the cordon.
3. Quick reaction forces that react immediate-
ly to any alarm.
4. Constant patrolling and vigilance along the
total length of the cordon, day and night.
5. Finally, these cordons were typically con-
structed along the entire length of a border. The
aim was thus to halt all cross-border movement, and
not to channel or limit any such occurences.
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4.2 Rhodesian Cordons Sanitaires
The origin of the Rhodesian strategy for the crea-
tion of a cordon sanitaire remains uncertain. Even more
vague is the initial concept and empirical data that the
operation was based on. A single fact that is, how-
ever, self-evident can be deduced from the date of
the first such attempt. During 1974 the insurgent
threat to Rhodesia was confined to the North-east,
and to all intents and purposes provided no evidence
that suggested its rapid spread to the rest of the
country. Events in far-away Portugal could, similar-
ly, at this stage not have implied the rapid trans-
fer of power in Mozambique.lt would thus seem that
when construction began on the first attempt at a
cordon sanitaire, the scope planned was strictly
limited to the North-eastern border.
Construction on this first Rhodesian attempt,
officially termed the Cordon Sanitaire (Corsan) ,
started during May 1974. It took 24 months to com-
plete the 179 km of Corsan at a cost of Rh$ 27 000
per kilometer.
According to official classified documentation:
The original Cordon Sanitaire was designed to
act as an obstacle which would provide warning
of people crossing in either direction, and in
itself be a deterrent to crossings taking place.
Timely warning would theoretically enable
troops to react and eliminate the group.
The design of the Corsan is shown diagrammatically in
Figure 4.1. It consists of two game fences approxi-
mately 25 metres apart within which was enclosed a
minefield. Blast mines were laid in the minefield at
a density of 1 to 3 mines for every meter of Corsan
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25m 2,1m Game
Fence
3 Rows of mines with ratio
of 1-3 blast mines per
metre of front
Alarm Fence
x x
Drag Road
Figure 4.1: Cordon Sanitaire
length. (Blast mines rely on the force of the
explosion rather than on shrapnel for their effect) .
A 'drag
1 road was constructed along the Rhodesian
side of the inner fence to facilitate the location
of tracks. (Drag roads are constituted by bulldozing
areas of bush to create strips of cleared ground
regularly swept and examined for footprints left by
transgressors).
The 25 metres of minefield were treated with a
defoliant known as HYVAR-X which totally destroyed
all vegetation. Attempts to further defoliate strips
of 150 metres each on either side of the Corsan met
with lesser degrees of success, largely as a result
of the cheaper herbicide used as TORDON 225.(3)
At a later stage an alarm fence was fitted t'o
the inner fence. The original system installed was a
YEAL system, but proved too sensitive and unreliable.
After a high level delegation had studied both
the YEAL and DTR 78 systems in Israel, the lat-
ter was chosen for further installation.
Although initial planning provided for the installa-
tion of an alarm system along the total length of
the Corsan, this objective was not achieved.
In theory the system was linked to control
points every 10 km along the Corsan where an alarm
was sounded. From here reaction forces could be
directed to the point of violation. From the start in-
adequate force levels and the demands of other,
urgent, tasks precluded the effective deployment of
such reaction forces along the length of the Corsan.
Even at this early stage security forces relied in-
creasingly upon regular patrols along the Corsan in place
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of highly mobile reaction forces. A variation entai-
led the direction of artillery fire for immediate
retaliation. This was attempted for a short period in
the Mjunibura area during 1975. The large number of
Corsan violations that occurred, however, resulted
in an inordinate expenditure of ammunition and the
operation was abandoned.
Further cover of the Corsan was provided by
regular patrols of mounted infantry. These forces
were specifically aimed at picking up tracks and
signs of interference with the Corsan.
Although the initial concept had seemingly
originated from the Army, in an almost panic reac-
tion to the insurgent threat of 1973, a Corsan com-
mittee was set up at inter-departmental level to co-
ordinate all civil/military aspects of the project.
Chaired by the Deputy Minister in the Office of the
Prime Minister, it consisted of senior representa-
tives from the Army, Air Force, Police, Treasury,
Internal Affairs and the Department of Tsetse and
Trypanosomiases Control. This last department had
wide experience in the construction of game fences
and was initially made responsible for all Corsan
fencing.
Within the Army the Corps of Engineers lay
the minefield while the Signal Corps installed
and maintained the alarm system. A civilian firm,
Agricura (SA) Pty Ltd, was contracted for the
defoliation.
Some initial success was achieved by the Corsan,
but this came from casualties caused by blast mines
and not from Security Force reaction to violations.
Very few of the casualties were captured, most lea-
ving only a blood spoor leading into Mozambique. The
lack of concrete evidence regarding the effective-
ness of the Corsan soon led to a loss of confidence
in the obstacle and even less effective policing of
it.
The configuration of the Corsan had, in effect,
determined its own failure. There were several major
contributing factors: the limited width of the mined strip
the ineffective type of mine used; the effects of
the heavy sub-tropical rains on these mines; the
placements of the alarm system on the inner fence,
and the difficulty encountered in maintaining the
minefield.
Since these factors constantly recurred in sub-
sequent additions and extensions to the Corsan, each
will be discussed in turn.
Within weeks of construction, the narrowness of
the minefield became the first evident shortcoming
107Minefield Obstacles
in the obstacle. The Rhodesian Corps of Engineers
later assessed it as follows:
The depth of 25 metres for a barrier minefield
was somewhat ludicrous,, as with normal breach-
ing techniques this could be breached within
two hours.
The method of breaching developed by the insurgents
was in fact even less time-consuming. They simply
dug holes at stride length, thus avoiding the detai-
led breaching of the total width of the minefield.
Breaching could furthermore take place at night
across a clearly demarcated, defoliated, strip.
Defoliation and the heavy annual summer rains fur
ther significantly reduced the effectiveness of
these mines. Heavy rains exposed mines, tumbled and
shifted them. It also buried a number deep enough to
avoid their detonation through the pressure exerted
on the ground by the weight of a man. Furthermore,
the Rhodesian Engineers were later to state:
Maintenance was impossible. The conditions
described above made the minefield more dange-
rous to breach than to walk over.
In the final instance, placement of the alarm
system on the inner fence, and the lack of__
depth and density of mines mentioned already ensured
the ineffectiveness of the Corsan. Insurgent members
leaving Rhodesia could, in the first place, trip the
alarm and still have enough time to breach the mine-
field before the reaction force arrived. In the
second place, insurgents entering Rhodesia only
activated the alarm as a last obstacle. In this case
the alarm merely indicated that a breach had occur-
red The insurgents were thus already a distance
into the country before the reaction force arrived. In
the absence of sufficient and effective quick reac-
tion forces the installation of the alarm system in
itself was questionable.
The advantages mentioned above regarding tne
insurgents, were further increased by the slow reac-
tion of Security Forces to any indications of
breaches. Yet this was largely due to the large num-
ber of false alarms caused by wild game either acti-
vating the alarm system or detonating mines.
The lessons learnt from the Corsan led to the
experimental construction of a Modified Cordon Sani-
taire (Mod Corsan). Only 18 km of this version were
constructed at a total cost of Rh$ 288 000, or
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Rh$ 16 000 per kilometer (see Fig 4.2). Due to
various delays the Mod Corsan took 4 months to com-
plete. It was, however, largely a further develop-
ment and extension of a tract of existing Corsan.
The Mod Corsan consisted of a modified double
apron fence (rows of semi-coiled> barbed wire on top
of each other) constructed about' 300m inside the
existing Corsan with a drag road on the inward side.
Three rows of mines were laid in the strip between
the apron fence and the Corsan at a total density of
2 mines per meter of front (ie. a lesser density
than in the 25 metres of the Corsan).
Original Corsan with Alarm Fence
- 300m
3 Rows consisting of
1 Ploughshare per 100m
1 POMZ 10 per 100m
V3 Anti-pers. mines per metre
Modified Double Apron Fence
X ~~~~ X ~~~ X ~~~ X ~~~ X ~~ X HIZI X
Drag Road
Figure 4.2: Modified Cordon Sanitaire
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The use of directional shrapnel mines termed
ploughshares was instituted, however, as well as
omni-directional POMZ 10 shrapnel mines. Both were
attached to trip wires and had to be placed above
ground level. To conceal these mines and to lessen
the effect of rain the 300m of minefield were
treated with herbicide.
The natural camouflage proved to be an advan-
tage while also lessening the effect of rain on the
pressure mines, but the devices were now susceptible
to the regular veld fires that occur in the area. A
further advantage was that the Corsan alarm fence
was now on the enemy (ie. Mozambique) side of the
minefield. On the other hand, maintenance of the
alarm system, and close investigation of it, could
not easily be undertaken owing to access problems.
Little attention had apparently been given to the
problem of maintenance during the planning stage of
the obstacle.
The construction and maintenance teams that had
completed the task were redeployed immediately after
completion and the Mod Corsan subsequently rapidly
deteriorated to ineffectiveness.
The Mod Corsan was mainly an Army project, with
the Engineers responsible for construction of the
modified double apron fence. After evaluating the
effectiveness of this fence it was decided that the
Department of Tsetse and Trypanosomiases Control
would again construct all future fences. These, in
turn, were more of the conventional game fence
types.
Furthermore, it once again became clear that
greater emphasis had to be placed on maintenance. A
final conclusion was reached concerning doubts about
the cost effectiveness of the alarm system in the
absence of sufficient/effective reaction forces.
At this stage 6 Composite Squadron, consisting
of infantry, engineers and signallers was responsi-
ble for patrolling and maintaining both the Corsan
and Mod Corsan. Owing to the ineffectiveness of the
obstacles that had been erected and the concurrent
lack of maintenance, the squadron was achieving very
little success.
In reaction to the threat of a possible FRELIMO
(Army of Mozambique) attack on Mutare (formerly
Umtali), the construction and maintenance teams
engaged on the Mod Corsan were hastily redeployed.
It was decided to install a further improvement on
the Mod Corsan, known as the Mod Mod Corsan (see Fig
4.3) in the area.
The design used entailed the construction of a
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game fence with a fitted alarm system parallel to
the existing border fence, 300 metres in depth, on
the Rhodesian side. An all-weather road was cut
through the mountains surrounding Mutare, parallel
to the game fence.
Border fence
- 300m 3 Rows consisting of
2 Ploughshares per 100m
Y3 Ant-pers. mines per metre
Game Fence with Alarm System
All-weather Road
Figure 4.3: Modified Modified Cordon Sanitaire
The minefield laid between the two fences consisted
of three rows. Only ploughshare and pressure mines
were used to a total density of slightly over two
mines per meter of frontage.
At a later stage about 50 so-called Radio Acti-
vated Devices were also installed to strengthen the
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minefield. These 'devices' consisted of 44 gallon
drums filled with explosives and shrapnel that could
be detonated by radio link.
The Mod Mod Corsan was probably the closest
that Rhodesia came to the construction of a cordon
sanitaire in the accepted sense of the term. Until
lack of maintenance nullified its effectiveness, it
was the most successful attempt undertaken by the
Security Forces. In terms of cost, however, it was
also the most expensive. Only 20 km of Mod Mod Cor-
san were constructed, but at a total cost of approxi-
mately Rh$ 600 000 or Rh$ 30 000 per kilometre. The
high cost- was mainly due to the expense of road and
fence construction.
In spite of previous expense maintenance pro-
blems were immediately apparent. This was largely
the result of bad minelaying practices and, once
again, the lack of a pre-planned maintenance scheme.
Again an urgent request had led to hasty and ill-
planned execution.
Following the construction of the Mod Mod Cor-
san, an analysis of the results achieved, in rela-
tion to the costs involved, was undertaken. The fol-
lowing conclusions were reached:
1. Local production of pressure mines would
contribute meaningfully to the lowering of costs.
2. The limited effectiveness of the alarm sys-
tem was not cost-beneficial.
3. The cost of constructing game fences and an
all-weather road was deemed too high.
4.3 Border Minefields
Following the conclusions reached regarding the Mod
Mod Corsan, the following principles were officially
formulated for the future construction of border
obstacles:
1. The alarm system would be discarded.
2. The imported pressure mines (Rh$ 7,00 per
unit) would be replaced by a locally produced ver-
sion (Rh$ 2,60 per unit).
3. Minefields would be constructed along exis-
ting roads as far as possible to reduce costs fur-
ther.
4. No further game fences would be constructed.
A normal cattle fence for demarcation of the mine-
field would henceforth be erected on the homeward
side of the minefield only.
5. Minefields would be a minimum of 300 metres
wide.
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6. The minefield itself would largely consist
of ploughshare mines. Pressure mines would only be
used to protect the more effective ploughshare mines.
When implemented, these measures reduced the
cost per kilometer to Rh$ 2 300. A total of 864 km
of Border Minefield was eventually constructed at a
cost of ± Rh$ 2,298 million (ie. Rh$ 2 660 per km).
The Border Minefield that was laid consisted of
3 rows each containing a combination of pressure and
ploughshare mines. During the final stages of con-
struction, the density of pressure mines was increa-
sed. A pull/release switch was also incorporated
(ie. the mine was detonated by either an increase or
a decrease in tension of the trip wire).
By August 1978, when 700 km of the total mine-
field had been completed, the Rhodesian Corps of
Engineers stated that
... terrorists are now crossing the minefield
relatively easily ...
This was in spite of the fact that the Border Mine-
field had again been added to the existing stretches
of Corsan, Mod Corsan and Mod Mod Corsan. A factor
that could have been used to Security Force advan-
tage was that all insurgent crossings were now
taking place by day. But by this stage crossings
were only
... normally discovered within 24 hours of
occurrence.
Border minefield obstacles were rapidly becoming
expensive history lessons.
Having moved away from the concept of a tradi-
tional cordon sanitaire, the Rhodesian Security
Forces were attempting to construct obstacles that
in themselves would result in insurgent casualties.
Again these could not be of real value since they
were not patrolled and guarded effectively.
As with all previous attempts, maintenance was
a further serious problem. This was most evident in
those areas where the minefield bordered on game
parks such as Gona Re Zhou and Hurange (formerly
Wankie). Since only cattle fences were now used to
demarcate the obstacle, both larger and smaller game
detonated mines to the extent that a 30% replacement
rate was required to prevent the rapid deterioration
of the obstacle.
In belated recognition of the over-ambitious
schemes that had been executed up to that stage, the
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majority of funds allocated for the construction of
border minefields during 1978-9 (Rh$ 4 million) was
now used for maintenance purposes. Furthermore pro-
jected extension of minefields along almost the
total length of the border with Mozambique was post-
poned. Indifferent to the lessons of the first Cor-
sans, the Engineer's themselves, as well as the
various Joint Operation Centres were once again all
calling for the further extension of these fields in
varying degrees.
The official Engineer's study (referred to
above) concluded during August 1978 that
Finally, the Border Minefield can be said to be
the battle of Engineers in this war. Where
superiority by own forces was gained in 1977
and the early part of 1978, parity now exists.
In order to regain the superiority once held it
is necessary to:
a. Increase the sophistication of the existing
minefield to try and eliminate their specia-
lists.
b. Increase the sensity (sic) of existing mine-
fields to ensure maximum kills.
c. To construct as many new minefields as pos-
sible to:
i. Further limit terrorist crossing points
ii. Stretch their Engineer resources as far
as possible and eliminate him (sic)
iii. Gain further intelligence on routes used
and methods of crossing.
d. The implementation of the above can only
hamper their ability to conduct the war
effectively.
A single corps in the Rhodesian Army thus saw itself
as fighting its own war. The corsan and minefields
had by now gained a life of their own, independent
of broad military strategic planning. Further
efforts were all based on these dubious concepts.
Two attempts to strengthen the Border Minefield
were known as the Reinforced and Superimposed Border
Minefields.
T>e Reinforced Border Minefield entailed the
addition of pressure mines to a stretch of 110 to
120 km of Border Minefield in the South-east. It was
completed during April 1979, but revealed a need for
even further depth in the minefield.
The Superimposed Border Minefield constituted
the final addition to the system of border minefield
obstacles. It was completed during November 1979 and
114
Minefield Obstacles
entailed a further extension of the Reinforced Bor-
der Minefields. The latter had been laid between two
to five km inside the border. To this were added four
belts of marked ploughshares and unmarked pressure
mines. The total density of pressure mines per metre
of minefield thus constituted four, with a plough-
share every 15m.
As clearly indicated by these final attempts,
the Security Forces were now attempting to establish
a barrier that in itself would be a formidable
obstacle, without the addition of large numbers of
policing forces. Obviously neither own lessons
learnt, nor those of other countries were deemed to
be valid.
4.4 Conclusion
When the first Corsan was constructed Mozambique was
still for most parts firmly in Portuguese hands.
Geographically the Rhodesian border, across which
insurgent infiltration was taking place, was thus
limited to that in the North-east. It is conceivable
that at that stage, Joint Operation Centre Hurricane
aimed at establishing a Corsan along the whole fron-
tage facing Tete province. As soon as Mozambique had
gained its independence, however, the situation
changed dramatically. The entire eastern border
became a potential infiltration route.
Whereas previously, the Security Forces, with
a major commitment of both material resources and
manpower, could have reasonably attempted to create
a cordon sanitaire in the North-east, the task now
became virtually impossible given Rhodesia's limited
resources.
Although the initial strategic concept was
never clearly formulated, it would seem that Joint
Operation Centre Hurricane did not envisage a Corsan
along its total north-eastern frontier. Apparently
the idea was rather to deny insurgent forces certain
routes and to force them to use others, better
suited to Security Forces countermeasures. Yet as
insurgent infiltration spread across the eastern
frontier, this rationale changed. Through successive
extensions of the existing obstacles the aim even-
tually became totally unrealistic to seal the eastern
border. Ample evidence in this regard is provided by
the requests for further border minefields received
from Joint Operation Centres in 1978-9.
Extension of border obstacles was undertaken on
request from Joint Operation Centre within the
115Minefield Obstacles
x—X—x Border Minefield Obstacles
Figure 4.4 Border Minefield Obstacles
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PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS
5.1 The Concept
The concept of 'pseudo' insurgents, i.e. members of
the counter-insurgency forces posing as insurgents,
is a well established, if lesser known, method of
gathering intelligence and one often used by police
units involved in crime detection.
In practice select members of the Security For-
ces are trained in the habits and modus operandi of
their enemy down to the smallest detail. Groups then
infiltrate known insurgent areas, attempting to
establish themselves as genuine insurgents. In coun-
ter-insurgency terminology this phase of the opera-
tion is known as 'validification' and is aimed both
at convincing insurgents and members of the local
population of the authenticity of the group.
Once a pseudo team has established its creden-
tials as insurgent forces, the focus shifts to
gathering all available information on insurgents
and local support for them in the area. In this way
pseudo operations can contribute substantially to
the total Security Force intelligence picture. In an
area where insurgent presence has already been esta-
blished, as was the case in north-eastern Rhodesia
in 1973, and where traditional Security Force intel-
ligence sources have been eliminated through popular
support for the insurgent cause, pseudo operations
may prove to be the only reliable source of intelli-
gence.
Within the cycle of any pseudo operation, vali-
dification and the acceptance of both local popula-
tion and insurgents of the pseudo team, invariably
proves to be the most difficult. To succeed, pseudo
teams need to emulate insurgent forces in every
respect. Furthermore, the insertion of these teams
into an area is in itself a very delicate operation.
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In most cases success is only possible if the pseudo
team contains a number of former insurgents, recent-
ly captured by Security Forces and persuaded to
change sides ('turned', in counter-insurgency jar-
gon) .
Again, this need not go hand-in-hand with physi-
cal intimidation as might seem necessary. Numerous
studies on the motivation of 'revolutionary' forces
indicate that ideological commitment to the cause of
'liberation' plays a far less important role in
motivation than is generally believed.(1)
Research has substantiated that there is a wil-
lingness among captured insurgent personnel to
change sides in the traumatic post-contact and ini-
tial period of capture. Should a captured insurgent
not be presented with obvious means of escape and be
physically involved in counter-insurgency operations
on the side of Government forces he, in effect,
becomes committed to the latter cause.
With the aid of these former insurgents, pseudo
teams are able to establish contact with the esta-
blished insurgent support structures within local
communities. Through the local population, further
contact with insurgent groups could also follow.
Information gleaned in this way is passed on to the
traditional elements of the Security Forces for
action. Only in very exceptional circumstances would
a pseudo team itself use intelligence obtained to
eliminate insurgent forces. For, if in the latter
case, the operation is not entirely successful, the
pseudo team would immediately risk being exposed as
government forces and thus lose all prospect of
gaining intelligence.
But pseudo operations are not exclusively aimed
at obtaining intelligence leading to insurgent
casualties. The aim of these operations can also be
much less subtle. By passing themselves off as
insurgents, pseudo teams could sow distrust between
the local population and insurgent forces in gene-
ral. Such actions could include acts of indiscretion
towards property, women and cattle, or local customs
and tribal beliefs. If, as was the case in Rhodesia,
competing insurgent forces (ZANLA and ZPRA) are
vying for local support, pseudo practices could fan
any friction between such forces into open armed
hostility. Ethnic affiliation could aid in this
regard.
However, if the strategy is to survive, it
needs to be tightly controlled and limited in prac-
tice. Once members of the local population and
insurgents become aware of the strategy, their
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security becomes stricter and further validification
and establishment of pseudo teams becomes increa-
singly difficult. There is the danger, also, that
pseudo operations may be used as licence for trans-
gression of the law. If the two factors are combined
and members of the local population become aware of
Security Forces posing as insurgents and committing
crimes in this guise, the real insurgent forces are
presented with an ideal propaganda weapon. At such
time both Security Forces and the Government are
likely to lose some of their claim to legitimacy
that seems a natural product of their position as
enforcers of, and compilers with, the law.
In recent counter-insurgency history, pseudo
operations were first conducted by Special Branch in
Malaya. Since the concept was only introduced
towards the latter stages of the campaign, the
impact was limited. The idea was, however, regenera-
ted and expanded during the Mau-Mau emergency in
Kenya under the driving leadership of Capt (later
General Sir) Frank Kitson.(2) It was from these
experiences that Rhodesian pseudo operations were
born.
5.2 The Formation of the Selous Scouts
In the period after the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence Special Branch was the first to employ
methods of gathering intelligence that could be ter-
med as pseudo operations. These were first conducted
in the Zwimba and Chirau Tribal Trust Lands during
1966 and were continued in these areas on an infor-
mal basis up to 1973. These first attempts were
unsophisticated and mainly aimed at determining the
loyalties of members of the local population.
Within Rhodesian Army circles pseudo operations
were apparently first suggested by the second in
command of the Rhodesian Light Infantry,Major John
Hickman. Sometime before 1966 he forwarded a paper
to Army headquarters outlining the possible imple-
mentation of such a scheme. Subsequently after
much delay, a pilot scheme was jointly run during
1966 by the Army, Special Branch and the British
South Africa Police. This met with little success,
for, at the time, the vast majority of the local
population could still be considered passive, if
not hostile to the insurgent cause. Little intelli-
gence could thus be gained by posing as insurgents.
Moreover, pseudo modus operand! was at an early and
rudimentary stage of development. For the time being
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serious Army interest abated.
While the traditional sources of Security Force
intelligence had been functioning adequately inside
Rhodesia up to 1971, a drastic change resulted from
ZANLA penetration into the North-east during 1972.
Security Forces suddenly found themselves in an
actively hostile environment late in 1972.
By the end of that year Rhodesian authorities
were fast becoming aware that the security situation
in the North-east was deteriorating rapidly. What
had seemed, to be an effective and sound network of
informers dried up in a matter of weeks. Although
aware of insurgent presence and intimidation, lack
of operational intelligence forestalled effective
counter-measures. This lack of detailed and accurate
information now led to the regeneration of the con-
cept of pseudo insurgents.
The former second-in-command of the Rhodesian
Light Infantry was by this stage Officer Commanding
2 Brigade. Against the background of an almost total
lack of operational intelligence and declining Army
morale, Brigadier Hickman obtained permission to
restart a pilot pseudo scheme. Similar interest had
been revived in Special Branch.
With the approval of Joint Operation Centre
Hurricane, Superintendent Peterson of Special Branch
Harare formed an all-black pseudp team on 26
January 1973. The team of six men, two African
Detective Constables and four former insurgents were
placed under the command of the Special Branch offi-
cer at Bindura. Following rudimentary training the
team was alternatively deployed in Bushu and Madziwa
Tribal Trust Lands, near Saint Albert's Mission and
in Chinamora Tribal Trust Land near Harare. While
some useful information was gathered, these opera-
tions led to no insurgent casaulties. At the time
the lack of white leadership an'd expertise in the
team was identified as the major problem. For a few
months the team was disbanded, but eventually reor-
ganized - this time to include white members.
A few weeks after the formation of the Special
Branch team, the Army commenced with two pseudo
teams of their own. These consisted of two Special
Air Service non-commissioned officers who had been
attached to the Army Tracking Wing at Lake Kariba
and a number of black soldiers from the Rhodesia
African Rifles. Finally, former insurgents were
added to the teams.
With the benefit of some weeks of operational
deployment with their own pseudo team, Special
Branch could train the Army teams in much greater
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detail - as well as provide them with vital and
detailed intelligence.
Subsequently a third Army team was deployed
with the result that operations could be conducted
in the Mtepatepa farming area and in Chiweshe Tribal
Trust Land. However, Army disillusionment soon redu-
ced the number of teams to two. By this stage effec-
tive control of all teams had passed to Special
Branch. .
The first tangible success attributed to these
teams occurred during August 1973 when a ZANLA
insurgent was captured along the Ruya River. During
the same operation the concept of 'frozen areas' was
developed to minimize the chances of a clash between
members of the Security Forces and a pseudo team.
The official definition of such areas read as fol-
lows:
A Frozen Area is a clearly defined area, in
which Security Forces are precluded from opera-
ting, other than along main roads. Army Secu-
rity Forces already in an area to be declared
"Frozen" will be withdrawn from such an area by
the time stipulated in the signal intimating
that such an area is to be "Frozen". This sig-
nal must be acknowledged by the recipient. The
above ruling also applies to all armed members
of the Services and Government Departments with
the exception of:
a. Those personnel tasked to operate exclusive-
ly along the Cordon Sanitaire.
b. Those personnel stationed at Protective or
Consolidated Villages and establishments
provided with a permanent guard in which
case they are restricted to 1 000 metres
from the perimeter of such establishments.
c. In the event of a vehicle breakdown, ambush
or mine deterioration on the main road within
a Frozen Area those personnel involved are
to remain in close proximity of their trans-
port. (3)
On 31 August 1973, a pseudo team effected the first
ZANLA casualty to result from these operations.
Within both the Army and Special Branch these
pseudo operations were being conducted under the
tightest security. Co-ordination between pseudo and
regular Army units was achieved on an informal basis.
As a result, a map reading error led to a clash
between the pseudo team and an Army patrol during
which the pseudo team commander,Sergeant Rabie,was
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killed. Temporarily all pseudo operations were hal-
ted.
By this stage the senior Army and Special
Branch members involved were convinced of the use of
pseudo operations. The death of Andre Rabie had,
however, indicated that pseudo operations had to be
conducted within a formalised structure and co-
ordinated with other Security Force actions in an
area.
During November 1973 a former Regimental Ser-
geant Major of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Captain
Ron Reid-Daly, was recruited and promoted to Major
as Officer Commanding the pseudo insurgent unit to
become known as the Selous Scouts. The personal
involvement of Lieutenant-General Walls in this
appointment suggests that pseudo operations had
received official blessing. Henceforth pseudo opera-
tions fell directly under the control of Special
Branch. Officially part of Army Tracker Wing, the
training camp moved to a secluded venue at Makuti
near Lake Kariba where a number of vigorous selec-
tion courses were conducted, eventually swelling
the unit to about 25 members. The regimental base
eventually came to be situated at Inkomo near
Darwendale.
When the first troop of pseudo operators was
ready in January 1974, they were deployed from Bin-
dura, where their Special Branch officer was loca-
ted, into Chiweshe, Madziwa and Bindura Tribal Trust
Lands. By the end of February a second troop became
operational and a third during March. All three
troops operated in Shona-speaking areas against
ZANLA. Each troop was divided into three operating
sections of nine to twelve men, a number of whom
were former insurgents. Depending on their number,
however, sections increased in strength to twenty and
thirty men strong in some cases. Although the unit was nomi-
nally under Army control, control of intelligence,
deployment and in some instances training was in the
hands of Special Branch. At no stage were even the
military intelligence organisations allowed to exert
any influence over the unit.
Security, however, remained a problem, for even
at this early stage it was becoming common know-
ledge in the operational area that the Security For-
ces were masquerading as insurgents.(4)
Following operations in Omay Tribal Trust Land
bordering Lake Kariba during December 1974 the need
for Matabele pseudo teams to operate against ZPRA
within Matabeleland became apparent. These opera-
tions co-incided with the discovery that ZPRA had
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started using rubber dingies to cross the lake and
enter the neighbouring areas. For the first time
Security Forces also encountered insurgent forces
using radio's inside Rhodesia. As a result a ZPRA
orientated pseudo troop was formed and stationed
near Bulawayo.
During the first half of 1974 the success of
the Selous Scouts had reached such proportions that
Lieutenant-General Walls instructed the unit during
May to double its strength from three to six troops.
By December this had been achieved with an addition
of about 50 former insurgents.
Although the existence of the unit, and to a
lesser extent its type of operations had by now
become an open secret, official notification of the
Selous Scouts was only served during 1977. During
April of that year the magazine To the Point repor-
ted that:
Rhodesian army chiefs have taken the wraps off
a legendary anti-terrorist unit that for two
years has played a vital and almost totally
secret role in the war ... According to their
commanding officer, Major Ron Reid-Daly, they
have been directly and indirectly responsible
for the elimination of 1 203 of the 2 500 ter-
rorists who have died in the four-year-old
war. (5)
In fact, the majority of insurgent casualties inside
Rhodesia were the direct result of intelligence
obtained during pseudo operations.
5.3 Pseudo Modus Operand!
Depending on the specific circumstances that enabled
a pseudo team to enter an area as insurgent forces,
pseudo methods and the deception employed varied
widely from one area to the next.
According to then Major Reid-Daly the role of
the Selous Scouts was to infiltrate the tribal popu-
lation and the terrorist networks, pinpoint the ter-
rorist camps and bases and then direct conventional
forces in to carry out the actual attacks. Then
depending on the skill of the particular Selous
Scouts' pseudo group concerned, their cover should
remain intact which would enable them to continue
operating in a particular area ... perhaps indefi-
nitely. (6)
As already indicated, validification was a
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prerequisite for success. Detailed operational
intelligence was required to enable a team to enter
an area without arousing suspicion. The next step
was to establish contact with the local population,
and specifically with the insurgent agents within
local villages. As a final step these agents or con-
tact men were used as go-betweens with the pseudo
team and any other insurgent team in the area.
Having made contact a meeting was arranged which
would be used finally to establish the credentials
of the pseudo team.
Patience is essential in almost all types of
pseudo operations. Arranging a meeting with a real
insurgent group could entail several weeks during
which numerous letters were passed back and forth
via mujibas (insurgents' youth supporters) and con-
tact men. If successful, a meeting would be arranged
between the two groups at a neutral spot in which
the senior group was approached by the juniors. Fol-
lowing this, the members of the two groups met and
mingled. Information would be exchanged, beer drunk
and possibly some revolutionary songs sung. Informa-
tion gleaned at such meetings, as well as from other
sources was then passed back to Special Branch or
directly to Fire Force, the helicopter-borne reac-
tion force, for action. One such specific type of
operation that proved to be highly effective, was
termed the Observation Post tactic.
For obvious reasons white pseudo team members
could not come into direct contact with members of
the local population or insurgents. When a pseudo
team thus entered a village, the white(s) remained
outside and as close as possible. After contact had
been made between village members and a pseudo team,
for example, the village would be kept under close
observation. The reaction of villagers very often
gave a good indication of the presence and location
of other insurgent groups. Upon confirmation of such
suspicion, the Selous Scouts team leader would call
in an air strike or Fire Force on the insurgent
group. To facilitate this, observation posts were
manned on high ground close to the village. Former
insurgent members with a detailed knowledge of both
local customs and insurgent practices proved inva-
luable in picking up the most minute indications of
insurgent presence. The use of observation posts was
especially suited to the rugged terrain in the North-
east of Rhodesia and proved highly successful in
these areas.
The modus operand! of the Selous Scouts was
particularly well suited for engaging the services
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of captured or wounded insurgents. It often happened
that Fire Force attacked an insurgent group, elimi-
nating most of them and capturing the remainder.
Immediately following capture and the traumatic
memory of the preceding fire-fight, these insurgents
would be 'turned
1 by promise and threat. Along
with a number of Scouts these prisoners would adopt
the identity of the former insurgent group and func-
tion as they had done in an adjacent area suffi-
ciently far enough from the local population who
could identify them. In this instance the newly-
turned insurgents would introduce the group to con-
tact men and in general establish their bona fides
with the local population. This method, however,
relied upon total security, specifically in the area
of the contact. But even where a prisoner had become
compromised he could still be used as advisor or
source of detailed local information -
A further variation of pseudo work entailed
what were termed "hunter-killer
1 groups. In contrast
to a purely defensive, intelligence-gathering role,
these teams were used aggressively. Having located a
specific insurgent infiltration route, pseudo teams
were despatched along it on the pretext of returning
from Rhodesia for resupply and retraining after an
extensive operation. En route further information
was collected while the group,in contrast to its
normal intelligence function, eliminated all insur-
gents on the way.
Hunter-killer groups were first used north of
Mount Darwin in the Mavuradonha area where the rug-
ged terrain inhibited normal Security Force opera-
tions .
In relation to their numbers, the success of
the Selous Scouts became an important element in
Rhodesian counter-insurgency operations. Both senior
Army and Special Branch officers continuously called
for the further expansion of the unit. Once the
Selous Scouts had two platoons trained for deploy-
ment, their tactical headquarters shifted to Bindura.
As the war spread accross the country, deployment of
Selous Scouts was no longer limited to the North-
east. The first Scouts troops moved to Inkamo Bar-
racks on 12 July 1974, which became the regimental
rear base. During January 1977 it was renamed the
Andre Rabie Barracks.
In general, the Selous Scouts achieved less
success in penetrating the tighter, more disciplined
ranks of ZPRA than was the case in the unstructured
command and control groupings of ZANLA. Three Group
did, however, achieve considerable success in a
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number of clandestine operations into Botswana and
Francistown itself.
Employment of the observation post tactic which
had been so successful in the North-east proved
ineffective in the rolling savannah plains and less
densely populated areas of Matabeleland.
Rhodesian external operations commenced on a
large scale during 1976 and were mainly aimed at
ZANLA bases in Mozambique. A major limitation until
then had been the lack of detailed operational
intelligence on the location and lay-out of such a
base. As will be shown in Chapter 7, it was a Selous
Scouts pseudo operation in Holdenby Tribal Trust
Land which led to the capture of a ZANLA insurgent
who could compensate for this need. This led to the
Nyadzonia raid of August 1976.
ZPRA pseudo teams were almost constantly invol-
ved in small-unit operations along the Grove road in
eastern Botswana. The group was also responsible for
the capture of important ZAPU officials in Francis-
town. The intelligence obtained from these men led
to daring Land Rover raids into Lusaka, which tempo-
rarily paralysed the ZPRA conventional threat.
In yet other instances, pseudo team members
were deployed deep into Mozambique and Zambia on
one- or two-man, reconnaissance missions to deter-
mine physically the exact locations of bases, or of
specific installations in such bases. For this pur-
pose a Reconnaissance Troop was formed during the
latter half of 1976. With a maximum strength of
twelve men they specialized in deep penetration in
preparation for larger external operations.
To facilitate security, the Selous Scouts con-
structed prefabricated corrugated iron 'forts' at
their forward deployment bases at Bindura. Bulawayo,
Mount Darwin, Chiredzi, Mutoko, Rusapi, etc. When
operating in an area, the fort would be occupied as
forward tactical headquarters from which deployment
(at night) was undertaken, and where all captured
insurgents were interrogated. All captives were
hooded and flown into a landing zone in the fort. If
the captives were important enough, eg. a political
commissar, section leader and one or two other mem-
bers of a group, the group would be reconstituted
with pseudo operators and returned to the area. In
this way the team had a sound knowledge of the
area from the start while the former insurgents
knew who their contact man in each village was and
how to contact other groups.
Should a pseudo team establish itself in an
area as an insurgent group in its own right, the
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process of validification could entail extraordinary
measures. It could entail calling in an air strike
by Security Forces on their own position or close to
it. Alternatively it could consist of select aggres-
sion against Security Forces or civilians. One such
example was documented in Africa Confidential
After a white farmstead about forty miles
north-west of Salisbury had been attacked, it
was discovered that one of the two groups in
the assault were Selous Scouts ... (7)
In some cases attempts at validification did more
harm than'good, as was the case with the first
attack on a Protected Village. This was carried out
by a pseudo team in the Mount Darwin area in Kandeya
Tribal Trust Land during 1974 and precipitated a
rash of similar attacks by real insurgent groups. A
second example occurred in Nyanga North where a
resident pseudo team trained and briefed the local
population so well in aiding them that by the time
real insurgents penetrated the area, a clandestine
organisation had been firmly established for them.
Especially during the initial years, many
pseudo operations were conducted to sow dis-
trust between members of the local population and
the insurgents. Rudimentary attempts towards achie-
ving this objective consisted for instance of theft
or offending local customs. Numerous further
refinements were added. One such practice entailed
calling in an air strike or Fire Force on the insur-
gent group after they had left a specific kraal.
After two or three such occurrences the insurgents
invariably suspected the kraal members of informing
Security Forces of their presence. In revenge, and to
forestall any repetition, innocent kraal members were
executed. This would normally put an end to any
voluntary support that the insurgents could expect
from the kraal. (At the same time such punishment
could also intimidate the inhabitants from helping
the Security Forces).
A second method used relatively widely once an
insurgent contact man had been identified, was for a
pseudo team to eliminate him publicly after label-
ling him a traitor to the insurgent cause. Since the
rest of the kraal members knew the contact man to be
a loyal and staunch insurgent supporter, such a death
would lead to considerable disillusionment and
bewilderment. This practice had become so common by
the end of the war that the Rhodesian Criminal
Investigation Department had opened a number of
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murder dossiers on Selous Scouts and Special Branch
members. Invariably poor security led to a general
knowledge of these measures. As the war progressed
and Selous Scouts operations increased and intensi-
fied, this knowledge also spread to the local popu-
lation and insurgent forces in the field.
Although the short term benefits that were
achieved by such illegal actions were substantial,
once the local population became aware of these
practices, it could only have had a distinctly nega-
tive effect on their attitude vis a vis the govern-
ment in general. The task of government, i.e. judi-
cious law enforcement and maintenance of law and
order, is incompatible with substantial transgres-
sion of the law. Under these circumstances it
becomes extremely difficult for any such regime to
claim legitimacy.
Once insurgent forces and their supporters
became aware of pseudo activities, various measures
were instituted to identify any such teams. Specific
bangles and pieces of clothing were worn which would
provide positive proof of identification. On speci-
fic instruction, members of the local population
changed their method of aiding insurgent forces.
Instead of leaving nightly food parcels at predeter-
mined spots, each insurgent received his food indi-
vidually during daylight. Any white member of such a
team would thus be identified. It was only during
1979 that the Selous Scouts succeeded in fielding
all-black teams to eliminate this problem.
In reaction to these changing means of identi-
fication, the Selous Scouts launched an intensive
intelligence effort to remain constantly aware of
what these entailed in any specific area.
A major success that did result from these ope-
rations was the mutual suspicion and distrust
between insurgent forces in the field. Contact
between such groups was increasingly preceded by
lengthy exchanges of oral and written messages and
co-ordination of forces for a single operation pre-
sented acute problems. This was even more so in
those areas where both ZANLA and ZPRA forces were
operating. Within ZANLA, groups frequently attacked
one another. To increase this breach even further,
pseudo ZANLA teams began attacking ZPRA insurgents,
thus ensuring that the next encounter between ZANLA
and ZPRA would turn into an armed clash. During the
period between 1976 and 1978 when ZANLA attempted to
encroach on Matabeleland, the success of this method
was such that a captured ZANLA commander confessed
to having been shocked by the fact that his first
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eight contacts were with ZPRA forces. He was captu-
red by the Security Forces in the ninth.
A further method employed in the Mount Darwin
area entailed the intimidation of known contact men
to aid the Selous Scouts. Shortly after having cal-
led in Fire Force on a group of insurgents in the
area, the pseudo team visited the contact man. It
was made clear to him that failure to co-operate
with Security Forces would lead to his death. There-
after his kraal was kept under constant surveillance
from an observation post. Each time an insurgent
group entered the area, the contact man would, for
example, hang up a certain blanket after which he
would meet the Selous Scouts at a predetermined spot
to exchange information. Fire Force would then nor-
mally eliminate the insurgent group.
The contact men recruited in this manner were
code-named 'Lemon
1 and 'Orange' and collectively
known as 'Fruit Salad'. Since they were also paid
for their services, the sudden appearance of riches
in both cases led to insurgent suspicion and retri-
bution. In his book Selous Scouts - Top Secret War
Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly describes a similar
operation code-named Market Garden with the two com-
promised contact men known as Apple and Banana. This
incident occurred at the foot of the Mavuradanha moun-
tains in the North-east. (8)
As stated above, the Selous Scouts eventually
could claim the highest kill ratio of all Rhodesian
Security Forces. Although Fire Force, and First Bat-
talion Rhodesian Light Infantry, which constituted
the quick deployment troops of Fire Force, were phy-
sically responsible for most of these insurgent
casualties, the intelligence that had led them to
the insurgents originated from the Selous Scouts.
Yet, the very success of pseudo operations led
to constant demands for the further expansion of the
unit. Originally a single platoon of highly skilled
men, the Selous Scouts grew into a disproportionate-
ly large unit of 1 800 men. A substantive portion
were, however, territorial soldiers and thus not
permanently attached to the unit. The rapid increase
in numbers in itself led to a number of problems. In
the first instance the unit was forced to lower its
entry standards to obtain enough personnel to comply
with Combined Operation demands. This led to a gene-
ral lowering of operational standards in the pseudo
role as did the widespread use of the less-demanding
observation post tactic. The latter did not require
as high a standard of training and experience as did
normal pseudo operations. On the other hand, these
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recruits were not all suitable for pseudo-type ope-
rations, while their training could not be as tho-
rough.
As a result pseudo operations again shifted in
emphasis away from that of gathering intelligence to
a more aggressive role where insurgent casualty
figures became all-important. This process was aided
initially when substantial bonusses were paid for
insurgent casualties.
5.4 Conclusion
The major problem touched on above, that of the
widespread use of pseudo operations and the illegal
nature of some of these practices, relates to a much
wider problem, namely that of legitimate political
authority. Without a legitimate claim to authority
in the eyes of a substantial portion of its popula-
tion, a government would have to rely on coercion
alone to enforce compliance to its laws.
Legitimacy is a political necessity, for it
reduces ... dependence on naked power by allow-
ing (the government) ... to rely on
authority. (9)
Furthermore, Claude E. Welch points to an important
factor in relation to government resorting to force
inconsistent use of coercion can both speedily
alienate individuals and focus their discontent
upon political institutions. (10)
As a legitimate institution, authorities lay down
and enforce compliance to laws that govern human
activity in any country. Should this same government
provide evidence of not abiding by these same laws,
it stands to lose much of its legitimacy in the eyes
of those affected. Such loss of legitimacy of neces-
sity focusses on the political structures and insti-
tutions of the country. Within rural areas such dis-
satisfaction is aimed at the manifestations of
government, i.e. local administration, the police
and other government institutions and agencies.
In the following quotation Frank Kitson addres-
ses the same problem, if more directly relevant to
pseudo operations
... there is absolutely no need for special
operations to be carried out in an illegal or
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immoral way and indeed there is every reason to
ensure that they are not, because they are just
as much part of the government's programme as
any of its other measures and the government
must be prepared to take responsibility for
them. (11)
Pseudo operations were used extensively in Rhodesia
and in the long term proved to be counter-productive.
In such operations the population inevitably become
the battleground. If adequate protection from the
insurgents is not provided, pseudo operations cause
the local population to be yet further alienated
from the Security Forces. In fact, the widespread
use of such operations in Rhodesia trapped the local
population between the two opposing sides: the
insurgents on the one hand and the Security Forces
posing as insurgents on the other. Both sides were
ready to exact retribution should the local inhabi-
tants assist the enemy. Yet, purely as a military
measure pseudo operations were probably the most
effective means of effecting insurgent casualties.
According to a study by the Directorate of Military
Intelligence in 1978 a full sixty eight percent of
all insurgent fatalities inside Rhodesia could be
attributed to the Selous Scouts.
Casualty figures in themselves, however, are
not a sure indication either of success or failure
in a counter-insurgency campaign. This is particu-
larly true in pseudo operations: although numerous
insurgents were killed, Security Forces failed to
gain any permanent hold over rural areas. Such ope-
rations did succeed in creating distrust and confu-
sion both amongst the insurgents themselves and
between the insurgent forces and the local popula-
tion. At the same time the punitive approach to sub-
verted and potentially subverted rural people led
to the simultaneous creation of distrust and confu-
sion between the rural population and Security For-
ces. Security Forces completely lacked a strategy by
which they could steadily gain control over increa-
singly subverted rural areas. Therefore, the Selous
Scouts were merely the instruments of an overly
aggressive and punitive strategy, simply directed at
killing as many insurgents as possible and punishing
the rural black population to force them to desist
from support for the insurgent forces.
Security Forces should not have attempted to
exert an uncertain control over all contested areas.
The most seriously subverted Tribal Trust Lands
should have been temporarily abandoned. Those areas
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securely under government control should have been
identified. Working outwards from these secure bases,
Security Forces would then have been able to concen-
trate their resources on adjoining areas which were
as yet only partially subverted. These threatened
areas could have been consolidated by means of
strict population control and by involving the local
population in their own defence and development.
Within the structure of the Rhodesian Security
Force apparatus the affiliation of the Selous Scouts
presented problems of its own. Army control of the
unit was initially vested in the Commander of the
Army, Lieutenant-General Walls. When appointed as
General Officer Commanding, Combined Operations,
General Walls retained this relationship. COMOPS
involvement in the planning of special force opera-
tions has been discussed in Chapter 2, 'Command and
Control'. In addition friction developed between the
Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service each vying
for the status as primary special forces unit.
A particular problem resulting from Special
Branch's control over all pseudo intelligence acti-
vities was the almost total absence of co-operation
with the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The
Selous Scouts were in fact under specific Special
Branch instructions not to divulge any information
to the Directorate of Military Intelligence. It
would seem that professional jealousy and personal
animosity played a major role in these co-ordination
problems. When the concept of pseudo operations was
initially put into practice, military intelligence
organisations were by their own admission, incapable
of controlling them.
Selous Scouts liaison with brigades also left
much to be desired. An area would be frozen, pseudo
teams would move in, complete their task and be
withdrawn with very little intelligence passed on to
the brigade headquarters in whose area it had taken
place. Again Frank Kitson has very definite ideas on
the subject
... special operations must be organised and
implemented under the auspices of the normal
machine for directing the campaign and the
advantages to be gained from them weighed
against the psychological implications of them
becoming known. Furthermore normal Security
Force units should be informed as to the nature
and purpose of special operations as far as it
is consistent with the requirements of security
so that they come to regard Special Forces as
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helpful colleagues and not as wild, irresponsi
ble people whose one purpose is to steal the
credit from those who carry out more humdrum,
but necessary roles. (12)
In the final analysis the technique of pseudo ope-
rations in Rhodesia proved highly successful and re
ern^hasised its value as a method of
 rtathsrin
r
T intel
ligence. The problems encountered and deviations
from the concept were less the result of the Selous
Scouts and Special Branch than they were the result
of the absence of a coherent Security Force counter-
insurgency strategy and a punitive approach to the
whole problem of the insurgency.
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Chapter 6
INTERNAL DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS, POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL, CIVIC
ACTION
6.1 The American Concept of Stability Operations
The first Western armed force in modern history to
develop and employ a counter-insurgency approach
directed at the political and socio-economic roots
of an insurgency was the British Army, but it was
left to the US Army to formalize and structure these
ideas within a coherent doctrine.
Even before his presidency, John F. Kennedy
held strong personal convictions concerning the
world-wide threat of communist-inspired insurgency.
Challenging the fundamental views held by his coun-
try's professional military establishment, President
Kennedy actively intervened in the formulation of a
new American military doctrine. This high level con-
cern, together with an increasing military involve-
ment in South Vietnam in the ensuing years, led to a
rapid evolvement of counter-insurgency doctrine
within the US armed forces. A number of new concepts
which have proved enduring in counter-insurgency
theory were developed. The first of these is the use
of the term 'stability operations' in place of
counter-insurgency.
That type of internal defence and development
operations and assistance provided by the armed
forces to maintain, restore, or establish a
climate of order within which responsible
government can function effectively and without
which progress cannot be achieved. (1)
This view was a departure from previous military
conceptions which regarded the strategy to defeat
insurgencies mainly, if not entirely, as a counter-
guerilla problem undertaken largely by military and
police actions. Viewed as part of the broader,
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national problem of internal development, the pre-
vention of insurgency came to be recognised as
including measures for internal political, economic
and social development. Therefore, the total counter-
insurgency effort should thus entail a combination
of both effective military operations and socio-
economic reform comprising three primary elements.
1. .Environmental improvement A program designed
to eliminate the causes of popular discon-
tent and restore confidence in the establi-
shed government.
2. Resources control A program designed to
isolate the guerrillas from the people and
their resources.
3. Counter-guerrilla operations A program
designed to neutralize and eliminate the
guerrilla organisation. (2)
Stability operations combine two mutually interde-
pendant and supportive concepts: defence and develop-
ment. Internal defence is intended to create a cli-
mate of internal security and relative peace within
which internal development can assure national growth
through controlled social, economic and political
improvement and change.
US Army doctrine identifies a number of
objectives in the execution of stability operations.
As regards the insurgent forces the objectives
are:
1. The elimination of neutralization of the
insurgent leadership and its infrastructure.
2. The defeat of the insurgent armed forces.
3. The separation of the insurgent from the
population.
Regarding the population the objectives are:
1. To obtain the support of the population by,
in the first instance, providing protection.
2. Removal of the conditions exploited by the
insurgents to foster the threat.
3. Instilling the psychological conviction that
the government will win and that it presents a bet-
ter alternative to that of the insurgent forces.
A number of the objectives outlined above are also
discussed in other chapters. As was the case with
internal development, internal defence was, however,
not executed within a broad strategic framework within Rhodesia.
Stategies of internal defence that are discussed
alsewhere include population resettlement and con-
centration discussed in Chapter 3, attempts at
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providing security for the rural population discus-
sed in Chapter 8 and operations aimed at destroying
the insurgent armed forces and their logistical
infrastructure in Chapter 7.
6.2 Population and Resources Control, Psychological
Operations and Civic Action
Psychological operations (Psyop) constitute an inte-
gral part of all internal defence and development
activities. They are conducted in support of the
objectives outlined in the previous section and are
tailored to meet the specific requirements of each
area and operation. Psychological operation target
groups and objectives are broadly the following:
Insurgents Psyop objectives are to create
dissension, disorganisation, low morale, sub-
version, sabotage, and defection within insur-
gent forces ...
Civilian Population Psyop objectives are to
gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian sup-
port for the ... government and its internal
defence and internal development objectives.(3)
In their attainment of these broad objectives, psyop
techniques appear not unlike those used in marketing
and advertising. They involve the planned use of
communications through words, symbols and actions to
influence the behaviour of selected target audiences
in order to promote the achievement of national
objectives. The media most often used for psycholo-
gical operations are face-to-face communication,
radio, loudspeakers and printed material. All of
these were used in Rhodesia and warrant close exami-
nation.
A further aspect of internal defence that has
also been discussed in the chapter on Protected Vil-
lages is that of population and resource control.
While the ultimate aim of this control is to assist
in preserving or re-establishing a state of law and
order within an area, its immediate objective is to
deny the insurgent forces access to the population
and its resources. The Rhodesian Security Forces
attempted to institute a number of measures comple-
mentary to that of resettlement, particularly as
regards food control, the establishment of no-go
areas and enforcement of curfews. These measures,
too, warrant investigation within the context of
stability operations.
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The remaining aspect of non-military stability ope-
rations is that of civic action. The objectives of
civic action are the organisation and motivation of
the local population in assisting the governmental
and military forces through the elimination or
reduction of poiitcai, economic and sociological
problems. Civic action to a degree, aims at bringing
the population and armed forces closer to each
other, so enhancing civil-military relations. The
active involvement of Security Forces in aiding the
local population is a prerequisite in 'helping the
people to help themselves
1. In its broader context,
civic action refers to the co-operation between
military and other government agencies in develop-
ment projects. (4)
Two important results desired from civic action
are firstly the positive commitment to the govern-
ment cause obtained by actively involving the local
population in government projects. In the second
place the involvement of the local population in
their own development assures that the schemes
jointly undertaken meet real local needs and fit
into the specific environment.
... destruction of the revolutionary organisa-
tion must be followed by construction of a
counter-revolutionary substitute. In other
words, police action and territorial consolida-
tion must be followed by civic action to
counter-organise the population - the real goal
of all other counter-revolutionary opera-
tions. (5)
The military unit established in Rhodesia and prima-
rily concerned with the planning and execution of
the measures outlined above was known as 1 Psycholo-
gical Operations Unit. In the context of stability
operations it is necessary first to trace the ori-
gins and history of this unit and the concurrent
development of psychological operations and related
measures before even a select overview of Rhodesian
stability-related activities can be attempted.
Chronologically, the history is divided into
three periods, the so-called Sheppard group, Branch
of Special Duties and the formation of the Psychological
Operations Unit , and the establishment of a Direc-
torate of Psychological Warfare.
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6.3 The Sheppard Group
The committee system approach adopted by the Rhode-
sian government at political, military and senior
public official level to co-ordinate all public sec-
tor activities related to the insurgent threat has
been discussed in Chapter 2. One of the senior com-
mittees formed was the National Psvcholoaical War-
fare Committee (Psywar Committee) under the chair-
manship of the Deputy Minister in the Office of the
Prime Minister, This was the only inter-departmental
organisation with psychological operations functions
in the period immediately after the commencement of
the insurgency in 1972.
The Psywar Committee included Commanders of the
Army and Air Force, Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Organisation, Minister or Secretary of Infor-
mation and Commissioner of Police. No Psychological
Operations organisation as such existed at lower
levels and Psywar Committee decisions had to be
executed via the normal departmental channels (as
was the case with decisions of the Joint Operation
Centres). Disseminating propaganda is an essential
part of psychological operations. The establishment
of any separate psychological operations organisa-
tion was strongly resisted by the Ministry of Infor-
mation which viewed this as a departmental function
to be executed by its Provincial Population Attaches.
The Psywar Committee made recommendations to the
Operations Co-ordinating Committee of the Joint
Planning Staff (prior to the formation of Combined
Operations Headquarters) and reported to the Secu-
rity Council (later called the War Council). Since
it was only concerned with the co-ordination of
psychological operations, the Psywar Committee func-
tioned on an ad hoc basis.
Initially no organisation aimed at psychologi-
cal operations or civic action existed within the
Security Forces. The need for such an approach came
to be recognised by members of the Territorial Army
rather than by regular soldiers. The initial idea
came from an ex-regular officer and Sandhurst gra-
duate, Ian Sheppard. At the time (1973/4) he perfor-
med his Territorial duties at 1 Brigade Headquarters
at Centenary.
Sheppard approached the brigade commander, Bri-
gadier Hickman, with the idea of applying basic
marketing and advertising principles to the war
situation. The aim was to enhance communication
between the armed forces, in particular the Army,
and the local black population. These talks led to a
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presentation given to the senior Joint Operation
Centre Hurricane officers on 8 May 1974, on a psycho-
logical component for Operation Overload (the reset-
tlement of the population of Chiweshe Tribal Trust
Land into Protected Villages). Although this opera-
tion was only completed during August, the Sheppard
group, as it was later known, became involved in the
planning for Operation Overload Two which commenced
in Madziwa Tribal Trust Land during the same month.
The informal psychological operations group
that had been formed consisted of six members. All
six had either a marketing, public relations or
public media background. The first recruit into the
group was Tony Dalton, at the time employed by an
advertising agency and thus having first-hand know-
ledge of methods suitable for schemes under the
Directorate of Psychological Operations.
The senior Joint Operation Centre Hurricane
members were largely convinced of the necessity for
a 'softer
1 approach to resettlement than had been
evidenced in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. The activi-
ties of the Sheppard group thus initially revolved
around 'selling
1 Protected Villages in Madziwa Tri-
bal Trust Land to the local population. Since
government revenue for rural development was severely
limited, the idea was to obtain commercial sector
involvement in the development of resettled areas.
The group also attempted to involve the local
population in their own development. A major scheme
prepared for this purpose was called the African
Development Bank, which was to serve as a finance
house for the people in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land.
It was planned that funds should be obtained from
revenue which the government had held and frozen
from international companies operating in Rhode-
sia. (6) The African Development Bank would then have
served as an institute receiving deposits to which
the local population could go in groups to buy trac-
tors, etc. The scheme was eventually presented to
the Secretary for Finance, but the government refu-
sed to underwrite it. The refusal was largely the
result of differing perceptions, at Joint Operation
Centre Hurricane and central governmental level,
of the threat that had developed in the North-east.
While the brigade commander and members of his Joint
Operation Centre had come to realize the extent of
subversion and the nature of their problem, this had
not yet permeated to other government department
headquarters in Harare. A second unsuccessful scheme
presented to the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minis-
ter's Office entailed the division of Protected
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Villages into plots to which blacks could obtain
free-hold title, as recounted in the chapter on Pro-
tected Villages.
The majority of schemes with which the Sheppard
group involved itself were self-initiated. However,
Joint Operation Centre Hurricane staff also involved
the group in two specific projects in an attempt to
determine the feasibility and viability of Psycholo-
gical Operations in general. The first concerned
Operation Needle in Masoso and Chinanda Trible Trust
Lands during May and June 1974, Both areas were
known to be subverted and local administration had
been disrupted to such a degree that the members of
the local population no longer had their cattle
inoculated. Since there was a drips problem on the
area, the Department of Veterinary Services was con-
cerned that the disease could spread further south.
The Department of Internal Affairs had recommended a
punitive operation to shoot all cattle in the area
(possibly in line with the policy of collective
punishment introduced in the North-east). The Shep-
pard group, however, succeeded in presenting an
alternative scheme by which teams would enter the
Tribal Trust Lands under armed escort in order to
inoculate the cattle. Army troops would infiltrate
the area beforehand in the hope that insurgent
groups would attack these teams.
The operation was approved by both the new bri-
gade commander of Operation Hurricane, Brigadier
Shaw, and the Operations Co-ordinating Council,
simply because it proved to be a means of inflicting
insurgent casualties. The Sheppard group plan was
thus executed despite strong opposition from the
Department of Internal Affairs. Although the inocu-
lation of the cattle was successfully concluded,
very little contact with insurgents resulted, despite
the use of pseudo teams from the unit that even-
tually became known as the Selous Scouts. It was,
however, probably the first civic action attempt
undertaken by the military since the 1972 campaign
began.
The .second project concerned a booklet entitled
Anatomy of Terror. It had been prepared by the
Ministry of Information for both internal and exter-
nal distribution. The galley proofs for the booklet
were .sent to Joint Operation Centre Hurricane for
comment which passed it on to the Sheppard group.
The contents were intended to illustrate the atroci-
ties perpetrated by insurgent forces. Although the
group saw it as a sound idea, it was thought to be
poorly founded, presenting only the nature and degree
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of insurgent intimidation with little coverage of
Security Force counter-measures and successes.
A comprehensive critique on Anatomy of Terror
was prepared, presented to the Joint Operation Cen-
tre and forwarded to the Department of Information.
Minister of Information P.K. van der Byl did not
take kindly to this interference in his department's
domain. For the first time both the Departments of
Information and of Internal Affairs noted with alarm
that the activities of a military group were
infringing upon the functions of another government
department. Internal Affairs exercised almost total
control over all governmental activities within
rural black areas and was loath to accept that its
efforts in this regard were insufficient to gain
the support of the population.
Minister Van der Byl summoned the Sheppard
group to Salisbury for an interview which ended in a
stalemate. The Anatomy of Terror was published in
its original form on 21 May 1974. A similar publica-
tion, Harvest of Fear, was also published subse-
quently. (7) Following this incident, the Commander
of the Army, Lieutenant-General Walls, was placed
under intense pressure to ensure that the Ministry
of Defence did not involve itself in an area in
which other ministries were already engaged. Minis-
ter Van der Byl's attitude towards Psychological
Operations was well summarized in his statement to
Julie Frederickse
I wanted to step up the use of the bayonet.
That's the most effective propaganda - the
bayonet.(8)
Despite this, Psychological Operations had come to
be accepted as a relevant factor in planning opera-
tions at Joint Operation Centre Hurricane and within
the Joint Planning Staff.
By September 1974, the activities of the Shep-
pard group were placing an increasing strain on its
members acting in a part-time capacity. An opera-
tional briefing at the headquarters of Operation
Hurricane was arranged for the group members' com-
mercial heads. This resulted in their full-time
secondment to the Army with retention of company pay
and benefits. The group continued to function on
this basis until December.
Although the core group still consisted of only
six members, a large number of experts were used on
a part-time basis to aid in the preparation of about
thirty-eight schemes that were forwarded to Joint
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Operation Centre Hurricane for approval and then to
the Deputy Minister in the Office of the Prime
Minister, Ted Sutton-Pryce, in his capacity as
chairman of the Psywar Committee. These schemes
included papers on
- the provision of communal tobacco sheds in
Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land
- a national pension plan for black farm labou-
rers
- rabbit farms
- family unit farms
- a bakery for Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land
- use of members of the Territorial Army to
train local blacks in farming and other tech-
niques and crafts
- a Radio Chiweshe
All the proposed projects failed through vested inte-
rests and lack of finance once attempts were made to
put them into practice. Since neither the Psywar
Committee nor the Sheppard group had any access to
funds for financing such schemes on their own these
had to be obtained directly from the Treasury,
Department of Internal Affairs or the Army. None was
willing to provide funds. (9)
In an attempt to provide continuity and better
co-ordination, the Psywar Committee had in the inte-
rim established a working committee entitled the
Psychological Action Co-ordinating Committee (PACC)
within the Ministry of Information.
The permanent secretary of PACC was a former
District Commissioner, Dick Ploughden, who had been
involved in limited attempts by the Department of
Internal Affairs at Psychological Operations for
some years as Director of the Branch of Internal
Duties. (10) The involvement of this department was
considered to be of prime importance as a result of
its intimate knowledge of the black psychology,
habits and fears. PACC further consisted of repre-
sentatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation,
Army, Police and Department of Information. It met
at least once a month with the aim of co-ordinating
existing Psychological Operations within the diffe-
rent departments.
By this time the Sheppard group had run into a
number of obstacles, of which the lack of finance
and resistance from the Department of Information
have already been mentioned. Further resistance was
encountered from Internal Affairs whose approach to
the rural black population differed from that of the
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Sheppard group. The general belief held by that
department was that black people respected force in
the first instance and that any attempt at 'winning
their hearts and minds' did not take the simplistic
black African mind into account. Both Department of
Information and Internal Affairs officials were fur-
ther suspicious of the political persuasions of
Sheppard and Daiton. (The former was publicly label-
led a communist by Sutton-Pryce at a Joint Operation
Centre.) Indeed a number of the schemes proposed by
the Sheppard group were perceived to be in direct
contradiction to Rhodesian Front policies. In the
final instance, the accusation was made that the
group treated psychological operations as a consumer
article to be sold, and not as a serious attempt at
developing rural areas.
Viewed collectively, the projects put forward
by the group, could have contributed a great deal
towards easing acceptance of Protected Villages and
government security measures in the North-east, but
ran into political and bureaucratic resistance to
innovation and change.
To members of the Sheppard group it was
becoming increasingly apparent that their efforts
were yielding few, if any, concrete results. The
Rhodesian government response to the 1974 detente
initiative spelt the final collapse of the group.
During November 1974, at the request of the Deputy
Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, the
newly appointed Minister of Information, Wickus de
Kock, ordered the group to maintain a low profile
henceforth. Some of the ideas propounded by the Shep-
pard group were considered as possible political
bargaining points that could be forfeited if
included in Security Force planning. With nothing to
'sell', this effectively shut down the group. Having
themselves become disillusioned with the results
achieved, the commercial heads withdrew their sup-
port for the individual members of the Sheppard
group.
Thus ended the first attempts at civic action
and psychological operations within the armed for-
ces. Furthermore, by December 1974, the Security
Forces had succeeded in stabilizing the threat, and
the need for any kind of long term internal develop-
ment appeared less urgent than it had done six
months previously.
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6.4 Branch of Special Duties (BOSD) and the Forma-
tion of 1 POU
By this stage it had become evident to the Psywar
Committee and PACC that they were operating in a
vacuum. An executive arm was needed to execute
policy at the level of the Joint Operational Centres.
Such an organisation was subsequently formed within
the Department of Information and eventually became
known as Branch of Special Duties (BOSD). In accor-
dance with the primary responsibility of the minis-
try, BOSD concentrated upon urban and semi-urban
communities but initially also attempted to gain
credibility within the Security Forces.
After the dissolution of the Sheppard group,
the Commander of the Army had ordered Tony Daiton
(at this stage a lieutenant in the Territorial Army)
to attach himself to PACC and gain its confidence.
(He was the only remaining member of the original
group still involved with military psychological
operations). The failure of military psychological
operations increased the necessity for military
psychological operations personnel to remain as
inconspicious as possible and so avoid objections from
the Ministry of Information. During April 1975,
Lieutenant Daiton joined BOSD which then launched a
countrywide tour to explain its functions to Secu-
rity Force commanders in the field.
BOSD was a small working group and it reported
to a committee (PACC) which in turn reported to a
committee (Psywar) whose functions were limited to
co-ordination: it could therefore attempt little
more than a change of attitude. It was clear that
both Psychological Operations and civic action with-
in the armed forces had ceased to exist even in
name, while any permanent establishment of an orga-
nisation was resisted by the Department of Informa-
tion. As a compromise, the Commander of the Army
suggested that Daiton recruit and deploy Territorial
Army soldiers. After rudimentary training these men
dressed in civilian clothing could be posted to
Joint Operation Centres. The first three recruits
were deployed in October 1975, but could establish
little more than contact with local Army, Police and
Special Branch officers. The size of the informal
unit slowly increased during the following months,
but the reliance on part-time soldiers had a
severely restrictive effect on any continuity that
could be achieved.
The major activities of these 'sensors', as
they were called, concerned attempts to influence
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the attitude of Army personnel in particular.This pro-
ved almost impossible since the only 'influence'
that could be exerted was through briefings and lec-
tures. At senior level Security Force officers
recognised the necessity for both psychological ope-
rations and civic action, but at lower level such
action was regarded as unnecessary. Here insurgent
casualties were considered the determinant of suc-
cess. A number of leaflets were also distributed,
but since the unit had no formal structure it could
obtain no facilities to reproduce such material.
Morale declined and the final collapse of this effort
by psychological operations seemed imminent.
The extent of the establishment of Protected
and Consolidated Villages provided the opportunity
to revitalise both psychological operations and
civic action. During 1974 Security Forces were
able to concentrate both the force levels and exper-
tise needed to plan and establish Protected Villages
in the limited areas. The vastly increased opera-
tional areas that had been established by late 1976
inhibited the collection of such resources, while
Joint Operation Centres at brigade level were cal-
ling for the employment of the strategy of Protected
Villages in increased areas such as Uzumba and
Maramba Tribal Trust Lands in the North-east.
Computer printouts of personnel records for
territorial soldiers assisted in a recruitment drive
launched to collect expertise within the informal
psychological operations unit which in turn helped in
the planning of Protected Villages. Designated Civil
Action Teams (CAT), almost 90% of all Protected Vil-
lages were henceforth planned by these teams in the
ensuing two years as from late 1976.
When Lieutenant-General Hickman took over as
Army Chief of Staff early in 1977 the first steps
were taken to formalize psychological operations and
civil action in the Rhodesian Army. One Psychologi-
cal Operations Unit, (1 POU), was formed on 1 July
1977 as part of the Corps of Infantry with Captain
Dalton as commanding officer. Within an established
structure the unit was able to obtain its own prin-
ting facilities, sky-shout equipment, vehicles, etc.
The unit was stationed at the Old Cranborne Barracks
in Harare.
6.5 The Directorate of Psychological Warfare
Although late in the day, both Treasury and the
National JOC (NATJOC) had finally recognised the
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need for a central body capable of initiating and
co-ordinating all aspects of psychological opera-
tions and civic action with day-to-day operations.
Early in 1979, a Directorate of Psychological War-
fare was thus established within the Central Intel-
ligence Organisation. Major-General Rawlins, pre-
viously commander of Guard Force, was appointed
director and became a member of NATJOC. Both 1 Psy-
chological Operations Unit and BOSD were placed
under the operational command of this directorate.
The directorate consisted of the director, a
deputy director and a secretary. Attached were Cap-
tain Dalton as officer commanding 1 Psychological
Operation Unit and John Lewis as Director of the
Branch of Special Duties (BOSD). A major objective
had thus been achieved: the involvement and partici-
pation of a psychological operations structure with-
in COMOPS itself. Within the Cen.tral Intelligence
Organisation, however, the directorate was not
accepted as an integral part of the intelligence
community. Furthermore, the senior Central Intelli-
gence Organisation personnel involved with it had
little knowledge or practical experience of either
Psychological Operations or civic action. Friction
between BOSD and 1 Psychological Operation Unit
further aggravated the lack of co-operation with the
result that the directorate survived as an ineffec-
tual body.
Major-General Rawlins eventually resigned as
director and at the request of the Commander, COMOPS,
Tony Dalton, now a Major, attended NATJOC and Spe-
cial Operations meetings. During June 1979, the
Deputy Commander COMOPS, Air Marshal McLaren, was
appointed as Director Psychological Warfare. In an
attempt to obtain closer co-operation with BOSD, the
Secretary for Information was also appointed as
Deputy Director, but this attempt was not successful.
It was, by now, late 1979 and not long before the
Lancaster House agreement brought the war to a close.
At the time of the elections that were to lead
to Mugabe's landslide victory both 1 Psychological
Operations Unit and BOSD launched a massive campaign
to discredit ZANU (then known as ZANU (PF)). Code-
named Operation Welfare, an American presidential
style campaign swung into operation, backed by nume-
rous 'unexplained' pamphlets, bombs, newspaper
reports - and even totally false newspaper issues
such as in the case of the black newspaper Moto.
Both the advertising accounts for the UANC and
the Transitional Government were handled by the firm
of De Villiers and Shonfeldt. Although Bishop
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Muzorewa's account was strictly on a cash basis and
separate from the government account for the promo-
tion of the election, both projects were co-ordina-
ted by the Branch of Special Duties. The slogan,
adopted was 'That is what the people want
1.
The campaign provided clear evidence of the
lack of grass-roots contact between Rhodesian psy-
chological operations and the target population they
were attempting to influence. Despite hundreds of
thousands of leaflets and millions of Rhodesian dol-
lars spent on the Bishop's campaign, it was the
ZANU (PF) campaign, however poorly orchestrated,
that proved victorious.
The organisation that had been established by
the end of the war proved to be an improvement on
that existing before the formation of the Directo-
rate of Psychological Warfare: but the reliance on
members of the Territorial Army led to a lack of
contunuity. This was possibly the major problem at
Joint Operation Centre and sub-Joint Operation Cen-
tre level. Because 1 Psychological Operation Unit
was formalised at such a late stage, the military
Psychological Operations organisation was unable to
obtain either the funds or the equipment necessary
to execute their task before 1977. In particular,
commanders and troops at lower level were not inte-
rested in either psychological operations or civic
action. For at this level success was seen as a
direct function of insurgent casualty rates. As
indicated, Rhodesian Psychological Operations was
also in general, out of touch with rural realities.
Against the above historical resume of Psycho-
logical Operations (psyop) organisations, a number
of psyop and population control operations under-
taken can be discussed briefly. The aim is to pro-
vide typical examples of Rhodesian psyop and civic
action projects within the theoretical framework
outlined in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. As
will become evident, the projects referred to were
not all executed on 1 Psychological Operations Unit
initiation, nor necessarily with the major involve-
ment of that unit.
Mention needs to be made of a number of impor-
tant projects, not subsequently discussed. The major
project was possibly regarding the Security Force
Auxiliaries. One Psychological Operations Unit
played an important role in the propaganda surroun-
ding these forces, and in the mental orientation of
the Security Force Auxiliaries themselves. (See
Chapter 8)
A second major scheme involved the training of
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envoys. In short, these formed the Security Force
equivalent to political commissars. In a sense, it
entailed the preparation of men for use in an Inter-
face type role (see section 8). Envoy training com-
menced in 1978 and included Police, Internal Affairs
and Security Force Auxiliaries.
Finally, as briefly recounted, both 1 Psycholo-
gical Operations Unit and BOSD were also involved in
numerous disinformation operations, especially
during the build-up to the April 1980 elections.
6.6 Rewards
A system of rewards for information regarding insur-
gent activities and equipment was instituted at a
relatively early stage of the war. In accordance
with a request from the Operations Co-ordinating
Committee, the Psywar Committee approved a poster
and leaflet outlining the system. These were distri-
buted at intervals with the first 900 000 leaflets
and 2 000 posters distributed during April and May
1974. The leaflets read as follows:
Government will pay substantial rewards to any-
one who volunteers secret information which
leads to the death or capture of terrorists or
their supporters and the capture of their
weapons.
The names of anyone giving information will
remain secret.
The amounts of the rewards offered by Govern-
ment are:
Five thousand dollars for a- senior terrorist
leader.
Two thousand five hundred dollars for a terro-
rist group leader.
One thousand dollars for a terrorist.
One thousand dollars for each terrorist vehicle
mine.
One thousand dollars for each terrorist heavy
weapon of war.
Five hundred dollars for each terrorist machine
gun.
Three hundred dollars for each terrorist light
personal weapon.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of
terrorist ammunition.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of ter-
rorist grenades.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of
149Psychological Operations
terrorist anti-personnel mines.
The rewards will not be payable to a civil ser-
vant who is engaged on duties concerned with
anti-terrorist activities or to a member of the
Security Forces, unless he obtained the infor-
mation while he was off-duty.(11)
Later a pictorial depiction of weaponry found repla-
ced the earlier verbal description. In a final
refinement two pictures were shown: tribesmen were
thus encouraged to co-operate either by the promise
of reward or the threat of punishment.
6 .7 Safe Returns and Amnesty Offers
A distinction should be made between an offer of
'safe return
1 to insurgent forces after which the
normal legal process would continue, and that of
amnesty. The latter entails an offer of safe return
as well as a guarantee against any possible prosecu-
tion that might arise from insurgent participation.
Both were instituted in Rhodesia, although that of
amnesty remained a politically controversial issue
for a number of. years.
The Operations Co-ordinating Council recommen-
ded instituting offers of safe return during
1973. However, execution of the policy on a national
basis was delayed until the 1974 South African and
Zambian detente initiative, which was considered the
ideal opportunity.
On 11 December 1973, Prime Minister Smith
announced that he had '... received assurances to
the effect that terrorist activities in Rhodesia
will cease immediately ...'(12) in preparation for a
constitutional conference. These assurances that had
been given, in fact, implied merely a cessation of
hostilities, but the opportunity seemed to have pre-
sented itself to convince insurgent forces in the
field that a political settlement had been achieved.
Despite furious broadcasts to the contrary by Radio
Lusaka, leaflets were printed and distributed to the
effect that insurgents should either leave the coun-
try in a northerly direction,or hide their weapons
and report to Security Forces. Both measures would
have removed the insurgents from the North-east. No
reports of the latter were received, but four South
African policemen were killed by insurgents preten-
ding to make use of the offer. Following this, the
Psywar Committee agreed that leaflets offering safe
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return should be printed and made available to
local commanders for use in support of successful
military operations as the opportunity arose.
The first national offer of safe return was made
during the period of December 1977 and January 1978.
The idea stemmed from Operation Maxply that had been
launched in the Repulse area. It was an attempt to
capitalise on the successes achieved by food control
(Operation Turkey) and resettlement programmes (in
Sangwe, Matibi No 2, Sengwe, Chipise and Diti Tribal
Trust Lands) in the South-east. Intelligence reports
indicated that ZANLA morale in the area was on the
verge of collapse because of their inability to
obtain either food from the local population or
water from points outside Protected Villages. These
had largely been destroyed by Security Forces Opera-
tions. Maxply entailed, inter alia, the preparation
and aerial distribution of two leaflets. The first
described the strength of the Security Forces and
the weaknesses of the insurgent forces; the second
consisted of a safe return offer. From this, COMOPS
decided to enlarge the scheme to a national attempt
but excluding Matabeleland where ZPRA was not con-
sidered susceptible to such an offer. By January
more than 1 000 000 such leaflets had been distri-
buted.
The results were disappointing. Intelligence
reports had again over-estimated the effect of Secu-
rity Force operations on insurgent morale. Although
the Internal Settlement talks leading to the
Agreement of 3 March were already underway, concrete
results had not yet been achieved. Thus the offer
could only rely on Security Force pressure on ZANLA
as inducement.
Following the Internal Settlement Agreement,
repeated calls were made by the black members of the
Executive Council for insurgents to stop fighting.
In preparation for the April 1979 black majority
elections, a direct amnesty offer was contained in
1 500 000 leaflets distributed from mid-March 1979,
onwards. The offer was signed by the four members of
the Council as well as by the Commander, COMOPS.
Any member of the ZANLA/ZPRA forces who returns
home in peace before the election will be well
treated. They will be fed, clothed and given
proper medical treatment. They will be integra-
ted with the Interim Government Auxiliaries
(SFA) under the command of .Combined Operations
and will be armed for this purpose. On no
account will those returning members of the
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ZANLA/ZPRA forces be stopped from voting in the
election in April, should they wish to do
so.(13)
Of the total number, 1 150 000 leaflets were printed
in Shona and 350 000 in Sindibele. A maximum of 50
insurgents availed themselves of this offer which
was apparently made from a position of weakness
rather than from one of strength.
An Amnesty Directorate was also set up on 7
June 1979. The amnesty call included the exhortation
to phone a series of numbers accross the country for
information on the offer of amnesty.
While the schemes mentioned above were at
national level, 1 Psychological Operations Unit was
involved in a number of localised attempts at safe
return. These attempts were more akin to what is
known as 'instant psyop'.
When access was gained to a captured insurgent
(normally via the Selous Scouts), leaflets with a
picture and a message from the victim would be prin-
ted and distributed in the area where the remainder
of the insurgent group was thought to be. On a few
occasions a second member would also defect. This
method was also used utilising skyshout equipment,
with the added advantage of broadcasting a personal
message from the captured insurgent which could be
recognised as such. These methods attempted to capi-
talize on the immediate shock of contact with Secu-
rity Forces and the strain of follow-up operations
but results were limited.
In general the success of the defection program-
mes is related to long-range factors such as the
insurgents' perception of the probable outcome of
the insurgency. More situational factors such as
being wounded or membership of a minority group also
play a role. (14) The efforts at 'instant psyop
1 were
aimed at the latter.
At no stage would the military pressure be
intensified to a level at which defeat of the insur-
gency seemed inevitable. It was primarily as a
result of this factor that Rhodesian offers of safe
return and amnesty were not fully made use of. Yet
it should be noted that even the limited number of
insurgents who did avail themselves of these offers
made the offers of safe return cost-effective in
terms of the intelligence thus gained.
6.8 Interface and Manila Interface
Interface Operations were commenced on a trial basis
in Madziwa Tribal Trust Land during April 1974. The
concept was initiated by the fledgeling military
intelligence organisation in an attempt to gain
operational intelligence,for at this stage Special
Branch controlled the full spectrum of operational
intelligence sources, with no parallel military
network.
The operation was based on insurgent modus
operandi. Small teams of mixed black and white Secu-
rity Force members moved clandestinely into an area
and subsequently made unexpected nightly visits to
kraals. All inhabitants of the kraal were called to
these meetings which were crucial to the strategy.
According to official documentation, meetings nor-
mally followed seven steps, i.e.
Step 1: An explanation was given providing the rea-
son for the visit, viz the maintenance of a Security
Force presence and concern for the local population.
Step 2: Warnings regarding the negative effects of
the insurgent presence, namely curfews, food control,
no-go areas, etc.
Step 3: Localised propaganda emphasising the hard-
ships caused by the presence of insurgents, as
against the harmony before their arrival.
Step 4: A comparison between the Security Forces
and the insurgents, specifically regarding the mate-
rial aid and services that could be/were provided by
government.
Step j>: A 'message to terrorists' using local inha-
bitants as a communication medium to notify the
cadres in the field of insurgent casualties and
Security Force 'victories'.
Step 6: The offer to all present to pose questions
and raise problems. Those issues that could not be
explained or answered satisfactorily by the team
were passed on to the local District Commissioner.
Step 7: The conclusion of the meeting with the
singing of songs.
Initial attempts by the military to obtain informa-
tion through closer contact with the rural black
152 153Psychological Operations Psychological Operations
population did not prove very successful. The
attempts were subsequently superceded by the identi-
fication of the psyop potential inherent in such
actions.
From mid 1975 onwards, the forerunners of
1 Psychological Operations Unit attempted to sell
psyop to the military by means of Interface Opera-
tions. Little success was achieved until it was rea-
lized that Interface had to be presented as a means
by which insurgents could be eliminated. Only under
this guise was it believed that Security Forces
could be persuaded to implement their programmes.
As officially formulated, the aim of Interface
was thus twofold:
... to kill and capture terrorists and to win
over the local population. The first part of
the aim is achieved in two ways:
a. Because of the method of operations the
chance of contact with the ter is increased,
and;
b. Due to improved intelligence reporting from
the local population.
The second aim of Interface is somewhat more
difficult, and at no time should we allow our-
selves to be fooled into thinking that the mere
introduction of Interface will immediately win
over the local population.
At various stages, and with little continuity.
Interface operations were conducted by the Army,
Police and Department of Internal Affairs. As a com-
munication operation it had great potential, but on
its own had a number of limitations. Firstly the
local population was not presented with a viable
alternative to enforced co-operation with the insur-
gents. Although Interface led to increased Security
Force activity by night, the type of operation was
best suited for use in areas in which insurgent for-
ces were physically prevented from obtaining access
to the people. Such conditions only existed in those
areas in which the local population had been reset-
tled in Protected Villages. In other areas it proved
viable when used by the Security Force Auxiliaries.
A second problem encountered in the execution
of Interface Operations was the lack of continuity.
The allocation of troops for these operations depen-
ded mainly on the attitude of the local commander
despite the fact that early in 1977, Lieutenant
General Walls had personally endorsed the programme
to all Army company commanders. Security Force
commanders were nevertheless loath to deploy their
limited manpower resources for such operations
because they did not obviously increase insurgent
casualties.
In the third place, Interface Operations had
failed to identify the need to aid the rural popula-
tion in material terms as one of their primary aims
and it could therefore do little more than improve
communication. Although local grievances were repor-
ted to District Commissioners, these were not neces-
sarily redressed. Neither did Interface teams pro-
vide immediate aid such as medical or veterinary
services which were possibly within their capabili-
ties. The general attitude of the Security Forces is
amply illustrated by a further quotation from the
document referred to above:
... peasant populations the world over have the
same thing in common: they simply want to be
left alone.
Concurrent with the Internal Settlement Agreement
and the decision to open a number of Protected Vil-
lages in Operation Hurricane, Interface operations
were modified. The new approach was termed Operation
Manila Interface. A document compiled by 1 Psycholo-
gical Operation Unit presented the general outline
as follows (August 1978):
Op Manila Interface would largely be modelled on
Interface Operations but would be broadened to
incorporate a day-time presence on the ground
at which an all-out effort would be made - on a
sustained and ongoing basis - to win over the
local population.
The introduction of Manila Interface in Joint Opera-
tion Centre Hurricane was in direct support of the
projected opening of Protected Villages. The aim was
to lessen the negative psychological effects that
the opening of these villages was expected to have.
The opening was planned to take place in 4 phases.
Phase 1 entailed the psychological preparation of
both rural blacks and white farmers in the areas
affected.
Phase 2 was the official opening which was to be
conducted by black nationalist members of the tran-
sitional government.
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Phase 3 comprised the introduction of Operation
Manila Interface.
Phase 4 entailed what was termed 'follow-up inter-
face operations', i.e. the long-term extension of
the effort.
As a concept, Manila Interface held much pro-
mise. In a short summary of the 1 Psychological Ope-
rations Unit paper on the operation, Joint Operation
Centre Hurricane stated the following:
It must be emphasised that this is essentially
a broadened version of Interface, the major
differences being:
a. Carefully selected areas of operation.
b. Resident Interface teams deploying to selec-
ted kraal heads/leaders' kraals (with shadow
sticks remaining clandestine) and establi-
shing presence on an ever-changing pattern
somewhere in the vicinity of that kraal.
c. Interface "swans" (i.e. working out from)
away from the selected kraal will continue
to harass, confound and confuse the terro-
rists , and to expand our own sphere of
influence, making sure that we return each
time to the selected kraal (these "swans"
away (sic) and subsequent meetings might be
conducted by the Shadow Sticks).
d. "Massive" propaganda support for the terms
will be forthcoming in the form of conti-
nuous supplies of new, up-dated leaflets,
notes, posters, etc.
e. Set plans must be made for the progressive
re-opening of schools, clinics, etc., in our
sphere of influence.
f. Aid. Whether this simply takes the form of
advice to locals or something more tangible,
it must be forthcoming.
g. Everyone must be totally committed to the
need to pull out all the stops to win over
the locals.
Unfortunately very little came of the two vital com-
ponents contained in Manila Interface, namely perma-
nent presence and aid. The modus operandi presented
above in fact bore a number of similarities to that
of the Security Force Auxiliaries (see Chapter 8).
The major difference was that the Auxiliaries were
(supposed to be) a local militia, armed to protect
the rural population on a permanent basis.
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The central reasons for the failure to imple-
ment Manila Interface were, first, the same resis-
tance that had been encountered regarding the type of
operation and manpower allocation of Interface. In
the second place, as discussed in Chapter 3, opening
Protected Villages proved to be counter-productive
to the extent that Manila Interface operations
were not sufficient to overcome the negative effects
that resulted. As with Interface, but possibly even
more so, Manila Interface operations were more sui-
ted to the general improvement of established Pro-
tected Villages than to the opening of these villages.
The factors complicating both Interface and
Manila Interface operations within a subverted area
are well illustrated in the case of Chiota Tribal
Trust Land.
During 1978 1 Psychological Operations Unit
started to receive regular black soldiers from the
overflow of Rhodesian African Rifle recruits at Bala
Bala training depot. The number obtained eventually
totalled 300 men. On request, 1 Psychological Opera-
tions Unit was authorized to use Chiota Tribal Trust
Land near Marandellas for intensified Interface and
Manila Interface operations. Although the local
population was subverted, resettlement had not been
implemented.
1 Psychological Operations Unit operated in
Chiota Tribal Trust Land for the remaining 15 months
of the war. More than 186 insurgents were killed and
by the end of 1979 intelligence reports indicated
that only a single group of 30 insurgents was still
active in the northern part of the Tribal Trust
Land. Two members of the group had remained in the
south of Chiota in an attempt to retain the logistic
link through the Operation Thrasher area to Mozambi-
que. Judged superficially it appeared that the unit
had achieved considerable success. The insurgent
command and control structure had been severely dis-
rupted, large caches of weaponry had been discovered
and the local population appeared to be in support
of the Security Forces. As part of Manila Interface
small irrigation schemes were further initiated,
schools reopened and cattle dipped regularly. The
role and functions of various government departments
were also re-established.
However, once the Lancaster House ceasefire was
implemented in December 1979, nearly 200 insurgents
emerged from Chiota Tribal Trust Land to gather at
the Mahusekwa Collection Point. Much weaponry was
evident and the local population openly supported the
insurgents. Needless to say, the change in attitude
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came as an acute shock to 1 Psychological Operations
Unit.
At the same time it should be stressed that the
rural population could not have viewed the cease-
fire as anything but an insurgency victory. Once an
underground subversive group, the insurgent forces
could now openly flaunt their success and their
weaponry. The perception as to who will eventually
control the country is in the long term an important
factor in the attitude and support of the local
population. The 'support
1 of the people of Chiota
Tribal Trust Land for the insurgent forces must
therefore be qualified. Despite the above two fac-
tors it still seems as if Interface and Manila
Interface had not been successful in Chiota.
In retrospect Interface and Manila Interface
had two further shortcomings, namely failure to
redress specific local grievances, and failure to
involve the people in the solution of them:
Fundamental to stability operations in the
nature of cross-cultural communication itself ...
it was found that the type of communication
made no difference to its outcome, but that
where the objective was definite rather than
vague, and where the recipients were involved
rather than just given aid, the communications
were far more effective. (15)
6.9 Food Control: Operation Turkey
On 28 January 1977, Government introduced an
amendment to the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of
Law and Order Regulations (no 8 of 1977)) whereby
control of food supplies was instituted in certain
areas. The order provided for controlling the deli-
very of food, growing of maize, sale and supply of
food and milling of grain. It also directed that
'security devices' be fitted to places where food
was stored. The regulations further made provision
for the closure of beerhalls at certain hours. If
persons were found contravening the order, a Police
officer or any other authorised person was empowered
to confiscate or destroy the food in question.
During 1976 intelligence reports indicated that
ZANLA forces in the Hurricane operational area were
increasingly able to obtain food from labour com-
pounds on white commercial farms. Both the movement
of the local population into Protected Villages and
the general drought had reduced the available food
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within the Tribal Trust Lands. The concept of food
control was presented to the Joint Operation Centre
by a sensor and subsequently instituted in the
Mtepatepa farming area between Chiweshe and Madziwa
Tribal Trust Lands at the end of the year.
Sensors had persuaded white farmers to accept
the concept on the understanding that the success of
the scheme depended almost entirely on the co-opera-
tion of the farmers themselves. Farmers were to
ration their labourers on a day-to-day basis with
only sufficient food for a particular day. No sur-
plus would therefore be available to feed insurgent
forces, even were this demanded by force of arms.
Tight food control would force insurgents to spend
much time seeking sustenance, which would hasten
their location and eventual elimination. A further
advantage could result from hostility between the
local population and insurgents as demands on limited
available foodstuffs increased.
When instituted, Operation Turkey, as it became
known, was relatively effective. Because food con-
trol was not extended to the black rural areas, it
could, however, be no more than a hindrance to
insurgent forces in general. After the initiation of
the effort with Operation Hurricane, Operation Tur-
key was extended to Mashonaland East and West and
in operational areas Thrasher and Repulse. Exten-
ded cattle farming within Repulse dictated that such
attempts would be very difficult to implement. Food
control measures were more effective within major
crop producing areas and were totally dependent on
the supervision of the farmers. As the war progres-
sed reports received from Selous Scout pseudo teams
indicated that the limited results initially obtai-
ned were diminishing.
At a later stage attempts were made to enforce
food control within the Tribal Trust Lands themsel-
ves by placing legal limitations on the amount of
foodstuffs being held in stock by stores, as well as
on the amounts sold. Ration cards were printed and
issued. Store-owners had to apply for permits from
District Commissioners to buy food supplies in bulk.
These measures would theoretically have further
reduced the availability of food supplies for insur-
gent forces in the rural areas.
To institute and effectively enforce such mea-
sures, however, total control over population move-
ment was needed to prevent members of the local
population from obtaining food from the nearest vil-
lage or town if unavailable from the local store.
Although curfews and no-go areas had been established
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by this time across wide areas of Rhodesia, these
measures were intended to facilitate freedom of
movement for the Security Forces. The only way in
which members of the local population could be pre-
vented from visiting nearby towns and from buying
unlimited amounts of food, was by total and detailed
movement control of the local population. A pre-
requisite for any such control was an inviolable
identification system. The lack of such a system had
already inhibited the extent of population control
that could be obtained by the institution of Protec-
ted Villages.
The single method of identification within
rural areas was the situpa or registration card.
These cards were carried only by adult black males.
As a means of positive identification they were
almost totally useless since the situpa contained no
photograph, fingerprint or description of the
bearer.
A registration wing was, however, set up within
the Department of Internal Affairs to conduct a
national registration scheme. The metallic identity
card that was approved for use, was virtually unal-
terable and very difficult to forge, but by the end
of the war completion of the project was still a
number of years distant. As an interim measure
mobile photographic teams were fielded in opera-
tional areas. Their task was to attach photographs
to situpas, but even this measure proved to be of
little real advantage. Photographs were easily fal-
sified or exchanged. But even more important, no
method of identification was extended to females and
young boys.
To a large extent the mujiba network establi-
shed by these adolescents was the 'eyes and ears' of
the insurgent forces. The control of their movement
was of cardinal importance within any system of
population and resource control.
Although restriction was initially a hinderance,
insurgent forces could circumvent the measures
imposed in terms of Operation Turkey. Food con-
trol measures instituted in farming areas adjacent
to Protected Villages were largely unsuccessful.
Furthermore, as Protected Villages became less
effective so did food control within and adjacent to
these villages.
6.10 Psyop: Operation Splitshot
Operation Splitshot was executed by 1 Psychological
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Operations Unit on a larger scale than most similar
attempts. At the time it also attracted both local
and international attention.
From April 1977 onwards, the operation entailed
the distribution of a series of one page leaflets.
Typically a leaflet contained a drawing and English
text on the one side with the same text in Shona and
Sindibele on the reverse side. The central theme
depicted was that insurgents were communist terro-
rists trained in Mozambique who brought only terror
and death. (See Figures 6.1 to 6.3 as examples.) The
pamphlets were distributed largely by Security For-
ces in Protected Villages, at schools, and posted in
shops and public buildings in the rural areas. In
some areas insurgent reaction was violent, entailing
crude counter-propaganda slogans, but in most areas
little visible reaction was elicited.
Although the accuracy of the sketches depicting
insurgents and their ways was technically verified
by captured ZANLA members beforehand, this was a
relatively crude and unsuccessful propaganda attempt.
The major problem was that the operation had been
based on false intelligence. A senior member of 1
Psychological Operations Unit stated during an
interview that the unit
... was being fed information to the effect
that the terrorist was unwillingly abducted
from Rhodesia, forced to undergo training in
Mozambique, been given dreadfully bad training,
fed badly, beaten into submission, maltreated,
forced back into the country...
whilst the vast majority of insurgent trainees in
fact left Rhodesia voluntarily to undergo training
and returned of their own accord. Since these
recruits had direct family ties with the local popu-
lation in Rhodesia, it seems unlikely that the
government would have been able to persuade the
local population otherwise. Both the insurgents and
the rural black population in effect knew that the
message conveyed was false.
Within a broader context, Operation Splitshot
was typical of psychological operations attempt by 1
Psychological Operations Unit. It tended to vindi-
cate the general criticism levelled at the unit
regarding its commercial approach to such attempts
in general.
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Figure 6.1 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet
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Terror and death is
ihe mwunlsi -terror is ft M Rhodesia
Sec fm/ihe,
K.
Figure 6.2 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet
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Figure 6.3 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet
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6.11 Use of Spirit Mediums
In large parts of rural Rhodesia tribal life had
been allowed to continue unhindered. Rhodesian Front
policy emphasised this reliance on the system of
chiefs and the continuation of the traditional rural
black way of life. In these circumstances spirit
mediums continued Lo play an integral role in the
tribal way of life.
Traditionally blacks tended to believe impli-
citly in the power of spirits to control life on
earth. As with the tribal hierarchy, a spiritual
hierarchy existed: some spirits were more powerful
than others. Spirit mediums took the name of the
deceased person with whom they could communicate. In
effect they represented the spirit of that person
who 'possessed' the medium.
Close contact between rural blacks and govern-
ment local administration had led to an awareness of
the continued dominance of spirit mediums within
rural existence. In the execution of their duties,
District Commissioners were specifically aware of
this and attempted to gain the confidence of promi-
nent mediums in the area. Consequently the potential
to manipulate spirit mediums to government advantage
had been recognised long before 1972. This potential
for manipulation and need to gain confidence were
also recognised by black nationalist organisations.
With little, if any exception,all insurgent incur-
sions that took place during the sixties entailed,
inter alia, advice on spirits.
The Director for the Branch for Special Duties
Dick Plowden in fact alerted the military in the
early 1970's to the fact that African spirit mediums
were moving across the north-eastern border with the
insurgents. Following this a series of pamphlets,
purporting to come from local spirit mediums were
dropped by air over the affected area advising the
local population against aid to insurgents. Having
not previously received such messages from their
ancestors, the rural blacks paid little attention to
the advice.
During the first seven months of 1973 Internal Affairs
compiled a register of all spirit mediums in Rhode-
sia. It contained an alphabetical index of all
mediums, witchdoctors, separatist church leaders,
sacred places and tribal rallying points. A paper
was also completed outlining the five major cult
organisations and their associates. (16) At this time
the majority of mediums were still either neutral or
supported the government. ZANLA insurgents had
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abducted an old woman claiming to be the 'legs' of
the dual spirit Nehanda from Dande Tribal Trust Land
during November 1972. Various mediums claiming to
represent the other half, the 'head' remained inside
the country. The old woman ('legs') subsequently
died in Mozambique. Government propaganda was made
of her abduction and a subsequent drought, but this
was abandoned as it became apparent that she was a
volunteer to the insurgent cause.(17)
Military Psychological Operations regarding the
influence of spirit mediums was relatively limited.
The obvious agency for these operations was the
Department of Internal Affairs due to their closer
contact with and better knowledge of the rural
black. 1 Psychological Operations Unit did, how-
ever, use a girl claiming to be posessed by the
'head' of Nehanda together with a medium claiming to
be possessed by the spirit of Chaminuka. (18) A report
in the Rhodesia Herald indicated that these efforts
were intensified during late 1975 when the two
mediums travelled through the North-east denouncing
ZANLA. In some cases the talks delivered were prece-
ded by weaponry, air force and band displays by the
Security Forces.
During the existence of the Sheppard group
Internal Affairs had also used a tame lion and hyena
to indicate to the local population that these spi-
ritually powerful animals were on the side of the
government. Two films were also made to illustrate
this, and subsequently shown countrywide by the
Mobile Cinema Teams.
In general, 1 Psychological Operations Unit were
more involved with the overt use of mediums such as
in the case of Bushu Tribal Trust Land in 1976.
Although the insurgent penetration through
Madziwa and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands had been
slowed down, ZANLA were still infiltrating from
Kandeya Tribal Trust Land through Chesa African Pur-
chase Land, the Umfurudzi Game Park and into Bushu
Tribal Trust Land. Their aim was evidently to sub-
vert Masembura, Msana and Chinamore Tribal Trust
Lands. A sensor from 1 Psycholigcal Operations Unit
and a number of Security Force members visited the
dominant spirit medium in Bushu Tribal Trust Land.
It was made quite clear that should insurgents move
through Bushu, Security Forces would kill the
medium. This proved effective for about three
months. ZANLA, who were aware of the visit, even-
tually intimidated the medium to leave the area.
Other attempts included substantial gifts to
win the favour of either the local chief, or spirit
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medium, (e.g. Chief Makoni in Makoni Tribal Trust
Land, was presented with a black bull which he
promptly slaughtered).
A further refinement was added using ground-
shout equipment. With the active involvement of
Selous Scouts pseudo teams in the area, false spoor
of hyena and lion were laid, while the sounds of a
laughing hyena and roaring lion were broadcast by
means of ground-shout. Both animals are highly
esteemed in spiritual matters and purported to have
magical charms. Leaflets were subsequently distribu-
ted stating that the spirits were offended at the
insurgent presence. Although groups of insurgents
left the area, they returned after a few weeks.
Locals were later to remark that the project had
little effect since spirits were not believed to
have access to a printing press.
As regards 1 Psychological Operations Unit
itself, the unit did not have the expertise to dab-
ble in this very sensitive field. On the other hand,
the Department of Internal Affairs tended to over-
emphasise the established tribal structure that had
existed during and prior to the sixties. As the war
progressed these traditions were continuously being
weakened until such time as a chief who did not
actively support the insurgent forces found his
authority usurped by the clandestine insurgent orga-
nisations .
6.12 Conclusion
In section 1 of this chapter, three primary elements
of counter-insurgency strategy were identified,
namely environmental improvement, resources control
and operations aimed at the physical elimination of
the insurgent forces. The above pages indicate that,
as a whole, Rhodesian authorities placed greatest
emphasis on the last of these. In practical terms
the major counter-insurgency effort was aimed at
obtaining maximum insurgent fatalities. The
least attention was given to environ-
mental improvement. In short, Rhodesia attempted to
re-establish government authority by means of
resources and population control and counter-insur-
gency operations aimed at eliminating the insur-
gents. Psychological operations, isolated as it was,
and lacking the support of environmental improvement
and local protection could under these circumstances
achieve very little.
Evidence has been given that there was
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organisational insecurity, lack of effective popula-
tion and resource control, and a lack of civic
action. Rhodesia went through the motions of a vast
number of psychological operations, population and
resource control measures, but with few concrete
results to show for it all.
Possibly one factor that played a role is that
of involvement. As A.R. Molnar wrote:
the most effective way to alter the indivi-
dual's perception of the situation is to direct
him into constructive action, rather than sim-
ply -to lecture him. (19)
As was the case regarding the protection of Protec-
ted Villages and the resistance encountered to the
formation and extension of the Security Force Auxi-
liaries, Security Force approach to the rural black
population was a continuation of Rhodesia's colonial
heritage. It was characterised by paternalism rather
than by seeking involvement of the locals. This was
most evident in the attitude of officials from the
Department of Internal Affairs.
A second major factor pertaining specifically
to psychological operations, is that these actions
could only enhance Security Force actions or reduce
the effectiveness of insurgent activities. It could
not, however, convince a people that the government
was 'winning' the war when all other indications
were to the contrary. This, of course, was in con-
trast to population and resource control, both of
which could contribute directly to the success of
counter-insurgency strategy.
Stability operations can be divided into two
complementary sections.On the one hand it entails
internal defence, which consists of the Security
Force actions necessary to defeat the insurgent for-
ces in a specific area. On the other hand, internal
development is aimed at consolidating the area under
firm government control, i.e. capitalising and
exploiting on the success of internal defence.
Should defence thus fail, development would also
fail.
Within Rhodesia the cliche that counter-insur-
gency in Africa entailed a "judicious mixture of the
iron fist in a velvet glove
1 could be heard repea-
tedly. Unfortunately the emphasis rather seemed to
be on the fist to the exclusion of the glove.
When attempts were made to focus attention on
the lessons that had been learnt in other insurgen-
cies, the response, more often than not, was that
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those wars had not been fought in the unsophistica-
ted African environment. The vast majority of whites did in fact
believe that the black African only understood and
respected force.Thus proof had to be given as to who
was the stronger, the government or the insurgents.
Invariably the local population were caught in the
middle. To a large degree, the Rhodesian approach to
internal defence and development was thus a product
of the racial preconceptions of white Rhodesians in
general.
That the top echelon of the Rhodesian Front
party failed to understand the real nature of their dilemma
is well illustrated by remarks made by former Minis-
ter of Information and Defence, P.K. van der Byl
after the war
South Africans will not - hopefully! - be inhi-
bited by the ridiculous considerations that we
were, of being overconsiderate about the enemy.
There was far too much influence of Sandhurst
and the Metropolitan Police here. The lesson of
the Rhodesian war - and Vietnam showed this as
well - is that you can't fight by the Queens-
berry rules.(20)
The lesson was, in fact, that in 15 years of armed
revolution, Rhodesian whites had learnt no lesson.
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EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
7.1 Strategic Base Areas and Insurgent Sanctuaries
The father of modern rural insurgency theory,
Maozedong (Mao tse Tung) identified the following
six fundamental principles of insurgency:
1. The relation between offensive and defensive
actions within the total revolutionary conflict.
2. Strategic defence and strategic offensive.
3. The establishment of strategic base areas.
4. The co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with
conventional warfare.
5. The development of guerrilla warfare into
mobile warfare.
6. The link between the various levels of com-
mand.
It is with the third of these principles namely the
establishment of strategic base areas that we are
concerned.
Mao defined strategic bases as those areas
... on which a guerrilla war relies for carry-
ing out its strategic tasks as well as for
achieving the goals of preserving and expanding
oneself and annihilating or expelling the
enemy ... (1)
While he viewed these bases within a political and
ideological context, the major thrust of Mao's deli-
berations in this regard focusses on geographical
features. His emphasis to this effect led him to
state that
... guerrillas without base areas are roving
insurgents and can have no connection with the
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political aspirations of the indigenous popula-
tion. (2)
In accordance with the above, strategic base areas
may be established either within the borders of the
endangered state, or adjacent to them. The latter
are generally termed sanctuaries. In both cases the
area should provide the insurgent forces with a
degree of physical security. This can be obtained by
terrain features such as inaccessability, or by
political and diplomatic measures. Should the base
area for an insurgency be established with an adja-
cent country, i.e. across an international boundary,
the insurgent forces might obtain security by diplo-
matic means.
The necessity for the establishment of such
areas is contained in the following definition by
Bernard Fall:
... an active sanctuary is a territory conti-
guous to a rebellious area which, though osten-
sibly not involved in the conflict provides the
rebel side with shelter, training facilities,
equipment, and - if he can get away with it -
troops.(3)
For the purposes of this chapter contiguous terri-
tory may be regarded as another sovereign state.
Some writers on insurgency such as Walter Lipp-
man, Peter Paret and John Shy claim that insurgency
forces with a privileged sanctuary cannot be defea-
ted. These views are undoubtedly influenced by the
important role that sanctuaries, or lack of them,
have played in Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya, Greece,
etc. Although the view expressed is possibly extreme,
there is little doubt that
... history shows that if guerrillas are provi-
ded with the freedom to move across national
borders, enabling them to receive material aid and
a sanctuary privileged from attack, then their
chances for overthrowing target governments
seem greatly enhanced.(4)
It should be clear at this stage that the status of
a sanctuary and the degree of 'privilege from
attack
1 it affords directly influences the impor-
tance of this factor in counter-insurgency strategy.
However, political constraints are the primary
determinants of both.
To John D. Deiner the results of case studies
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done on Algeria, Greece and Vietnam indicate the
existence of two strategies as counter to active
sanctuaries. The first is border control and the
second armed incursions. John J. McCuen indicates a
third strategy, the organisation and support of
'counter-insurgent insurgents' operating from the
target country into that country serving as host to
the insurgent forces; in other words, fighting fire
with fire.
Physical border control on the frontier is pro-
bably exemplified by the construction of a cordon
sanitaire as discussed in Chapter 4. The second
strategy,, that of armed incursions to destroy or
dislocate insurgent sanctuaries, is the subject of
this chapter.
Even in the case of a country such as Rhodesia
which was, since 1975 and up to the end of the war,
virtually surrounded by potential sanctuaries, care
should be exercised to avoid over-emphasising the
importance of a strategy of external operations. As
Deiner cautioned:
... while border sanctuaries may be significant
factors affecting the military aspects of guer-
rilla wars, they are not determinant factors of
the ultimate outcomes of such struggles. (5)
Clearly such operations constitute an important ele-
ment of military strategy, but only in the case of
total military preponderance can external operations
eliminate the external insurgent threat. Even should
this be possible, the political costs involved in
such actions will be the final sanction for their
execution.
After UDI in 1965, Zambia was Rhodesia's only
neighbour providing active assistance and succour to
insurgent forces. Infiltrators from that country
either had to cross the Zambezi river (or Kariba
lake) to the south, or attempt to enter Rhodesia
through the territories of Botswana and Mozambique.
Once the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique,
FRELIMO, had come to power in Mozambique during 1974,
the Rhodesian strategic situation changed drastical-
ly for the worse. The whole north-eastern, eastern
and south-eastern border was thrown open to penetra-
tion and infiltration. When ZPRA infiltration via
Botswana increased from 1976 onwards, a similar
situation developed along the western and south-
western borders. The number of recruits and refugees
leaving the war-torn country during those years fur-
ther provided both ZANLA and ZPRA with more than an
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ample supply of trainees. Therefore, by the end of
the war Rhodesia had an active hostile border stret-
ching for nearly 3 000km. Only 200km of southern
border adjacent to the Republic of South Africa
remained in hands not hostile to the country.
As indicated in Chapter 4 (Border Minefield
Obstacles) Rhodesia had neither the manpower nor the
resources to even attempt an effective system of
border control. The obvious military alternative
entailed a forward defence in depth. Such a strategy
would imply that insurgent forces could be elimina-
ted en masse within their strategic base areas.
A further extension of this strategy entailed
punishing countries giving sanctuary for passive and/
or active aid rendered to the insurgent forces. In
this regard Zambia and Mozambique provided evidence
of an almost unrestricted commitment to the 'decolo-
nialisation' of Rhodesia.
Lastly, Rhodesian creation and support of the
Mozambique Resistance Movement had great potential
as a destabilising factor. It is, however, not
directly relevant to this chapter.
The Rhodesian strategy of cross-border assaults
developed rapidly in the period 1976 to 1979. The
major characteristics of this strategy can only be
ascertained from an account of external operations
into neighbouring countries.
7.2 Mozambique
In spite of Prime Minister Ian Smith's public denial
on 4 December 1972, Rhodesian military units had
been operating continually in Mozambique since 1969.
After the initiation of Operation Hurricane, co-
operation with Portuguese armed forces was increased.
Permission was granted for Special Air Service (SAS)
and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) operations in
large areas north and south of the Zambezi river, to
a line running North-South through the village of
Carnde 100km into Mozambique.
Co-operation lasted until 1974, and even for
some months after the coup in Lisbon. Operations by
section and platoon size units into Mozambique con-
tinued after Portugal had handed over power to
FRELIMO, for it was some months before President
Samora Machel was able to consolidate power.
Co-operation between ZANLA and FRELIMO dated
from 1969, when ZANLA was offered the use of the
Tete province to infiltrate insurgents into north-
eastern Rhodesia. This co-operation had strengthened
175External Operations
Figure 7.1. Mozambique
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during the intervening years to such an extent that
the two movements had a largely integrated logistics
system. Once FRELIMO was in power, command, control
and training were also to be integrated. President
Machel's commitment to the 'liberation' of Rhodesia
was total.
By 1979 the Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence estimated that a total of 1 000 FAM (Army of
Mozambique,formerly known as FPLM) troops were trai-
ned for use in support of ZANLA forces inside Rhode-
sia. The total number actually deployed within Rho-
desia was estimated at between 150 and 300 troops.
Initially political constraints and the inte-
gration of ZANLA and FAM discouraged large Rhodesian
operations into Mozambique. Strict constraints were
placed on raids into that country. Only during the
latter half of 1975, for example, were the Selous
Scouts given permission to penetrate into Mozambique.
Penetration was, however, limited to a maximum of
five kilometres and attacks on FAM or camps jointly
occupied by FAM and ZANLA were strictly prohibited.
The first Selous Scouts operation into Mozambique
was executed on 7 January 1976 when fifteen Scouts
attacked a ZANLA transit camp situated near Chicom-
bidzi. Although a number of insurgents were wounded,
no fatal casualties could be confirmed.
During 1976, as the trickle of ZANLA insurgents
into Rhodesia turned into a flood. Combined Head-
quarters, (COMOPS), was able to convince the Secu-
rity Council that attacks against ZANLA training and
holding camps in Mozambique was vitally important to
limit the number of insurgents inside Rhodesia to
manageable levels. In spite of the continuous small-
unit operations that had taken place, Rhodesian
intelligence concerning these bases had previously
not been detailed enough to ensure success.
First use of the Selous Scouts' so-called 'Fly-
ing Column' occurred during June 1976. Code-named
Operation Long John it entailed an attack on the
ZANLA transit camp at Mapai and staging-post known
as Chicualacuala. The operation was greatly assisted
by the capture of a ZANLA liaison officer from
Malvernia opposite Vila Salazar.. Under cover of an
artillery barrage the column of six vehicles cros-
sed into Mozambique and in succession attacked Mapai
and Chicualacuala. Although only a small number of
insurgents were killed a large quantity of arms and
ammunition was destroyed.
The first major success resulted from pseudo
operations in Holdenby Tribal Trust Land during
which a ZANLA captive gave detailed information
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regarding a major base in Mozambique. According to
all reports this base was the major staging area for
ZANLA infiltration into Operation Thrasher. The
exact location of the camp followed from a visual
sighting by a Canberra pilot. Detailed preparation
led to the execution of Operation Eland on 8 August
1976. Eighty-four members of the Selous Scouts,
dressed as FAM soldiers, swept into the Nyadzonia
camp about 40km from the Rhodesian border in Manica
province with ten Unimogs and four Ferret armoured
scout cars. Entering the camp via a circular route
during muster parade, the Scouts killed about 300
ZANLA and'30 FAM troops according to the official
Security Force communique released after the raid.
At the time of the attack Nyadzonia was reported to
contain about 5 000 ZANLA insurgents and 50 FAM sol-
diers. According to the results of an FAM board of
inquiry subsequently found at Chimoio, total ZANLA
deaths at Nyadzonia were estimated at over 1 000.
During the raid the Pungwe river bridge linking Tete
to Chimoio was also blown up to prevent any inter-
vention by the FAM brigade stationed at Chimoio.
Although this has not been confirmed, it would
seem that the Selous Scouts launched a simultaneous
attack on a camp in the region of Vila Machado
nearly 200km from the Rhodesian border on the Umtali-
Beira railway line. FAM and ZANLA casualties were
reported to be between 800 and 1 000. (6)
Code-named Operation Mardon, the Selous Scouts
launched a second flying column attack into the Gaza
province on 31 October 1976. The columns main objec-
tive was to disrupt the ZANLA logistical system.
After the attack on the Mapai base in June 1976,
ZANLA had shifted their base to Jorge do Limpopo,
fourteen kilometers away, but still referred to it
as Mapai. As part of the operation the railway
between Jorge do Limpopo, Malvernia and Massangera
was also disrupted.
At the time there was considerable doubt as to
FAM reaction to such raids. As it turned out, this
was less of a danger than originally feared and even
after Rhodesian Security Forces launched overt
attacks on FAM targets, the armed forces of Mozambi-
que remained hesitant to close with them.
During this early stage deployment of insurgent
base camps was found to assist rather than hinder
Rhodesian operations. Camps were permanent establish-
ments in which hundreds of trainees were concentra-
ted in a very small area. Active air defence measu-
res such as missile sites and anti-aircraft guns
were very few while passive measures such as
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camouflage, bunkers and track discipline were in
their infancy.
These practices changed drastically, and from
1978 onwards ZANLA camps were spread over several
square kilometres. Permanent sites gave way to nume-
rous temporary camps. Locations were rotated between
these sites at irregular intervals, while camouflage
and concealment were highly sophisticated. By the end
of the war, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-
Daly
To avoid detection, ZANLA transit camps had
become little more than mere resting places,
with stocks of ammunition, food and supplies
concealed, often by burying, in wide areas of
the surrounding bush. There were no huts or
grass shelters and the camping areas were gene-
rally sited amongst thick bush or under large
trees, to comouflage the terrorist presence
from our reconnaissance aircraft. They were
normally manned by a small garrison who lived,
if they were fortunate, in nearby villages.
Their job was to ration and resupply the groups
passing through on route to the war and to pro-
vide guides to take them to the next staging
post. (7)
Where the Joint Services Photographic Interpretation
Staff, JSPIS, originally had little difficulty in
identifying camps and their lay-out from aerial
photographs, this was no longer possible. The deter-
mination of whether a camp was occupied or not
became a'major problem. Since final confirmation
could only be obtained by physical ground reconnais-
sance, Special Air Service or Selous Scout teams of
one to four men in strength had to be sent in. With-
in camps spread over large areas they were also
needed to determine the precise location of key
installations such as anti-aircraft sites. The
nature of the task in hand led to the discovery of
some of these reconnaissance teams and comprised
ensuing operations.
The Mapai raid of May/June 1977, was one such
attack. Official Security Force figures released
claimed only 32 insurgent casualties. The camp dis-
persal also played a role during this raid. Co-ordi-
nated with an external area operation by 2nd Batta-
lion of the Rhodesia Regiment in the Vila Salazar
area, elements of the Rhodesian Light Infantry were
emplaced into the Rio base on the Nuanetsi river as
well as. into Madulo Pan. Similarly a Selous Scouts
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column attacked Jorge do Limpopo, only to discover
that the main ZANLA camp had shifted back to Mapai.
During the ensuing attack on the latter a Rhodesian
Air Force Dakota was shot down. This operation also
finally destroyed what remained of the Mozambique
railway system in the Gaza province. The previous
large external raid into Mozambique, Operation
Miracle, had encountered similar problems during
October/November 1976, when the targets in Tete pro-
vince received early warning as a result of the
detection of the approaching vehicle column.
In spite of these problems the destruction and
capture of arms, ammunition and other material
increasingly played a role in Security Force strate-
gy. Where the initial objective had always been pri-
marily to obtain maximum insurgent casualties, it
was moderated to give logistical damage an almost
equal status.
The first operation aimed at destroying logis-
tical targets, albeit for mainly military reasons,
was code-named Operation Virile. It entailed the
destruction of five road bridges on the road between
Dombe and Espungabera during November 1977. Espunga-
bera is located on the Mozambique side of the border
to Mount Silinda. As a result, Espungabera was cut
off from the main FAM and ZANLA base at Chimoio and
the garrison stationed there denied all substantial
means of support. As a transit base for infiltration
into Rhodesia it subsequently lost much of its
value.
The pattern of Security Force external opera-
tions was closely linked to seasonal fluctuations.
The annual summer rainy season brought about the
growth of thick, green vegetation which provided the
best natural cover for insurgent infiltration and
activity. Such was the case on 23 November 1977,
when ZANLA suffered heavy losses of 1 200 casualties
during Security Force attacks on the ZANLA headquar-
ters north of Chimoio, and against the holding camp
at Tembue. The attacks were executed by the same
force of Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light
Infantry troops who were air-lifted from Chimoio to
Tembue. In preparing for the massed infiltration of
insurgents, ZANLA had taken to concentrating them in
forward holding camps at the start of the annual
summer rains. Needless to say, this strategy was not
repeated indefinitely.
ZANLA base camp deployment, as it had developed
by 1978, presented the Rhodesian Security Forces
with a number of interrelated problems. The method
employed to attack an insurgent base was known as
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vertical envelopment. This consisted of an air
strike by bombers followed by the delivery of troops
on the perimeters of the camp and across the most
likely enemy escape routes by helicopters or para-
chute. The latter forces adopted ambush positions
while the perimeter forces fought inwards, cleaning
the camp progressively from one side as the battle
progressed. This had originally been made possible
by the development adopted by ZANLA in its base
camps, as well as the absence of organised resis-
tence to Security Forces during the operations.
While the lack of offensive action remained
specifically a hallmark of ZANLA forces when faced
with a conventional attack, passive counter measures
such as the dispersal and extensive use of bunkers
presented a serious challenge to the cost-effective-
ness of such attacks. These problems were further
accentuated when the insurgents resorted to building
their bunkers on higher ground. As a result their
anti-aircraft cover was both better placed and more
effective, improving the somewhat restrictive capa-
bilities of SA-7 missiles and the fields of fire
both of missiles and other anti-aircraft weaponry.
The FAM in particular were becoming more adept in
the use of SA-7's. During the later Chimoio raids
they positioned these missiles along the Vandusi-
Catandica road, firing on all aircraft in transit.
Air strikes and close air support gradually
became more costly and dangerous. Since the Rhode-
sian Army relied on antiquated Second World War 25
pounder field guns, artillery fire support would not
dislodge insurgents from bunkers built to withstand
a near miss by a 350kg bomb.(8) Artillery fire sup-
port was only used during Operation Miracle pre-
viously mentioned. During this operation FAM attemp-
ted one of its few interventions, while a ZANLA
anti-aircraft machine gun company put up fierce
resistance in the face of concerted Rhodesian air
and ground attacks. (9)
Throughout the period in question, although the
FAM never became involved against the Rhodesian for-
ces in any meaningful way, FAM intervention was more
active than that of the Zambian National Defence
Force (ZNDF). The most serious Rhodesian fear was a
possible attack on their Forward Administrative
Areas (FAA). These were established as logistical
resupply points within Mozambique (or Zambia) when
deep strikes were made into enemy territory. Any
attack against the FAA would endanger the entire
operation. As a result many of the Rhodesian attacks
on FAM forces should be viewed in the light of the
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danger these forces posed vis-a-vis the FAA.
Occasionally the Rhodesian Air Force also acci-
dentally bombed either FAM or members of the Tanzanian
Peoples Defence Force (TPDF). A maximum of 2 000
TPDF troops were deployed at Massingwe in Tete pro-
vince but did not actively involve themselves in the
war against Rhodesia. Such accidental bombings were
normally the result of faulty intelligence reports
and related to the problem of distinguishing between
ZANLA, FAM and TPDF forces within the various carnps.
Restrictions on action against FAM forces were lif-
ted during 1978. Prior to this these forces had been
engaged only in self-defence. One example of the
accidental bombing of TPDF forces occurred late in
1978/early 1979. The Directorate of Military Intel-
ligence had identified two possible area locations
of a ZANLA base with the knowledge that there was
also a TPDF camp in the area. When Selous Scouts
teams discovered a base in the Songo area near Lake
Cahora Bassa, and air strike was carried out on the
location. The base subsequently proved to have been
occupied by TPDF forces. As an insurgent training
area Tanzania had played an active role in providing
ZANLA training facilities since August 1968. These
were initially situated at Itumbi in south-western
Tanzania and as from 1971 at Mgagoo.
Although not as widely publisized, air strikes
without ground support proved an important factor in
insurgent casualties. One such raid that was never
officially disclosed occurred in mid to late 1979
when a ZANLA holding camp at Nhangau, north of Beira
was bombed, resulting in about 600 casualties.
As ZANLA started its build-up of conventional
forces and armaments in 1978-1979, it was also
becoming clear that Rhodesian weaponry could not
deal with the base camp deployment that was evolving,
especially as regards dispersal and the extensive
use of bunkers. In terms of casualties and effort
the cost of traditional vertical envelopment methods
was rising, but no ready alternative seemed appa-
rent.
During 1978 it was also becoming increasingly
evident that purely as a method of inflicting insur-
gent casualties, external operations were not as
effective as they seemed to be initially. In the
period 1977 to 1978 ZANLA casualties resulting from
such raids totalled 3 500, while the number of
active insurgents in eastern Rhodesia had risen from
1 200 to more than 8 000. This led to a shift in
emphasis from causing casualties to disrupting the
ZANLA logistical system. One example of such a change
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in emphasis is the air attack on combined ZANLA and
FAM armouries at Chingodzi and Dendo. Henceforth,
ZANLA arms were mainly stored in Maputo itself,
where political considerations prevented their mass
destruction by air. Alternatively they were disper-
sed in forward areas. ZANLA was, however, forced to
stay in the vicinity of Chimoio since the latter was
the main FAM administrative centre for Manica Pro-
vince, and, subsequently, for ZANLA. ZANLA was thus
forced to alternate their camps within an approxi-
mate radius of sixty kilometers of Chimoio. To the
Security Forces this area became known as the
Chimoio Circle.
As the war entered its final stages, logistics
were increasingly seen as a primary factor in easing
the onslaught from outside Rhodesia. A target study
of the Mozambiquan communication and transport sys-
tem as part of the ZANLA logistical chain was com-
pleted by the Directorate of Military Intelligence
early in 1979. The result presented to NATJOC sug-
gested the destruction of eighteen major bridges,
extensive mining of certain stretches of road and
sinking of dredgers in the Makuti channel off
Sofala.
The War Council refused to agree to the execu-
tion of this plan in a single operation. NATJOC pro-
ceeded, however, to authorise piece-meal attacks on
some of these objectives during 1979. When the Lan-
caster House constitutional talks began, a number of
them had been attacked, but the desired result,
total collapse of all traffic, and thus of ZANLA
logistics, was not achieved. The operations launched
were too extended in time to be effective and the
only result achieved was the disruption of local
movement.
During the ensuing ceasefire, ZANLA was capable
of concentrating its remaining external forces and
then infiltrating them into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia with
little difficulty directly counter to the ceasefire
agreement.
The attempts at what amounted to a limited
interdiction campaign was the nearest that the Rho-
desian Security Forces came to being allowed to
attack strategic targets in Mozambique. At no stage
did NATJOC sanction operations against economic tar-
gets that could not be justified on purely military
grounds. Operation Uric (September 1979) into Gaza
province bears witness to this.
Although this operation was the first to be
officially admitted as purposely aimed at FAM tar-
gets (in the subsequent Security Forces communique)
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the real aim of Operation Uric was to destroy five
bridges and thus halt all rail and road movement
north of Baragem. Military justification for the
raid was provided by the arrival of large numbers of
Ethiopian-trained ZANLA insurgents in Maputo in
transit to holding camps near Zimbabwe-Rhodesia prior
to infiltration. In view of the political negotia-
tions underway that would eventually lead to Lancas-
ter House, NATJOC feared that the FAM might be temp-
ted to assist ZANLA either in seizing territory and
declaring it a 'liberated' area, or in shortening
ZANLA's logistical line. In an effort to halt all
movement in the area as well as to counter the FAM
build-up there, an FAM brigade administrative area
at Mabalane near Mapai was also attacked. Only three
of the five bridges were effectively destroyed. It
is reasonable to assume that this operation had an
effect on the pressure exerted by President Machel
on Mugabe at Lancaster House, for it represented a
further serious blow to the Mozambique economy.
In conclusion, Rhodesian Security Force raids
into Mozambique had some distinct advantages in com-
parison with those into Zambia. Vehicle columns
could be employed with little difficulty as a result
of the absence of a barrier comparable to the Zam-
bezi river. This made the use of artillery possible
to provide close fire support, although only used
during Operation Miracle. As a legacy of co-opera-
tion with the Portuguese their detailed knowledge of
the terrain was a further advantage. A strange fac-
tor was the reliability of radio interceptions. Vast
numbers of these were made, but the loose, unco-
ordinated command and control structure of ZANLA in
contrast to that of ZPRA led to the interceptions
being of greater use in Zambia than in the case of
Mozambique.
While the general strategic posture regarding
Zambia was forward and aggressive, the eastern ope-
rational area commanders attempted to institute a
defence in depth, with protection of vital economic
areas as a vital component. Within the three eastern
operational areas such a strategy entailed establi-
shing border minefield obstacles as impediments to
cross-border movement, with little manpower back-up.
The majority of forces were involved in the protec-
tion of farming areas and railway lines.
In the final year of the war an attempt was
made towards a more forward strategic posture; with
Rhodesian Light Infantry and Special Air Service
units operating inside Mozambique on a continual
basis. The Special Air Service and Corps of Engineers
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laid extensive minefields in Manica, Gaza and Tete
provinces in a further attempt to hamper freedom of
movement. The effectiveness of these measures is
extremely difficult to determine.
7.3 Zambia
Zambia had been the traditional base for Rhodesian
nationalist movements since UDI in 1965. Although in
direct political and ethnic competition, both ZANU
and ZAPU had no choice but to avail themselves of the
hospitality of President Kaunda. This situation con-
tinued until FRELIMO gained power in Mozambique. The
third member of the Frontline states, Botswana, was
economically too dependent on the Republic of South
Africa and Rhodesia and militarily too weak to play
any major role in the war.
President Kaunda had played an active role in
numerous attempts to obtain international action
against Rhodesia. These had cost Zambia dearly and
culminated in the closure of the border with Rhode-
sia on 9 January 1973. Zambian commitment to the
'liberation' of Rhodesia is probably best illustra-
ted in the well-known Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969
which included the following statement:
On the objective of liberation ... we can
neither surrender nor compromise. We have
always preferred and we still prefer, to
achieve it without physical violence ... But
while peaceful progress is blocked by actions
of those at present in power in the states of
Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give
to the people of those territories all the sup-
port of which we are capable in their struggle
against their oppressors.(10)
Despite having signed this, President Kaunda was not
prepared to use Zambian forces to 'liberate' Rhode-
sia. It was to be a struggle by a people for their
country. A legacy similar to that of the common
struggle by ZANLA and FRELIMO in Mozambique did not
exist in Zambia between the Zambian National Defence
Force, ZNDF, and ZPRA. This led to a major distinct-
tion regarding the support these two countries
accorded ZAPU and ZANU.
While FAM and ZANLA forces were integrated at
various levels those of the ZNDF and ZPRA remained
strictly separate.(11) Each had its own command and
control functions as well as logistical chain. At no
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stage of the war did the ZNDF become actively invol-
ved with insurgent operations inside Rhodesia.
As regards Rhodesian Security Force operations
in that country, separate bases and facilities for
ZNDF and ZPRA were advantageous. Therefore attacks
on insurgent bases could take place with little or
no chance of ZNDF casualties. As in Mozambique, the
Zambian army did not involve itself further in Rho-
desian external operations. It became evident that
the ZNDF was intent on preventing any confrontation
with the Rhodesian armed forces. Three factors, how-
ever, hampered large scale Security Force operations
into Zambia at least until 1978.
The first of these was Zambian membership of
the Commonwealth and its standing as a moderate
government in the eyes of the West. While Mozambique
had gained independence merely as a result of the
coup in Portugal, Zambia had gained its freedom
peacefully from Britain during the era of de-coloni-
sation. Large scale Rhodesian reprisals would at
least have prompted Britain to adopt a harsher Rho-
desian policy. The distinct prospect of direct
involvement in the dispute could not be ruled out.
South Africa exercised a similar and possibly
more direct restraint on Rhodesian actions against
Zambia since President Kaunda was the one major
black leader prepared to take part in detente in
Southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa could
not allow any Rhodesian actions that might endanger
this relationship.
In the years preceeding 1978, Security Force
external operations into Zambia consisted of small-
scale clandestine activities such as sabotage and
the laying of mines. The operations were conducted
in close secrecy and at a relatively low level of
intensity. As the war intensified, operations
against ZPRA also intensified but were still limited
in comparison with raids into Mozambique. Thus, for
example, a combined force of Special Air Service,
Rhodesian Light Infantry and Rhodesia African Rifles
attacked the ZPRA staging-post in Kavalananja on 6
March 1978. The operation was code-named Operation
Turmoil and the camp attacked was a mere four kilometers
inside Zambia. Forty two ZPRA insurgents were killed
and a quantity of equipment destroyed.
Until 1978, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, had
repeatedly proved ready to take part in negotiations
with the Rhodesian Front government. To a large
extent this willingness reflected the imbalance of
strength between ZPRA and ZANLA, yet during this
period Nkomo was still widely regarded as the major
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nationalist leader. (During 1976 Nkomo was still
inside Rhodesia as leader of the Internal ANC.) His
agreement to a constitutional settlement could have
been a decisive blow to the insurgent onslaught. The
first Viscount disaster and the ensuing massacre of
the survivors on 3 September 1978, however, halted
all contact between Ian Smith and Nkomo. Following
this, and in the face of reports concerning a major
build-up of ZPRA forces in Zambia, the War Council
sanctioned attacks on major ZPRA bases in and
around Lusaka.
A final factor that tended to restrict Security
Force raids was that of physical barriers such as
the Zambezi river and Kariba Lake. The initial
strike, emplacement of troops, fire support, logis-
tical replenishment and evacuation of troops thus
all had to be undertaken by air. As the Rhodesian
Air Force had a strictly limited number of aircraft,
this was a severe limitation. Only on a single occa-
sion did Rhodesia ferry vehicles across the Zambezi
to attack ZPRA targets inside Lusaka itself.
The first major external raid into Zambia took
place during October 1978. During May of the pre-
vious year, Prime Minister Smith had warned Presi-
dent Kaunda that Harare might order pre-emptive
strikes against insurgent bases in Zambia in view of
the increased ZPRA forces in that country. This
first raid consisted of bombing raids on several
targets, inter alia on the ZPRA headquarters at
Freedom Camp (F.C.) near Lusaka on 20 October 1978.
From here half-trained insurgents were forwarded to
Luso in Angola for a final four month training
period. As had been the case with the first large-
scale raid into Mozambique, targets that had neither
active nor passive defence systems were taken
entirely by surprise. This was the well-known Green
Leader attack.
ZPRA quickly learned from the casualties they
had suffered. As with ZANLA, they resorted to camou-
flage and concealment, the use of bunkers and dis-
persal of bases over large areas. Where ZPRA bases
had initially been limited to major camps close to
urban areas, they were now divided into numerous
smaller bases and spread over remote areas, away from
Lusaka. Within a matter of months air attacks against
ZPRA bases were proving much less cost effective
than was the case initially. Their training was more
conventionally orientated and in general more tho-
rough. ZPRA forces also put up more resistance when
attacked than ZANLA did.
The effectiveness of ZPRA passive counter-
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measures is illustrated by the air strikes against
Mulungushi camp north-east of Lusaka during 1979.
Subjected to twelve Canberra and eighteen Hunter
sorties over a period of two days, ZPRA forces
remained dug-in throughout the attack, sustaining
only 7 deaths and 30-40 wounded despite the expen-
diture of thousands of kilograms of explosives. This
was the second bombing attack on Mulungushi. It had
first been bombed on 22 December 1978. At the time
it contained two hundred and seventy conventionally
trained ZPRA insurgents. Thirty-three died during
this first attack.
As in Mozambique, it soon became clear that
Rhodesian Air Force armaments could not dislodge the
enemy from hardened shelters. Various experiments
were conducted in an attempt to design some means of
dislodging or killing personnel in their bunkers
over a wide area. These experiments met with little
success. In the case of Zambia specifically this was
a serious limitation.
At a later stage Mulungushi base also provided
proof of the effectiveness of insurgent camp routine
and general security. Security Forces had planned a
normal vertical envelopment operation on the camp in
the belief that total ZPRA strength amounted to a
single battalion. Owing to logistical problems and
possible ZNDF involvement the operation was cancel-
led. After the war the Directorate of Military Intel-
gence learned that ZPRA had encamped a further three
battalions in the surrounding area as counter attack
force against just such an eventuality.
The preparation and strength of ZPRA forces and
camps soon made it evident that attacks on main
camps were becoming too costly. The alternative
entailed the elimination of ZPRA communications,
logistics and hierarchy. This decision was further
prompted following a highly successful Selous Scouts
operation into Francistown, during which a number of
high-ranking ZPRA officials were captured. During
interrogation they revealed the extent of the ZPRA
conventional build-up in Zambia. It was planned to
seize bridgeheads across the Zambezi after which
either Wankie or Victoria Falls airfields would be
used as air resupply points. Ground forces would
establish an anti-aircraft umbrella over the two
airfields.
The whole operation was intended as a severe
psychological blow to white morale, as well as inter-
national proof of the extent of insurgent activities.
During May 1979 Intelligence Digest had reported:
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It is reliably reported from Zambia that there
is a large-scale build-up of Russian military
forces and equipment in the country. Up to 50
Russian transport planes daily have been seen on
the Lusaka runways ... The military equipment
is largely offensive ... mostly tanks, artil-
lery and heavy machine guns. The troops are
mainly East German 'instructors' and a few
Yugoslav pilots ... There is much talk of an
offensive against Rhodesia, spearheaded by
Nkomo
!s terrorist forces and some elements of
the Zambian Army. (12)
It can be accepted that the planned ZPRA operation
was to be a concerted bid by Nkomo and his Soviet
backing to forestall ZANU (ie. Chinese) political or
military victory. Planning included Angola which was
to provide the aircraft for a typical Warsaw Pact
type operation. (Egyptian attacks across the Suez
canal in the Yom Kippur war during 1973 exemplify
such an operation.)
In reaction, the Security Forces launched pre-
emptive raids by Special Air Service troops into the
heart of Lusaka during April and June 1979 to dis-
rupt ZPRA command and control structures. ZPRA cen-
tral command and communication facilities were
severely damaged by these operations. The first of
these raids on 14 and 15 April 1979 was the only
occasion during which a mobile column of seven Land
Rovers was used in Zambia. During the raid an abor-
tive attempt on the life of Joshua Nkomo was carried
out.
Although large-scale external operations into
Zambia had started only in 1978, two years after
similar operations against Mozambique, their scope
and intensity were soon to be of an equal magnitude.
The same basic arguments that were used to justify
attacks on strategic targets in Mozambique were used
regarding Zambia.
Being a land-locked country, Zambia had limited
export routes. In Angola the Union for the Total
Independence of Angola, UNITA, had cut the rail link
to the port of Benguela. To the south lay Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia. The only viable routes remaining
were along the Chinese built railway line between
Tanzania and Zambia (TANZAM now called the TAZARA)
and through Mozambique to the port of Beira. Hampe-
red by inefficient management and handling problems
at the ports of Dar es Salaam and Beira, these links
were hard pressed to move even the minimum of
exports and imports.
190
External Operations
As part of the limited interdiction campaign
waged against Mozambique, the first raids on strate-
gic targets in Zambia took place on 11 and 12 Octo-
ber 1979. Three bridges on the Beira-Moatize railway
line in Mozambique were bombed. Zambian links with
the port of Beira were effectively cut. At the same
time Special Air Service forces destroyed the Cham-
beshi railway bridge in northern Zambia. The route
carrying 40% of all Zambian imports and exports was
thus cut. Since the initial appreciation of objec-
tives to be attacked was incomplete, subsequent
raids had to be complemented by further attacks some
weeks later. A number of other bridges were also
destroyed making Zambia almost entirely dependent on
its southern rail link through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
President Kaunda was forced to re-open this route in
full to avoid total economic chaos.
The military justification for these raids was
towards halting the flow of military equipment to
ZPRA from Dar es Salaam. The rate and extent of sup-
ply had reached alarming proportions.
As in the case of President Machel's pressure
on Robert Mugabe at Lancaster House, it is difficult
to gauge the resulting pressure that President
Kaunda brought to bear on Joshua Nkomo.
In contrast to ZANLA, the majority of whose
forces were inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at the time of
the Lancaster House talks, the larger part of ZPRA
was still in Zambia. As mentioned in the previous
section, Nkomo had been planning a conventional
onslaught to regain the military initiative he had
lost to ZANLA in 1969-1976. When it became evident
that a Lancaster House ceasefire would prevent the
execution of any such plan in time, it should then
have been clear to Nkomo that little doubt could
exist regarding the results of an election in view
of the imbalance (more ZANLA than ZPRA) of politically
motivated insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,
Early in 1979 a high-powered Soviet military
delegation arrived in Lusaka to reorganize the ZPRA
strategy. They emphasised the need to go onto a con-
ventional war footing, but in the meantime making
the maximum use of the existing ZPRA insurgents to
pave the way for entry into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia of the
conventional forces. From then on ZPRA was divided
into a conventional and an insurgent force.
The conventional plan involved having two
bridgeheads across the Zambezi, one in the Chirundu/
Kariba area and the other near Victoria Falls. Large
numbers of conventionally trained troops would then
advance in armoured vehicles to seize the airfields
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at Hvange and Kariba into which they would airlift
the remainder of their troops.
However, as a settlement at Lancaster House
became a real possibility, it also became apparent
that the number of insurgents inside Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia would play a major role in the elections
that were to follow. Furthermore, ZANLA encroachment
into traditional ZPRA areas was causing great alarm.
To bolster their insurgent forces inside Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia, ZPRA began deploying regular troops into
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These forces operated in strengths
up to company level. Friction between ZPRA regulars
and insurgents had a distinctly negative effect on
these operations. ZPRA regulars also suffered severe
reverses at the hands of the Security Forces at or
near infiltration points, such a-s Mlibizi, Lumbimbi
and Lupane.
By mid-1979 ZPRA had concentrated close to
twenty thousand regular soldiers at its Central
Guerrilla Training Camp No 2 (CGT-2). Further troops
were stationed in Angola. Unable to tackle this
force head-on, COMOPS decided on a defensive stra-
tegy. This strategy was aimed at preventing any ZPRA
armoured columns from arriving at the launch points
along the Kariba Lake and the Zambezi River, and to
prevent a build-up of ZPRA troops and supplies for
an attack into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Accordingly the Special Air Service destroyed
the road and rail bridges along the Great North road
linking Zambia with Tanzania over which the bulk of
Zambian exports and imports had flowed. Nine road
bridges were also destroyed a few weeks later. This
effectively cut the Great East, the Chirundu and the
Livingstone roads. The latter two constituted the
major two road approach routes to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
As further counter COMOPS deployed Special Air Ser-
vice Selous Scouts and Rhodesia Light Infantry for-
ces in southern and south-western Zambia on a con-
tinual basis in operations designed to hinder dis-
rupt and where possible, stop all ZPRA movement into
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Pressure brought to bear on
Bishop Muzorewa in London forced the withdrawal of
these forces late in 1979. ZPRA was thus enabled to
concentrate its forces from Luso in Angola at CGT-2
and Mulungushi. From here they were transported by
road to infiltrate through bridgeheads held by five
conventionally trained ZPRA battalions along Lake
Kariba and eastwards to the point where the border
between Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
meet.
In general, Security Force operations into
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Zambia were influenced by a number of geographical
features, the most obvious being the barrier of the
Zambezi river and Lake Kariba. A second was the vul-
neribility of Zambia as a land-locked country whose
major viable export routes ran through a country with
which it was at war. It was mainly these factors
that led to the use of Botswana as a ZPRA transit
route.
Strategically, ZAPU had a major problem in its
ethnic representation; one fifth of the Rhodesian
population against the three quarters represented by
ZANU. In contrast, however, Nkomo could be assured
of the total support of the Matabele. Muzurewa,
Sithole and Mugabe were all vying for Shona support,
which led to the distinct possibility of ZAPU emerging
as power-broker in any elected government.
Possibly as a result of the influence of its
Soviet-block backers, ZPRA's military strategy was
not as closely aligned to the politization of the
rural masses as was ZANLA. ZPRA commanders believed
that the better military force would eventually
triumph, if only by force of arms.
7.4 Botswana
During December 1972, the Rhodesian Minister of
Defence had stated that
We have always had to watch the Botswana bor-
der, but now we have undoubted evidence of the
existence of terrorists in Botswana.(13)
As the war spread across the rural areas of Rhodesia,
three operational areas were formed and actively
engaged in combating the threat from Mozambique and
Zambia (Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse). Political
consideration forestalled the official declaration
of 'war' against Botswana so that military comman-
ders were hesitant to provoke an intensified strug-
gle in the area that was eventually designated Ope-
ration Tangent. A final factor was a mutual interest
to limit the level of violence:
... in view of the fact that many guerrilla
raids against Rhodesia have been mounted from
Botswana the Rhodesians have responded with
notable restraint. This may be related to the
fact that one of Rhodesia's two remaining rail
links with South Africa runs through
Botswana.(14)
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Possibly the first external operation of real
significance mounted into Botswana was executed by a
team of eight Selous Scouts on the night of 30 March
1974. As a result four high level ZPRA officials
were captured. Numerous arrests were made and arms
caches seized, resulting in a complete setback for
both ZPRA and ZAPU in Matabeleland.
During September a fifth ZPRA official who had
been attempting to reorganize the broken network in
Matabeleland was also abducted by three members of
the Selous Scouts. Both operations were substantial
intelligence coups for the Security Forces.
Botswana had always been an unwilling partner
with the other three black African countries
bordering on Rhodesia and actively involved in
the war against that country. Flanked on all sides
by white-controlled countries her economic survival
was in the hands of Rhodesia and the Republic of
South Africa. Botswana's only link with any other
black state was at a single point in the north where
South West Africa/Namibia and Zambian territory met.
The Kasangula ferry across the Zambezi river was the
only external link which did not run through Rhode-
sian or South African territory.
Largely as a result of the natural obstacles
hindering direct infiltration into Rhodesia from
Zambia, ZPRA had begun to enter Matabeleland via
Botswana. ZPRA forces cut across the western tip of
Rhodesia, were transported down the Grove road in
eastern Botswana from where they entered Rhodesia.
Initially this did not occur with the active aid of
the Botswana Defence Force (BDF)- but Sir
Seretse Khama became more sympathetic to ZPRA's use
of Botswana terrain as the war in Rhodesia intensi-
fied.
Until April 1977, Botswana had a very small
paramilitary Police Mobile Unit which proved totally
inadequate to police the long Rhodesian and Zambian
borders. The BDF was then formed, at total strength
of two companies. ZPRA use of Botswana continued
unabated however, and although not officially condo-
ned, the BDF provided limited aid to ZPRA forces.
An important factor in the Rhodesian attitude
towards Botswana was the absence of any armed insur-
gent camps, in contrast to their approach to Mozam-
bique and Zambia. In both these countries 'refugee
1
camps listed as such by the resident United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees were actively being
used as training bases. Listed refugee camps in
Botswana were a major source of ZPRA recruits, who
were flown out to Nyamapanda near Lusaka. From there
194
External Operations
recruits were transported in batches of 2 000 to
Luso in Angola as well as to other training camps
within Zambia such as Mwembeshi, CGT and Mulungushi.
Insurgents were not trained within Botswana iself.
Botswana's role as a passive transit area, however,
became vital in the years 1977-1978 when ZAPU laun-
ched its massive recruitment drive in western Rho-
desia in an attempt to build up an army comparable
to that of ZANLA.
Teams of Selous Scouts and Special Air Service
troops were now operating in Botswana virtually on a
permanent, if small-scale, basis. These were espe-
cially aimed at ambushes on the Grove road and met
with varying degrees of success resulting in both
ZPRA and BDF casualties. During 1977 Africa Confi-
dential stated
There is now also no doubt that members of the
Selous Scouts counter-insurgency unit have been
operating inside Botswana, primarily to kidnap
men wanted by the Smith regime and abduct them
across the border. Sometimes they have posed as
refugees in order to gain access to the refugee
camps at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe.(15)
Possibly one of the largest single operations into
Botswana was the sinking of the Kasangula ferry
during April 1979, which effectively cut Botswana's
major link with Zambia, and the concurrent attack on
the ZPRA headquarters in Francistown. Highly success-
ful pseudo operations in Francistown by the Selous
Scouts further provided invaluable intelligence, as
documented in the previous section on Zambia. During
an ambush on the Grove road by members of Three
Group, Selous Scouts, Elliot Sibanda, the senior
ZPRA Intelligence Officer for the South Front, was
wounded and taken prisoner. The ambush team had
actually been waiting for Dumiso Dabengwa on 22
March 1979 when Sibanda was captured. According to
Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, 'he was the most
important prisoner of the whole war',(16) Informa-
tion received from him resulted in a brilliant opera-
tion by a team of Selous Scouts leading to the capture
of the entire ZPRA command for the Southern Front.
Under the guise of BDF soldiers, the Scouts gained
entry to the ZPRA command headquarters on 13 April
1979 and ''arrested' all ZPRA insurgents present. A
vast amount of documentation was also captured.
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For the greater part of the war, Rhodesian Security
Forces were largely unaware of the active role
played by Angola in training ZPRA forces and supply-
ing them logistically.
The same ZPRA high-level capture whose informa-
tion led to the raids on Lusaka during the first
half of 1979, also provided details of training
undertaken at Luso in Angola. This was later confirmed
by aerial photographs taken by the Rhodesian Air
Force. On 26 February 1979, after delaying the raid
for two days as a result of bad weather, an extremly
successful air strike was carried out against the
series of twelve camps in the area. No ground forces
were involved while total surprise was achieved.
ZPRA losses were considerable, not least as a result
of the fact that the attack took place early in the
morning. Rain had further confined the majority of
the recruits to their huts. According to captured
ZPRA documents total casualties amounted to 160
insurgents killed and 530 injured.
As with Tanzania, Angola played a much more
active role in the war for Rhodesia than is generally
recognised. Ample proof of this is provided by the
plans to launch a conventional onslaught against
western Rhodesia. Angola was to provide the
aircraft for this operation.
7.6 Conclusion
Although only a selected number of the larger and
more spectacular operations conducted in Mozambique,
Zambia, Botswana and Angola have been mentioned, the
sum total of these raids should not be underestima-
ted. Interviewed in Cape Town during September 1978,
Lieutenant-General Walls stated: 'There is no
single day of the year when we are not operating
beyond our borders ...'(17)
It should, of course, be emphasised that the
size of external operations varied from one man
reconnaissance missions to almost brigade-size
operations.
External operations, however, need to be placed
within a sound strategic framework, as has partially
been discussed in the introduction to this chapter.
Before returning to this central theme, there are a
number of relevant factors that need to be mentioned
to provide proper perspective.
In both planning and execution of external
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operations, senior military commanders were faced
with a number of severe planning restrictions. The
first of these was sensitivity concerning the number
of white casualties. With the singular exception of
the Selous Scouts,the Rhodesian Light Infantry and
the Special Air Service were exclusively white
units. Repeated combat experience had indicated to
the Rhodesians that in aggressive operations, white
soldiers were better, while black soldiers had the
edge regarding bush- and fieldcraft. Inevitably
external operations involved the extensive use of
the white units as attacking force. With a total
community of 250 000, white casualties had a dis-
proportionately large effect. In the words of T.E.
Lawrence:
An individual death, like a pebble dropped in
water, might make a brief hole; yet rings of
sorrow widened out therefrom. We could not
afford casualties. (18)
In practical terms this influences the type of ope-
ration that could be carried out as well as the
security of the operation itself.
Initially external operations were primarily
aimed at inflicting the maximum number of insurgent
casualties before these forces entered Rhodesia. As
pointed out, in the early stages insurgent base camp
strategy assisted this role. However, evolving
insurgent strategy soon had a marked effect on Rho-
desian military operations. On the one hand, the
targets presented were no longer as concentrated and
limited in size. On the other hand the facilities
constructed inside these camps proved very difficult
to destroy. The emphasis thus slowly shifted to what
had been termed in Vietnam 'working the system'
(the motto of General Abrams). Insurgent logistics
probably became the primary rationale behind Rhode-
sian military planning for these raids. This was,
however, also the result of a realization that almost
unlimited manpower resources available to both ZANLA
and ZPRA prevented the long term effectiveness of a
strategy simply aimed at eliminating these insurgents
prior to their entry into Rhodesia.
A further related factor was the threat of sig-
nificant involvement by the Zambian and Mozambique
armies during such raids. This was specifically of
importance regarding the physical security of the
Rhodesian forces' return route to their country. Any
possible involvement by national defence forces that
could jeopardise this had to be eliminated at an
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early stage. Equally important, Rhodesian forces
could not become involved in either long drawn out
or running battles with any insurgent or foreign
army. Although the armed forces of Mozambique and
Zambia only actively intervened on a small scale on
four occasions, adequate provision had to be made
for dealing with any such an eventuality.
From 1976, with the geographical spread of sub-
verted areas and the increasing numbers of insur-
gents inside Rhodesia, the availability of select
weaponry and weapon systems also became a severely
restricting factor. Although the majority of insur-
gent casualties inside Rhodesia resulted from intel-
ligence provided by the Selous Scouts, the actual
killing force was the airborne Fire Force.
This consisted of Rhodesian Light Infantry
troops transported in helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft, supported by helicopter gunships. Owing to
the limited availability of helicopters in particu-
lar, any large-scale external operation virtually
implied denuding internal operational areas of Fire
Force. With the most effective weapon temporarily
forfeited, the internal security situation deterio-
rated dramatically to the extent that during the
last two years of the war, a single week proved
almost the maximum period for any external opera-
tion. According to the officer commanding the Selous
Scouts, Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly:
Due to the small numbers of aircraft we posses-
sed, any major attack on an external base meant
that the internal scene was denuded of helicop-
ters and consequently their Fireforce passen-
gers for periods of up to ten days at a time
and, without Fireforce around, the kill rates
dropped back to almost zero and the influence
of the terrorist increased.(19)
A procurement problem related to that of aircraft
was also encountered as regards sophisticated air
delivery weaponry. At the start of external opera-
tions the only available counter to extensive bun-
kers was the old 350kg (1 000 Ib) bomb which only
succeeded in collapsing shelters in the immediate
vicinity. Various experiments and projects were
initiated to develop a counter to the use of bunkers.
Possible solutions included the use of heavy gasses
as well as the creation of a ring of fire by means
of the vortex effect. The war ended before any of
these attempts could be realized. Attempts at night
bombing to counter insurgent movement during the
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hours of darkness had little more than a psychologi-
cal effect.
The general implication was that the Security For-
ces were not able to counter the evolving insurgent
base camp deployment strategies. The alternative to
the measures discussed above was to land ground
troops to clear such bases. Once on the ground, how-
ever, and fighting through bases spread over several
square kilometres, Rhodesian forces ran into increa-
singly strong resistance.
Within a base of 30km
2, such as found in the
Tete Province, insurgent forces had space to regroup
and break out of any possible encirclement. ZPRA in
particular became increasingly aggressive as the war
progressed. This was clearly illustrated during Ope-
ration Tepid in Zambia, where ZPRA forces made a
conventional night withdrawal from their well-
prepared battalion defensive positions: whereas,
lacking supportive weaponry, the Rhodesian forces
almost suffered serious casualties. Availability and
procurement of both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft
was limited so that ground forces airlifted into an
operation could not be provided with close fire sup-
port. For reasons that have already been discussed
in sections 2 and 3 this problem was more serious in
the case of Zambia. If necessary, artillery could
provide this support for operations into Mozambique.
This support would undoubtedly have become necessary
had the war continued for even a few months longer.
Two final factors worth mention are the repea-
ted attempts to assassinate key ZANU and ZAPU leaders,
as well as Rhodesian support of dissident movements
such as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement,
MRN, in Mozambique. The Resistencia Nacional Mocam-
bicana (RNM) is also known as the Mozambique Natio-
nal Resistance Movement (MNRM), the Mozambique Resis-
tance Movement (MRM), and the Mozambique National
Resistance Front (FUMO). Following the coup in Por-
tugal, the Rhodesian government decided to aid
resistance against the Machel-regime in Mozambique.
A 400 000 watt transmitter stationed at Gwero was
used to transmit the 'Voice of Free Africa
1. This
was the same transmitter originally used from Plum-
tree to block BBC broadcasts from Francistown in
Botswana shortly after UDI. Transmissions in support
of the MNRM began early in 1976. For the first years
of its existence, the MNRM had no distinct ideologi-
cal stance other than the rejection of the FRELIMO
regime. By. the end of the war this movement had
become a major factor in undermining the stability
of Mozambique. "
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The elimination of key expatriate nationalist
leaders was codenamed Operation Bouncer. In spite of
repeated attempts it failed to remove leaders such
as Mugabe, Nkomo, Nhongo and Dubengwa. Rex Nhongo
was wounded during one attempt, while Dumisa
Dubengwa escaped death by a few minutes on the Grove
road. (20)
In sum, external operations had to be part of
Rhodesian military strategy. Alone, they could
either buy time for a political settlement or be
aimed at the overthrow of the existing government to
destroy that country's support for insurgent forces.
If, as in.the case of Rhodesia, a political strategy
was lacking, only the latter option remained.
Eventually Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces
engaged in limited interdiction campaigns that ten-
ded to be more punitive than preventative. The les-
sons to be learnt from the American strategic bomb-
ing of North Vietnam should have been heeded; Zambia
and Mozambique provided evidence of an almost limit-
less commitment to the de-colonialisation of Rhode-
sia. Neither country could lay claim to democratic
status and as a result could sustain their commit-
ment far beyond that which would have been the case
had the respective government been responsible to an
electorate. Furthermore, with largely subsistence
economies, neither country could be brought to
total political chaos by economic disruption.
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OPERATION FAVOUR: SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES
8.1 Introduction: The Concept
Within the theory of revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary warfare the dictum that the battle is
in effect one for the 'hearts and minds' has been
repeatedly cited. Probably the major qualification
lacking, is that the Security Forces cannot "win the
hearts and minds' of the local population if they
are unable to protect them from insurgent intimida-
tion and reprisals.
On the one hand, the local population is faced
with an insurgent force that strives to establish
itself within certain population concentrations and
extends its influence from there. If the Security
Forces fail to protect the local population from
insurgent intimidation and influence, however, they
will be unable to retain any support they might have
had. The major object of the struggle between the
two opposing forces is to obtain the active partici-
pation of the majority of the uncommitted populace. This
can largely be gained by demonstrating whether or
not the Security Forces can provide physical secu-
rity for the local population.
Within counter-insurgency doctrine, breaking
the hold of the insurgent forces and re-establishing
control by the authorities has generally been seen
to be attempted in two stages. The first is to break
contact between the insurgents and the people, while
simultaneously destroying the insurgent organisa-
tion. The second stage is to obtain the active
participation of the population against the insur-
gent forces. Strict population control including
protected villages, curfews, martial law, food con-
trol, identity systems, and related measures have
been traditional methods of isolating insurgents
from the population. A number of these have already
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been discussed in previous chapters. Local militia
whereby the people are encouraged to defend themsel-
ves against insurgent forces is a further important
element in the second stage of the counter-insur-
gency strategy. Normally these would be in the form
of a local force within a protected village. The
local population thus become responsible for their
own defence. Mobile, quick-reaction Security Forces
should back up this system. Both stages were suc-
cintly summarized in the four objectives of the well
known Briggs plan as employed in Malaya:
a. To dominate the populated areas and to build
up a feeling of complete security, which
would in time result in a steady and increa-
sing flow of information coming from all
sources.
b. To breakdown the Communist organisation with-
in the populated areas.
c. To isolate the bandits from their food and
supply organisations in the populated areas.
d. To destroy the bandits by forcing them to
attack the Security Forces on their own
grounds. (1)
The Rhodesian exercise in the establishment of a
local self-protection force to consolidate and even
reassert government control, was unique in a number
of respects. It therefore merits closer examination,
for it had great potential as a major element of the
Rhodesian counter-insurgency effort.
8.2 Operation Favour
As early as 1973, the idea of a local black militia
which would enable the rural population to defend
themselves against insurgent attacks had been mooted
both in Special Branch and Department of Internal
Affairs. Within Special Branch it was known as the
Impi-idea, while the District Commissioner at Sipo-
lilo prepared a paper on the subject late in 1973. A
number of members of the local population were in
fact armed with old bolt-action rifles in Sipolilo
Tribal Trust Land but these were stolen by insur-
gents, finally leading to the failure of the scheme.
From the outset the concept ran into both mili-
tary and political opposition. The former resulted
from doubts as to the loyalty and effectiveness of
thousands of poorly trained and armed rural blacks,
and the latter as result of white resistance to
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'arming tribesmen
1. This opposition had already led
to delays in the formation of second and third bat-
talions of the Rhodesia African Rifles. Before 1978
recruitment and arming of District Assistants and
District Security Assistants by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs from 1974 onwards to defend Protec-
ted and Consolidated Villages, was the sum total of
any official attempts in this direction.
In January/February 1978, the idea of a local
militia based on the village family unit to provide
protection against all external threats was revised
within Special Branch.
As a.result a pilot scheme was launched in
Msana Tribal Trust Land. Initially these forces were
termed the Interim Government Forces. As the name
indicates, the Interim Government Forces were initia-
ted as an apolitical body in the sense that it was
not linked to any one black political party. It was,
however, linked with the majority rule talks being
held in Harare between Prime Minister Smith,
Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and Chief
Chirau. With the active participation of the Selous
Scouts, Special Branch introduced 42 blacks into
Msana Tribal Trust Land. Of these, nearly half were
former insurgents, but all originated from the spe-
cific area. (2) Each man had been given an extra wea-
pon which thus enabled him to recruit in turn so
effectively doubling the strength of the Interim
Government Forces, By March 1978, Msana Tribal Trust
Land was being permanently protected by about 90 men.
From this humble beginning the programme was slowly
built up in the Tribal Trust Lands surrounding
Harare, until by the end of the year, some 2 000 men
were in the field, living in the local villages as
part of the tribal structure, for the first time
permanently affording the local population protec-
tion. The idea of an apolitical force, however, soon
proved impractical against the background of the
tribal affiliations that dominated political affi-
nity. As soon as it was realised that the UANC and
ZANU {Sithole) were the two parties with the most
internal black support, the Interim Government Force
was renamed the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA's)
during June 1978.
Concurrent with the start of Operation Favour,
as it was to be designated at a later stage, was the
Internal Settlement Agreement of 3 March 1978. To
Prime Minister Ian Smith, the major rationale for
his talks with Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend
Sithole was his belief that, as the most popular
nationalist leaders, these two politicians would be
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in a position to call an end to the war. Muzorewa
had been given a hero's welcome both on his return
from self-imposed exile on 3 October 1976 and after
his return from overseas early in 1978. Close on
200 000 people welcomed him at Harare airport and
this left an indelible impression on the minds of
Prime Minister Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa him-
self. Ndabaningi Sithole was still adamant that he
was the true and popular leader of ZANU and held the
allegiance of ZANLA cadres. In this regard the fled-
geling Security Force Auxiliary scheme was received
as evidence of the numbers of insurgents that had
given up the struggle in the bush and joined the
government forces. A vast amnesty programme suppor-
ted the attempt to convince both ZANLA and ZPRA that
real majority rule had finally been achieved. On 4
November 1978, Lieutenant-General Walls claimed that
The Transitional Government has persuaded more
than 2 000 Patriotic Front terrorists to join
its side and they were now fighting under the
control of the Rhodesian Security Forces. (3)
This campaign reached its climax with the publicity
given to 'Comrade Max' (actually a member of the
Selous Scouts) who claimed authority of Msana Tribal
Trust Land. Although this was the first Tribal Trust
Land circumscribed for exclusive Auxiliary control,
the majority of Comrade Max's men were not true for-
mer insurgents, but recently trained Security Force
Auxiliaries. During November 'Commander Lloyd
1 clai-
med similar authority in Maranda Tribal Trust Land.
Both Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole clai-
med the allegiance of substantial numbers of insur-
gents, but neither had any real influence over the
cadres in the field. While General Walls had claimed
that 'more than 2 000' insurgents had joined the
Security Forces, in fact a maximum of 50 had availed
themselves of the amnesty offer. The rest were Secu-
rity Force Auxiliaries. According to Lieutenant-
Colonel Reid-Daly 'Muzorewa and Sithole only had a
minimum of genuine terrorist support, and each was
using the auxiliary concept and the money it genera-
ted from Government ... as a means of producing pri-
vate armies from nothing'.(4) This vast propaganda
operation could only have been aimed at international
recognition, for neither the local population nor
the insurgents themselves could be misled as to the
true nature of the Auxiliaries. The only real insur-
gent forces loyal to the UANC and ZANU (Sithole)
were two groups that had been trained in Libya and
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Uganda and returned to Rhodesia during the latter
part of 1978. In total these numbered 140 men and
were subsequently included in the existing Auxiliary
structure. The 42 men that Sithole obtained from
Uganda in fact constituted the initial group of
Security Force Auxiliaries loyal to him.(5) (They
were deployed in Mphoengs Tribal Trust Land.) Reve-
rend Sithole had, however, already told newsmen in
May 1978 that
By the end of the month it will be obvious that
the military situation is under control. My
lieutenants are meeting with the guerrillas in
the bush. Increasingly, the guerrillas are
expressing their solidarity with us.(6)
Sithole was in fact trying to regain control over
ZANLA cadres in the field in a continuous attempt to
reassert his leadership of ZANLA over that of Robert
Mugabe. This challenge only came to a head following
Sithole's crushing defeat during the April 1979
elections. Casualty figures seemed to provide ample
proof of both Muzorewa and Sithole's inability to
initiate the ceasefire they had promised Prime Minis-
ter Smith. At the start of the year total casualties
were at a daily figure of eight, rising to fifteen a
day after the conclusion of the Agreement of 3 March
1978. By September 1978, it was reported that an
average of thirty people were killed daily.
At this time, and on the recommendation of 1
Psychological Operations Unit, the Security Force
Auxiliaries were given the name 'Pfumo re Vanhu
1 or
'Spear of the People
1 (Shona), and 'Umkonto wa
Bantu' (Ndebele)
In an attempt to obtain COMOPS approval for the
SFA scheme, Special Branch arranged an unauthorized
well-reported visit by Bishop Muzorewa to Msana Tri-
bal Trust Land on 12 August 1978. Neither the Chair-
man of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation nor
the Minister of Information knew of the intended
meeting. Special Branch had in fact broken into
COMOPS and using official stamps, etc, falsified
COMOPS approval of the intended visit. Although the
press coverage of 'Commander Max' led to some resis-
tance within the white community, and a hot debate
in Parliament,the obvious success of the pilot
scheme led to official COMOPS approval soon after-
wards. In preparing for the April 1979 elections,
COMOPS recognised the potential of the Auxiliary
scheme in securing block votes for its favoured
candidate, Bishop Muzorewa.
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By this stage the Army was involved with Operation
Favour to a far greater extent than Special Branch
who had originated the scheme. General Walls had in
fact, personally ordered the Selous Scouts to under-
take the training, administration and feeding of all
insurgents who handed themselves over and were pre-
pared to join the Auxiliary forces. While this task
was to take precedence over all operational respon-
sibilities, the very limited numbers of insurgents
so disposed reduced the scope of the foreseen task
dramatically. The two services involved, held diffe-
ring views on the concept: to the military the Auxi-
liaries represented a distasteful method of regai-
ning rural control, while Special Branch tended to
view the project as a political weapon to regain the
support of the subverted rural black population. To
COMOPS it was directly linked to the April elec-
tions. When briefing the responsible Special Branch
officers early in 1979, the Director General of the
Central Intelligence Organisation expounded the
"Ground of Tactical Importance
1 concept whereby the
Security Force Auxiliaries would be used first to
consolidate the economic heartland. The accent later
shifted towards ensuring key block votes,especially
for Bishop Muzorewa. The numbers of ZANU (Sithole)
Auxiliaries were constantly limited by Special
Branch as it became clear that it was the Bishop and
not Sithole who had majority support. (See Chapter
11 for further detail on 'Ground of Tactical Impor-
tance ' )
In view of the proven success of the small
Security Force Auxiliary scheme in stabilizing the
rural black areas in which they were deployed,
COMOPS now demanded its immediate and vast extension
in preparation for the April 1979 elections. Both
the security chiefs, as well as black and white
politicians now began to realize that Operation
Favour was possibly the one vehicle that could re-
establish control in the Tribal Trust Lands. This
would ensure a high percentage poll for the election
which could possibly lead to international recogni-
tion. However, instead of recruiting members of the
local population from the Tribal Trust Lands and
training them before returning them to their home
villages, as was the original idea, Operation Favour
was also seen as a solution to the large numbers of
blacks unemployed in the towns and cities. These
were now 'recruited' and after a rudimentary 4 week
training course sent into the Tribal Trust Lands.
The introduction of the 'townies' into an alien
rural environment led to an increase in rape, murder -
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and general crime. According to official documenta-
tion
Because of the urgent necessity to deploy the
SFA into the Tribal Trust Lands to ensure a
good vote at the April election, few of them
received more than four weeks basic training
whilst their leadership was selected more by
trial and error than experience. There was, on
average, one white liaison officer, normally a
junior NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), to every
hundred and fifty SFA.
Towards the close of 1978 attempts were also made to
start an apolitical scheme in Matabeleland. The
major incentive offered was financial, and detach-
ments were started in Wankie, Belingwe, Godlwayo and
Lupane Tribal Trust Lands. Results seemed promising
but soon proved false by a high desertion rate
and the attempt was allowed to dissipate. Yet in
spite of both manpower and time limitations, by
March 1979:
There is growing evidence that in some Tribal
Trust Lands the irregulars known as Security
Force Auxiliaries have pushed back the Patrio-
tic Fronts' forces. (7)
UANC Auxiliaries were particularly successful in
Karoi, Chinamore and Seki Tribal Trust Lands. (8)
A further problem related to recruitment was
conscription to fill the ranks. Some blacks reluc-
tantly accepted arms, and once placed in a Tribal
Trust Land cohabited with the Patriotic Front forces
in the areas. This was once again a side effect of
the expedient of using urban blacks to protect rural
blacks. Since UANC and ZANU (Sithole) had to provide
recruits for Security Force Auxiliary training, both
had the advantage of abetting the limited role that
was accorded to Auxiliaries loyal to ZANU (Sithole) .
As a result of its limited black support, this party
could not provide as many Auxiliary trainees as the
UANC could. The limiting of Sithole's Auxiliaries is
further to be seen in the context of intense white
suspicion of his political ambitions and of the dan-
ger of presenting Sithole with a large armed force.
In contrast to these problems discussed above
and seen from a security point of view, the results
of the internal elections of April 1979 could
largely be attributed to the role played by the more
than 10 000 Auxiliaries deployed in the field. The
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high number of insurgents killed during the elec-
tions and the increased Security Force levels,
resulted in a considerable rise in the ratio of
surrenders to kills.
After the war Mugabe in fact admitted that
ZANLA had been experiencing difficulty in motivating
its forces to fight against a black government,
especially in those areas in which the support of
the people had swung in favour of the Security Force
Auxiliaries. But the Rhodesian economy was now
under severe strain with the result that demobilisa-
tion followed almost immediately' after the elections.
Within the various Auxiliary allegiances the elec-
tion results brought their own problems; as recoun-
ted in official documentation:
a. The SFA orientated towards the UANC who num-
bered about 8 000 were delighted with the
result, but there were immediate demands to
stand down as they were now the 'Winners'.
When they realised that this was not to be,
as the war was continuing there was a marked
drop in morale in some areas and a number of
desertions.
b. When the election results were announced
there were slightly under 2 000 SFA's orien-
tated towards ZANU (Sithole) in the field.
The allegations of gross irregularities in
the election made by Sithole and others of
his party had a marked effect on the ZANU
detachments who were convinced that they had
been cheated. A mistake in the addition of
the votes cast in the Gokwe district, which
reversed a narrow ZANU majority into a loss
of almost a thousand turned what was a model
detachment at Nembudzia into virtual enemies
of the Government.
The election results ultimately led to the demise of
all of Sithole's Auxiliaries. Problems had already
been encountered during the previous year when some
of his forces began living a rapacious existence,
especially in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land in central
Rhodesia. Security Forces had been forced to inter-
vene forcibly on at least two occasions (Dorowa in
Sabi Tribal Trust Land and Brunapeg Mission in
Mphoengs Tribal Trust Land to put an end to these
practices. For some time ZANU (Sithole) Auxiliaries
had also been involved in attempts to make local
contact with ZANLA forces, eg. in Nyadjena Tribal
Trust Land, where they sided with ZANLA forces to
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combat ZPRA insurgents in the west of the Tribal
Trust Land. On advice from Special Branch, Special
Forces Headquarters, who were taking control of Ope-
ration Favour, began to deploy ZANU (Sithole) Auxi-
liaries in areas in which ZANLA and ZPRA were con-
tending for control, such as Maramda Tribal Trust
Land. This effectively limited the support that
Sithole was able to draw from Shona areas in compe-
tition with Bishop Muzorewa. Security Force doubts
were vindicated when efforts to round up ZANU
(Sithole) Auxiliaries for 're-education
1 at Gokwe
(Nembudzia) met with armed resistance. During the
ensuing battle 183 members of the Auxiliaries were
killed on 20 June 1979. The remaining ZANU (Sithole)
Auxiliaries were either jailed or allowed to join
UNAC Auxiliaries. No further ZANU (Sithole) Auxilia-
ries were deployed.
Both finance and enthusiasm for Operation
Favour waned in the post-election period. The Army,
which had gradually been gaining control of the
scheme saw it as a military instrument whose use had
diminished once Bishop Muzorewa had won the elec-
tion. The total Security Force Auxiliary establish-
ment was reduced from its maximum of 16 000, although
this was also as a result of the concurrent retrai-
ning and retrenchment programme. For the first time
the role, tasks and structure of the Auxiliaries
were formalised. According to its standing Operating
Procedures for Operation Repulse area, these were as
follows
ROLE OF THE PRV (Pfumo re Vanhu)
2. The role of the PRV is to win over the local
population and motivate it to support the
Government of National Unity (GNU), the
Government Administration and the Security
Forces.
TASKS OF THE PRV
3. The PRV are responsible for carrying out the
following tasks in JOC Repulse area:
a. Encouraging Communist Trained Terrorists
(CTTs) to accept the Amnesty offer.
b. Protecting the local population by retai-
ning a constant presence in areas in
which they are deployed.
c. Maintaining or re-establishing civil
administration.
d. Assisting Security Forces in preventing
terrorists from re-establishing their
domination over areas from which they
have been driven.
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e.
g.
h.
Establishing a pro-Government Mujiba
system for gathering intelligence.
Acting as a link between tribesmen and
Security Forces.
Protecting villages.
Through their local knowledge assisting
the Security Forces on operations in or
adjacent to areas which they occupy.
More attention was paid to the political message in
the intensification of 1 Psychological Training
Unit's training of envoys, the insurgent equivalent
of the political commissar, while all Auxiliaries
were rearmed with G3 rifles (a standard NATO rifle
at the time). This had two distinct advantages in
that it gave the Security Forces real control in the
supply of ammunition, while it also effectively cut
off the Auxiliaries as a source of arms and ammuni-
tion for the cadres. For, in Rhodesia, the insur-
gents were never able to live off the Government
forces for arms and ammunition supplies, but had to
rely on supply lines back to their adjacent host
countries. As a final step in this process Special
Branch relinquished control over the Auxiliaries to
the Army on 1 July 1979. Special Forces Headquarters,
originally formed to co-ordinate the operations of
the Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and Rhodesia
Light Infantry, was now responsible to Army Head-
quarters for all aspects of Operation Favour, and
not directly to COMOPS as had been the case up to
this date. Each Joint Operations Centre thus gained
control of the Auxiliaries forces deployed in its
area. As an intelligence organisation Specia.1 Branch
did not have the organisation, facilities or manpower
to run the operation as it had developed by this
stage.
The transfer of authority created a number of
problems. The direct link with their political lea-
der, that had proved so crucial thus far, was weake-
ned, as the Auxiliaries were now part of the hierar-
chical Army command and control system. Normal Army
logistics now applied, replacing the (admittedly
expensive) local procurement of supplies by cash
transactions. The latter had not only tended to sti-
mulate the local economy but was a further link in
Auxiliary involvement at local level.
Up to this stage Security Force Auxiliaries had
only been deployed in Tribal Trust Lands where the
local population had not been placed in Protected
Villages. In September, COMOPS decided that the
Auxiliaries should take over from Guard Force the
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responsibility for 74 Protected Villages so that the
latter could be deployed along railway lines and in
a mobile role in the white farming areas. As a
result the Auxiliary establishment was raised, and,
by the beginning of October, the Protected Villages
in the Beit Bridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa and
Mount Darwin areas had been taken over, with vary-
ing degrees of success. Where possible,each Protec-
ted Village was defended by a force of 40 men. This
was a logical development of the Auxiliary scheme,
although it was essential that Auxiliaries used in
such an environment should have come from the Pro-
tected Village itself.
On completion of the redeployment, expansion
took place again but was hastened considerably at
the start of the Lancaster House talks. Mr Smith in
fact issued orders from Britain to the effect that
the Auxiliary numbers had to be increased to 26 000
as soon as possible, while the Army had by now set
an ultimate objective in the region of 60 - 70 000.
An indication of the priority that had been
allocated to the extension of Operation Favour was
the Rh$ 4,3mil earmarked for the scheme during the
November 1979 supplementary defence appropriations
tabled in parliament for the period ending June 1980.
Although the ceasefire and disbanding of the Secu-
rity Force Auxiliaries cut this short, some 19 000
Auxiliaries (for a total budget outlay of Rh$ 20 mil)
were in existence at that stage. Yet funds were not
the limiting factor, for these were again being
channelled in from South Africa and the Middle East.
In fact Operation Favour was not granted a suffi-
ciently high priority in the period after the elec-
tion in April 1979. When it was finally given this
high priority subsequent effectiveness was limited
by availability of Army instructors as well
as continuous attempts by the Army to produce Auxi-
liary soldiers comparable to normal Army troops.
Operation Favour had, however, been one of Ian
Smith's last hopes, for during February 1980, Finan-
cial Mail had reported:
... when government forces went into an affec-
ted TTL and "cleaned it out" the local populace
was grateful. However, once the hardpressed
Security Forces left, the "terrs" would return.
Now the Auxiliary Forces ... are staying in the
countryside. Allegations that they use their
position to intimidate the rural folk to vote
for the Bishop are probably true, but the auxi-
liaries do represent a degree of stability
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which the TTL's have not known for some years.
One way or another, they are bringing whole
sections of the youth 'on sides'. (9)
However, when the ceasefire agreed to at Lancaster
House restricted the Security Forces to their bases,
the Auxiliaries were not yet strong enough to face
the brunt of the ZANLA and ZPRA onslaught on the
local population which followed. Their political
motivation had also been weakened, leading to increa-
sed acts of terrorism and thus losing support
amongst the local population.
8.3 Conclusion
In the final months of the war, many members of the
Security Forces saw the military solution in buil-
ding up the Security Force Auxiliaries to dominate
and stabilize the rural black areas, while directing
the full attention of the Security Forces firstly on
Mozambique and then on Zambia after President Machel
had effectively been removed from the war. The
Mozambique economy and general security situation
was precarious at this stage, with the FRELIMO lea-
dership increasingly desperate for an end to the
Rhodesian war that was threatening to engulf the
whole of the former Portuguese colony. Yet it is
hardly conceivable that the aims set for the Auxi-
liaries could possibly have been realised before the
institution of black majority rule. Rhodesia had
been experiencing the classic "mobilization of the
masses' and although probably very few members of
the rural black population fully understood the con-
cept of 'one man one vote
1, it had become a
national objective for them. To obtain local active
participation against the 'boys in the bush', sub-
stantial proof had to be delivered that the politi-
cal objectives that were being fought about had been
achieved by Muzorewa's government.
The essential difference between regular black
troops, as in the various Rhodesia African Rifles
(RAR) battalions, and a local self-defence militia
should be emphasised, for although there were to be
some instances of disloyalty to the government with-
in the ranks of the Rhodesia African Rifles,
these were few. On the whole the RAR were as keen as
any other fighting force in 'killing terrs', yet in
the final 1980 elections, black Rhodesia African
Rifles soldiers apparently voted overwhelmingly for
Mugabe and were encouraging black civilians to do
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the same. The essential difference was that, as is
the case, though to a lesser degree, with white
units, the primary loyalty of the black soldiers lay
towards his unit, for it represented status, money
and job security in an immensely over-supplied
unskilled labour-force. But the most important fact
was that, in spite of being overwhelmingly black,
the Rhodesia African Rifles were led by whites, who
had a very good relationship with their black sub-
ordinates. To a black 'troopie
1 it was very diffi-
cult to see his platoon leader as symbol and a part
of the white regime that both ZANLA and ZAPU were
fighting against. Yet in general, he still identi-
fied with the political aspirations of his black
kin. Furthermore, in contrast, the Auxiliaries were
politically motivated. In the present rural African
context, in which ethnic bonds are still primary in
determining political support, the two are closely
linked. Thus any militia-type force had to be a
political and an ethnic representation. This was, of
course, not the case as regards the regular black
soldiers of the Rhodesia African Rifles battalions.
From this it may be concluded that although
Rhodesia had no lack of volunteers to swell the
ranks of their regular black units in the fight
against both ZANLA and ZPRA, this did not represent
black support, or even condonation of the Smith-
regime. Once efforts were made to involve the gene-
ral mass of rural people into a self-defence scheme,
the political quid pro quo had to be present. When
this was achieved by means of the 3 March Agreement,
external political momentum had overtaken events. By
delaying any major political concession until such
time as his military bargaining power had been dras-
tically curtailed. Prime Minister Smith was forced
to compromise from a position of weakness, instead
of making concessions from one of strength and thus
retaining or even regaining political initiative.
Thus, by the time the Auxiliaries were proving a
viable scheme, the whites in Rhodesia had run out of
time.
As regards Operation Favour itself, a number of
mistakes were made, not least of which was the resort
to conscript urban blacks to protect rural tribes-
men. This was a serious deviation from the princi-
ples that should govern any such attempts, and held
the seeds of a complete breakdown of law and order
in view of the limited availability of controlling
personnel. To a degree, as a result of the use of
urban blacks, but possibly more as a result of the
political taint that clung to the Auxiliaries as
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'private armies', serious resistance was encountered
within the ranks of the military who refused to
accept these informal soldiers as allies in the war.
This attitude was as common at the highest level of
command as it was among the regular soldiers of the
armed forces and was largely the result of doubts as
to the loyalty of these forces.
To the armed forces of Rhodesia, the security
that the Security Force Auxiliaries afforded the
locals was only a means to an end, for once an area
had come under a semblance of control by the auxi-
liaries there was a resurgence of intelligence: the
lifeblood of any counter-insurgency campaign. In
certain instances in which Selous Scouts teams ope-
rated in conjunction with Auxiliaries good co-
operation was achieved.
The Army should have viewed the Auxiliary pro-
ject within its broader political framework and not
restricted it to a limited military context. This
broader view would have enabled the Army to identify
the military advantages of self-defence schemes and
benefit from them at an earlier stage.
An important part - possibly the most important
part - of counter-organisation of the popula-
tion (as first phase of counter-insurgency) is
the organisation of its self-defence against
revolutionary intimidation and exactions.
Unless the people themselves have the means and
commitment to resist, their desire for personal
security is likely to overcome their loyalty to
the government or neutrality.(10)
For this single reason alone the history of the
Security Force Auxiliaries is closely linked to that
of stability operations (Chapter 6). Neither project
held immediate and direct security advantages appa-
rent to the hard-pressed military forces. Both
rather seemed to place yet a further drain on an
already over-extended Security Force. In contrast
external operations into neighbouring insurgent host
countries and the employment of a helicopter borne
Fire Force inside Rhodesian borders presented a
measurable tally of insurgent fatalities. Neither
the number of poorly trained armed black Auxiliaries
within the Tribal Trust Lands nor the aid diverted
to the development of rural black areas under
government control could provide any such measurable
record of success. Consequently both Auxiliaries and
aid were accorded lower priority in terms of man-
power and resources: had they been given greater
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priority they in fact should and could have been
crucial determinants in regaining control over sub-
verted areas, for expounded by 1 Psychological
Training Unit, the basic concept was sound. The fol-
lowing extract from an official document lists the
characteristics of the Pfumo re Vanhu
a. Unsophisticated personnel in an unsophisti-
cated organisation.
b. Reliance on the population for:
(i) Security through the passage of infor-
mation
(ii) Material assistance in terms of facili-
ties such as (indistinguishable) and
cooking offered by the people
c. Total identification with the population
d. Strength through:
(i) Physical numbers in small areas
(ii) Permanent and close contact with a
population base
The characteristics dictate that the Pfumo re
Vanhu is not viewed as a soldier but as a coun-
ter-guerrilla. In essence he should exhibit the
same basic characteristics as the terrorist with
the notable exceptions that:
a. Once he has secured his population base he
is not at liberty to abandon it even tempora-
rily as is the terrorist.
b. Because he is an adjunct to the Security
Forces, he is governed by the same code of
conduct which does not allow him to coerce
or terrorise.
However brief, the considerations discussed above
point to a number of critical shortcomings in the
conduct of the counter-insurgency campaign within
both the Security Forces in general and the Rhode-
sian authorities.
NOTES
1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-revolutionary
War (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 145.
2. Although the operation was not controlled by
the Selous Scouts, it was run by their Special
Branch officer from Bindura. The latter had built up
a vast network of informers and intelligence sources
as well as having access to considerable financial
resources. The Selous Scouts supplied weaponry,
military expertise and a number of former insurgents
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as members of the Interim Government Forces. They
used two farms as base camps, one near Beit Bridge,
the other was Blackwater Farm in Plumtree area.
Later a third camp was established at Mangula.
3. Sunday Mail (5 Nov. 1978).
4. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:
Top Secret War (Galagom Alberton, 1982), p. 315.
5. The UANC forces from Libya stemmed from the
period when Bishop Muzorewa had led the external
wing of the ANC and Nkomo led the internal wing.
6. Newsweek (8 May, 1978), p. 18.
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8. ZANU (Sithole) Auxiliary circumscribed areas
were Mphoengs, Maranda, Nyajena, Gokwe, Sabi,
Nyamaropa and Muwushu Tribal Trust Lands.
9. Financial Mail (29 Feb. 1980), p. 814.
10. McCuen, Counter Revolutionary War, p. 107.
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INTELLIGENCE
9.1 Introduction
Intelligence, it is widely claimed, is the life-
blood of any counter insurgency campaign. It should
be apparent that Security Forces need more than
chance and luck if they are to locate and eliminate
their elusive foe. Since Security Forces normally
have the edge on mobility and fire power, once
insurgents have been located, their destruction
becomes relatively simple. Thus, the insurgent kill-
rate, to name but one indication of success, is a
direct result of the intelligence obtained.
In this final chapter on key aspects of the
Security Forces counter insurgency strategy a brief
look will be taken at the Rhodesian intelligence
community as a whole. The problems encountered
here were vital in determining the outcome of the
struggle as a whole.
9.2 Organisation and Major Characteristics of the
Rhodesian Intelligence Community prior to 1973
In the years preceding the outbreak of the December
1972-1980 period of conflict, the responsibility for
Rhodesian intelligence was almost exclusively that
of the Central Intelligence Organisation of the
Department of the Prime Minister. The Central Intel-
ligence Organisation was divided into three branches,
namely Branch One, Branch Two and the Administration
Branch. Branch One, or Special Branch, was headed by
the Director of Internal Affairs. For administrative
and operational purposes it fell under the Commis-
sioner of Police. Policy and all aspects related to
intelligence were, however, under the control of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation.
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Special Branch was mainly involved with internal
intelligence and until the formation of a military
intelligence section some years later, was also
responsible for military, or operational, intelli-
gence (in contrast to strategic intelligence of a
less detailed but wider ranging economic and poli-
tical nature).
The Director of External Affairs headed Branch
Two. As indicated by his title, he dealt with exter-
nal intelligence regarding foreign-based political
activities. The Branch was almost exclusively inte-
rested in political intelligence and also responsi-
ble for a number of psychological and propaganda
projects, including disinformation. For the greater
part of its activities Branch Two worked indepen-
dently of the rest of the intelligence community.
The third branch of the Central Intelligence
Organisation was headed by the Director Administra-
tion. Duties entailed administration and logistics.
Other less directly relevant members of the
intelligence community included the Criminal Inves-
tigation Department which had the normal police-
supportive role in fighting crime, the Government
Protective Security Department and the Government
Telecommunication Agency. The latter produced the
codes and cyphers used by the government as well as
manufacturing telecommunication equipment.
The Department of Internal Affairs had the
vital function of collecting detailed operational
intelligence through its system of District Adminis-
trators. A monthly intelligence report was in fact
produced by this department for internal use. As the
war progressed, however, and the local population
became less sympathetic to Government, Internal
Affairs slowly lost contact with the local
population. This was to a certain degree due to
particular aspects of government policy (such
as collective punishment) that Internal Affairs had
to enforce. Constant friction between Special Branch
and Internal Affairs further reduced any intelli-
gence co-operation that might have existed. (1) Spe-
cial Branch (and later military intelligence) even
had difficulty in obtaining copies of the afore-
mentioned intelligence reports for their own use.
The Department of Foreign Affairs also had a
limited intelligence collection role through its
office in the United States of America. This office
was manned by a member of the Central Intelligence
Organisation. It also had men in Lisbon, Mozambique,
Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Greece, Spain and France.
Before 1973, Special Branch had a vast and very
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effective strategic network for gathering intelli-
gence. Little difficulty was encountered in provi-
ding relatively detailed intelligence to counter
what had amounted to little more than unco-ordinated
acts of terrorism. Before early 1966 counter-insur-
gency operations were almost exclusively Police
efforts with British South Africa Police and Special
Branch co-operation presenting little problem. The
joint Police and Army operations that followed ser-
ved to cement this relationship, while the Army grew
accustomed to relying on Special Branch for its
intelligence requirements. Inside Rhodesia, and even
to a limited extent outside it, Special Branch
relied on a system of paid informers and normal
Police contact with the local population for infor-
mation. In the absence of any organized attempts by
either ZANLA or ZPRA to politicize and intimidate
the local population, this system had proved both
reliable and satisfactory.
Since both ZANLA and ZPRA resorted to press-
ganging in the absence of sufficient revolutionary
recruits during the above period, desertions and
even surrenders to the Rhodesian Security Forces
were commonplace. This presented Special Branch with
sufficiently detailed information to counter the
insurgent incursions prior to 1972. At this stage
insurgent base-camp strategy and tactics were at an
early stage of development. External bases, for
example, were relatively permanent and fixed. Secu-
rity Forces could thus rely on information some
months old to plan external operations.
In general, the Rhodesian intelligence commu-
nity was geared for peace-time operations. Although
the insurgent threat was very real, and recognized
by Special Branch as such, neither the organisation
nor its methods of collecting information was suited
to the more specific needs of operational intelli-
gence. The result was that it missed two crucial
developments involving ZANU and ZAPU. The first was
the reassessment of insurgent strategy, that was to
take place in the period 1969-1971. (See Chapter 1)
The second was the development of ZANU links with
the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)
during the same period. FRELIMO had initially sup-
ported ZAPU as the only true Rhodesian nationalist
movement. When Joshua Nkomo displayed little inte-
rest upon being offered the use of the Tete province
as infiltration route into Rhodesia in 1968, it
turned its support to ZANU. The latter eagerly
accepted the use of the Tete route.
Special Branch registered its alarm early in
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1972 with regard to the build-up of forces in Tete,
and the generally deteriorating security situation
in the province. This followed an attack by the SAS
on the Matimbe Base near Gungwa mountain in Mozambi-
que. Although all casualties were dressed in FRELIMO
uniform a vital notebook read in Shona 'Go and tell
Evenesi that the Zimbabwe boys had arrived. This is
a secret, don't tell anyone else'. (2) For the first
time the evidence was more than circumstantial. CIO,
however, was not convinced. Prior to this the gene-
ral expectancy among Special Branch members was
still that future infiltration would emanate direct-
ly from Zambia as had been the case in the past.
9-3 Revolutionary War and Special Branch Intelli-
gence' ' ~
With the outbreak of armed attacks in late 1972, the
Special Branch network of paid informers and police
patrols in the North-east came close to total col-
lapse within a matter of weeks. The first ZANLA
insurgents had already, according to the report,
entered the Centenary and Mount Darwin areas on the
night of 4 December 1971. In accordance with their
new revolutionary strategy, they remained undetected
in the area for nearly a year, engaging in intense
preparatory work among the local population. Avoi-
ding the limited Army and Police patrols in an area
of more than one thousand square kilometres presen-
ted no problem. (From 1969 one platoon of either
Rhodesian African Rifles or Rhodesian Light Infantry
was deployed to patrol this vast area. By 1972 this
had been increased to company-level. Martin Meredith
describes the situation as follows:
Eventually the local population was won over
to an extent which later astonished the Rhode-
sian authorities. Intelligence sources, which
had proved so useful to the authorities during
the earlier incursions, dried up. For six
months, while the guerrillas were building up
an extensive network in the north-east, no
word of their activities reached the administra-
tion. With local support the guerrillas located
safe infiltration routes and suitable spots for
arms caches; they recruited hundreds of tribes-
men as porters and sent others to Tete for
crash courses in guerrilla training; older men
and women were enlisted to supply food. Hun-
dreds of tons of arms and medical supplies were
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carried across the border and, until late in
1972, the supply columns, on occasions more
than hundred strong, managed to avoid army
patrol.(3)
The character of the war and Special Branch method
of operation within this climate were incompatible.
Apart from the fact that the source of paid infor-
mants dried up almost immediately owing to a spate
of insurgent 'disciplinary killings', the ambushing
of normal Police patrols also severely curtailed this
source of information. Within a year of the activa-
tion of Operation Hurricane it had become evident
that the traditional Special Branch intelligence
network had run into serious trouble.
A number of other factors also contributed to
what was arguably one of the major intelligence and
Security Force failures of the war. As mentioned,
Special Branch had noted the deteriorating situation
in Tete province, and pointed to the influence this
might have on the security situation in the North-
east although remaining largely unaware of the
extent of subversion inside the country itself.
These 'alarmist
1 reports were sharply contradicted
by assurances from the Department of Internal
Affairs that all was peaceful in the area. (4) In
actual fact, both Internal Affairs and Special
Branch representation in the North-east was very
sparse indeed. Two Special Branch offices (at
Bindura and Sipolilo) and two Internal Affairs offi-
ces (at Mount Darwin and Sipolilo) were responsible
for the whole area from Msengedzi right around to
Nyamapanda in the North-east.
Special Branch patrols had been blaming the
Department of Internal Affairs for the administra-
tive neglect of the area even prior to UDI in 1965.
But its own cover of the area had also been neglec-
ted. When Special Branch did press for the more
extensive cover of the area in the early seventies,
it was vetoed by the Commisioner of Police. The lat-
ter was further to follow a strict policy of rota-
tion amongst Special Branch field officers through-
out the war, resulting in a discontinuity of intel-
ligence in some areas. During February 1973, Prime
Minister Ian Smith candidly admitted
We darn well know that tribesmen were subverted.
We know, for example, that Chiefs have also
been playing with the terrorists and they are
going to be dealt with, but this isn't anything
one can anticipate. It was the information that
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didn't come through. We have also known for
some time that we haven't got good enough
ground cover in some of these remote areas. (5)
It should have been quite apparent to both the mili-
tary and Special Branch that while there was no lack
of strategic intelligence, the counter-insurgency
requirements for operational intelligence were not
being met. It was some years before this need was
met.
9.4 The Development of Military Intelligence Organi-
sations
The military were, on the whole, completely unpre-
pared for the intelligence requirements of counter-
insurgency. In the tradition of reliance on Special
Branch, the Army intelligence organisation was, for
all practical purposes, non-existent. No intelli-
gence corps existed and no intelligence course was
presented. Senior military courses presented in Rho-
desia placed little emphasis on the correct use of
intelligence. Prior to the formation of the Military
Intelligence Directorate (MID) in 1973, the military
intelligence organisation liaising with the Central
Intelligence Organisation consisted of a military
liaison officer known as either the Directory Mili-
tary Intelligence (DMI) or as the Military Intelli-
gence Liaison Officer, and a Director Air Intelli-
gence (DAI). Both were located at the Central Intel-
ligence Organisation. Their function was solely to
provide liaison and advice to Central Intelligence
regarding military aspects of intelligence (as this
was still a Special Branch function).
On paper the total Army intelligence organisa-
tion now consisted of a lieutenant-colonel as Direc-
tor of Military Intelligence at the Central Intelli-
gence Organisation, a G2 (major) at Army Headquar-
ters and G3's (captain or lieutenant) at brigade
levels. The G3, in theory, had an intelligence sec-
tion at his disposal and was responsible for opera-
tional intelligence. The link between the Directo-
rate of Military Intelligence and the brigade com-
mander was supplied by a Military Intelligence Offi-
cer (MIO) at the brigades. These officers were
mainly orientated towards strategic intelligence.
Below brigade level some units had an intelligence
officer, but in most cases only a corporal. Invaria-
bly the task of Intelligence Officer at unit level
was seen as a 'soft job' to be filled by someone not
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suitable for any other post. It was also considered
the first ready-use pool of officers and other
ranks, should a shortage of personnel occur else-
where. At brigade level the same attitude predomina-
ted with the intelligence posts mostly filled by
operations staff members on an 'over-and-above'
basis.
As a result the Army was almost totally reliant
on Special Branch for all its intelligence require-
ments . Even Army captures were interrogated by Spe-
cial Branch. As they controlled all sources within
an area as well as access to them, Army intelligence
requirements had to be routed through Special
Branch. This situation grew intolerable after the
formation of Joint Operational Centre Hurricane as a
permanent operational centre early in 1973, since it
was the Army that was mainly involved in countering
the insurgency. This eventually led to the formation
of a Field Intelligence Detachment under the newly-
formed Directorate of Military Intelligence, in
which territorial soldiers were used on a regular
basis to gather intelligence.
The simple formation of an organisation with
no-one to fill the posts, and with very little sup-
port, both from the majority of middle- and lower
ranking Army personnel, as well as from Special
Branch, did not in itself solve the problem. Special
Branch had traditionally been responsible for mili-
tary intelligence in the field and saw the formation
of an Army intelligence organisation as unnecessary
and a threat to its own existence. It was not until
1975 that the Army was able to convince both the
Central Intelligence Organisation and the treasury
of the necessity for an Army intelligence organisa-
tion. (6)
The tradition that existed (in some units right
throughout the war) was for the local Army commander
to call on the Special Branch Officer in the area to
provide intelligence for the planning of operations.
The result was that Special Branch members were
giving intelligence briefings up to brigade level.
Even if capable, the Army Intelligence officer's job
was reduced to the updating of maps and other mun-
dane chores. Invariably these Special Branch brief-
ings were a run-down of incidents over a given
period with few military appreciations being made
regarding the implications of these incidents or of
expected enemy intentions. A vital element of the
military planning cycle was thus overlooked. This
problem was perpetuated by the fact that the Special
Branch officer at provincial or district level was
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without exception senior (both in rank and expe-
rience) to the unit and brigade intelligence offi-
cers. Furthermore, he exercised total control over
all local sources. Extracting of relevant mili-
tary information implied a rudimentary military
knowledge foreign to Special Branch officers,
schooled in Police tradition.
By and large, military commanders failed to
appreciate the shortcomings in the intelligence
reports they received. In select cases requests
were, however, put for closer Special Branch liaison.
In many instances this included a request for the
attachment of a Special Branch officer to the unit
concerned on a permanent basis. (Only in the some-
what unique case of the Selous Scouts was this
allowed as the unit itself was to a large extent
created by the Special Branch.) Had both the Central
Intelligence Organisation and the Army chosen this
solution many of the problems involved with the for-
mation and growth of Army intelligence might have
been avoided. Although the above solution had been
mooted by Central Intelligence and the Army, it was
rejected by the Commissioner of Police. (This would
have led to the possible accommodation of opera-
tional and strategic intelligence within a single,
expanded organisation.) Special Branch had, in the
interim, become increasingly concerned about the
extent to which its internal intelligence sources
were dwindling. This led to the regeneration of the
concept of pseudo operations and ultimately to the
formation of the Selous Scouts as a unit as recoun-
ted in Chapter 5.
The formation of the Directorate of Military
Intelligence (MID) in 1973 proved to be a step in
the right direction, since operational control of
the territorial element of Army headquarters intel-
ligence was also gained. To a limited extent the
Directorate was now able to provide Intelligence
Officers at lower level. Since, however, these members
were territorial soldiers any one unit was served
by three or four officers on a rotational basis,
the interrupted flow of intelligence was by
no means ideal, and served to perpetuate
the senior role played by Special Branch officers
who were at least fully informed. A further problem
was that the initial terms of reference of MID were
limited to the armed forces of neighbouring states,
thus excluding ZANLA and ZPRA.(7) Owing to the large
degree of co-operation between ZPRA and the Zambian
National Defence Force and the nearly complete inte-
gration between the Army of Mozambique, and ZANLA,
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this eventually led to the Directorate being respon-
sible for external intelligence and thus ultimately
for the intelligence required for external opera-
tions. Previously this function could possibly have
been seen as the task of the Joint Services Target-
ing Committee (JSTC) which formed part of the Joint
Planning Staff which had existed prior to the forma-
tion of COMOPS. The Joint Services Targeting Commit-
tee was responsible for the compilation and updating
of a central register of all strategic targets.
Except for the odd Special Air Service sabotage
prior to the start of the external raids in 1976,
Security Force targets were insurgent training
camps, holding camps, ammunition dumps, and the
like, with economic, or real strategic targets, only
being attacked in 1979. It thus seemed a largely
irrelevant organisation during the early stages of
the war, especially as the Directorate of Military
Intelligence and its associated military intelli-
gence sections were taking care of the targets
being attacked. With the ever present manpower shor-
tage the Joint Services Targeting Committee was dis-
solved when COMOPS was formed in 1977. All registers
were passed to Military Intelligence.
On 1 July 1975, the Rhodesian Intelligence
Corps (RIC) was formed and took over the limited
responsibility of the Directorate of Military Intel-
ligence for internal operational intelligence. The
latter had been running both the intelligence for
external operations as well as for the internal ope-
rational areas through its territorial members at
brigade and unit level. However reluctantly, the
Central Intelligence Organisation thus made room for
military intelligence within the intelligence commu-
nity, although on the clear understanding that RIC
deployment would be controlled by Special Branch.
RIC was formed at a late stage and hampered by
manpower shortages and the Army's dismissive atti-
tude towards intelligence. After training, RIC mem-
bers were posted to brigade headquarters and made
responsible for intelligence at this level. This was
in contrast to their intended task: the formation of
intelligence detachments in the field for the collec-
tion and processing of operational intelligence,
although limited RIC/Special Branch combined ground
coverage was done at low level in some areas. Rota-
ting Territorial (RIC) officers thus provided the
military intelligence function at brigade and batta-
lion level. Although suffering from a lack of conti-
nuity, this was an improvement on the previous
situation. Owing to its formation at a late stage
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and the manpower situation, RIC could never develop
to its full potential.(8)
At brigade level the RIC Mapping Section did
extremely good work in the updating of maps, as well
as regards the production of operational maps. Ori-
ginally both mapping and operational research fell
under RIC. In the years immediately following the
formation of RIC, a Mapping and Research Company was
added to the organisation. The mapping section was
established during November 1976 and by the end of
the war provided a very capable service. The origi-
nal maps were produced by the Surveyor General after
which the RIC mapping section updated them by the
use of a silk screen. By 1979 operational maps were
also being produced for specific operations. Infor-
mation for the updating of maps was obtained from
field offices set up at Joint Operational Centres
who collected it, in turn, from normal infantry patrol
reports.
The RIC Research Section was formed in February
1977, and was involved in basic operational research,
although none of its members had any operational
research qualifications. The computer of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Research and Special Services
Section was used for this purpose. A number of the
studies made included the ratio of gunships to
trooping helicopters in Fire Force, the use of Rho-
desia African Rifles or Rhodesia Light Infantry
units for use in Fire Force, and efficiency study on
external operations; camouflage of aircraft, etc.
While some of the results were accepted by the mili-
tary (eg. the increase of trooping versus gunship
helicopters in Fire Force), others were not (eg.
light grey as camouflage colour for aircraft). Other
results were later proved to be incorrect (eg. that
Rhodesia African Rifles were better Fire Force
troops than Rhodesia Light Infantry).
Throughout the war the Directorate of Military
Intelligence was never accepted as a complete and
integrated member of the intelligence community.
Professional jealousy continued to hamper co-opera-
tion in that some of the desks at the Central Intel-
ligence Organisation retained a military function
while neither the Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence nor RIC was allowed to build up its own inter-
nal network of sources. It was only after the forma-
tion of a joint interrogation team in late 1978 that
the Directorate obtained direct access to captured
insurgents. Prior to the formation of this team,
Special Branch had compiled a standard list of Army
and Air Force intelligence requirements which, upon
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completion, was passed on to Military Intelligence.
Central to the problem was that Special Branch con-
sidered Military Intelligence generally to be of a
poor standard and incapable of undertaking in depth
interrogations. As from 1978, however, the Directo-
rate of Military Intelligence's external operational
intelligence coverage grew to be superior to that of
Special Branch (who concentrated on the internal
security situation) due to their relatively sophis-
ticated radio intercepts and better interpretation
of military information. Yet, even by 1978 Lieute-
nant-Colonel Reid-Daly had the following to say
about military intelligence
Military Intelligence was a misnomer in the
Rhodesian Army for, apart from the good work of
a few dedicated Territorial officers at Joint
Operational Command levels, they rarely produ-
ced anything intelligent to work on. (9)
At the height of the war 8 Signal Squadron obtained
a monthly 12 000 radio interceptions for Mozambique
alone. The figure for Zambia was, however, much
lower.
The interrogation team that was now formed con-
sisted of both Military Intelligence and Special
Branch members and fell under the operational con-
trol of COMOPS. All interrogation of important cap-
tured personnel was undertaken by them. As the team
was also included in external operations a distinct
improvement resulted in both the extraction of rele-
vant intelligence as well as in its dissemination.
In the final years of the war, the Directorate
of Military Intelligence thus tended to accept
responsibility for the intelligence needed for the
planning of external operations, while Special
Branch and RIG were in control of internal intelli-
gence requirements. The nature of the war precluded
a watertight distinction between military and non-
military, yet in general the Directorate's opinion
was accepted as regards aspects related to security.
However it was rarely accepted as regards decisions
with political implications. Although this was not
to be faulted, Special Branch internal sources
('ground cover') had slowly been dissipated as the
established administration in the Tribal Trust
Lands broke down. In many areas Security Force
patrols became the main source of regular and relia-
ble intelligence, while ground cover traditionally
provided by Special Branch was uncertain. That this
had other than purely military implications is
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probably best illustrated by the differing predic-
tions presented by Military Intelligence and Special
Branch regarding the outcome of the 1980 elections.
While the latter gave Bishop Muzorewa's UANC at
least a blocking vote, the Directorate of Military
Intelligence predicted the possibility of a Mugabe
win, although this prediction was made at a later
stage. It should, however, be pointed out that Spe-
cial Branch analysis of the electoral vote was made
on the premise that in those areas where proof of
intimidation was overwhelming, the party responsible
would be disqualified. Seventeen such areas were
identified, but Lord Soames informed Ken Flower, the
Director General of the Central Intelligence Orga-
nisation, only 48 hours before the elections were to
start that this would not be the case. At that late
stage Bishop Muzorewa could no longer back out;
mainly owing to lack of South African backing for
any such action. A Special Branch officer later
admitted that their 'ground cover had folded com-
pletely
1 under the weight of ZANU (Patriotic Front)
intimidation. In her comprehensive account of the
propaganda war, Masses vs the Media in the Making of
Zimbabwe, Julie Fredrikse gives a clear account of
how out of touch the Security Forces were with the
black rural population. (10) Launching a massive and
very slick Western style political campaign to
endorse Muzorewa as Prime Minister, the Security
Forces had lost all contact with rural reality.
The one military intelligence organisation that
seemed to function relatively smoothly during the
war was the Joint Services Photographic Interpreta-
tion Staff (JSPIS). As the name indicates, JSPIS had
already been in existence during the Joint Planning
Staff system and thus had the advantage of being
both settled and accepted. This was clearly an advan-
tage since most of the operational intelligence for
external operations was derived from aerial photo-
graphy.
As the insurgents adapted to the ever-increasing
frequency of external operations, however, even this
source proved to have its limitations. On more than
one occasion external attacks were launched on unoc-
cupied bases. This meant Security Forces had to rely on
physial reconnaissance as final confirmation in
select instances. While this had certain distinct
intelligence advantages it also tended to place the
whole operation in jeopardy, should the advance
reconnaissance party be detected.
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9.5 The Role of COMOPS
Probably the single most decisive factor as regards
intelligence inside the military was the lack of a
central intelligence co-ordination body at COMOPS.
To a large degree this could be seen as a further
product of the military neglect of intelligence.
Since little allowance had been made within the
Joint Planning Staffs for intelligence control and
co-ordination, the same situation was perpetuated
within COMOPS, although to a lesser degree.(11) Yet
it should also be added that at the time of COMOPS
formation, March 1977, there seemed to be no senior
intelligence officer available to fill the post.
Provision had been made in COMOPS Operations Staff
for both operations and intelligence sections, but
the incumbent initially was a single Army captain
with no intelligence training or experience, later
to be replaced by an Air Force squadron leader.
Their major task was the preparation of COMOPS maps
while the intelligence co-ordination that took place
consisted in most instances of passing responsibi-
lity to Military Intelligence.
There was a need at COMOPS level for an intel-
ligence section with enough background to co-ordi-
nate the work of the other Army and Air Force intel-
ligence sections. At this level all the relevant
intelligence from the total intelligence community
should have been collated and on the basis of it an
appreciation made for presentation to COMOPS at the
start of the planning cycle. In an attempt to
achieve this, the COMOPS section was enlarged to two
officers with the rank of major, one responsible for
Zambia and the other for Mozambique. Since neither
of these had any background knowledge of the coun-
tries concerned, and Special Branch control of sour-
ces and general co-operation again proved an obsta-
cle, COMOPS reverted to working directly with MID in
the latter stages of the war. One example of the
lack of central military intelligence co-ordination
is provided by the intelligence process that prece-
ded the attack on the Mozambique bridges (Operation
Uric) during September 1979: at various stages,
JSPIS, Military Intelligence, Special Air Service,
Selous Scouts and finally the planning team at
COMOPS carried out duplicating analyses with no cen-
tral co-ordination of the effort. Had co-ordination
existed, a single organisation could have tasked all
sources and after completion of the analysis distri-
buted the result to all concerned.
As the war intensified, and especially from
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1978 onwards, the Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence began to meet the needs of COMOPS more effec-
tively. A major criticism levelled at the operations
planning section at COMOPS, was for shortening the
planning cycle that was followed to external opera-
tions. This led to the repeated use of set-piece
plans which insurgent forces were quick to compre-
hend and to counter.
9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and the Spe-
cial Forces Intelligence Centre (SFIC)
Due to the singular nature of their operations, the
Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts each had
their own intelligence sections at unit level. As
discussed in Chapter 2, Special Forces operations
suffered from a lack of central co-ordination. This
situation was also evident as regards intelligence
co-ordination. The latter was arguably the major
incentive towards the formation of a Special Forces
headquarters.
The major problem concerned the exchange of
operational intelligence between Special Force
units and Joint Operational Centres. The Selous
Scouts were initially established to gather such
intelligence and proved the most important source of
this vital material. Their type of operation, and
the ever-present fear of compromising themselves,
led to the minimum exchange of intelligence between
this unit and the Joint Operational Centre in whose
area they were operating. An area would be 'frozen
1
fora Selous Scouts operation (ie. all other Security
Forces removed from it) the pseudo teams would move
in, complete their operations, and withdraw with
little if any co-ordinated exchange of intelligence
taking place with local Joint Operational Centre.
Even the preceding operation of gathering intelli-
gence in preparation for either a Selous Scouts or
Special Air Service operation led to problems since
security instructions normally precluded the dis-
closure of the operational plan.
At the suggestion of the Commander of the
Selous Scouts a Special Forces Intelligence Centre
(SFIC) was established at Inkomo barracks (headquar-
ters of the Selous Scouts) during August 1978. For the
seven weeks of its duration, SFIC was largely involved
with its own internal organisation. This culminated
in a presentation to, inter alia, the Commander,
COMOPS and Director General of the Central Intelli-
gence Organisation in an attempt to establish SFIC
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as the prime co-ordinator or operational intelli-
gence.
The concept was that the Selous Scouts and Spe-
cial Branch would supply all available internal
operational intelligence, while the Special Air
Service and aerial photography would provide the
same for those countries affording shelter and aid
to the insurgent forces. Special Forces Intelligence
Centre was to be divided into two wings; an external
wing manned principally by the Special Air Service,
and an internal one manned by the Selous Scouts.
Each wing would be divided into ZPRA and ZANLA sec-
tions and.these again would be subdivided to suit
the insurgent operational areas. The Directorate of
Military Intelligence would thus have lost its major
function, external operational intelligence, to
SFIC. But little came of the proposals, as neither
General Walls nor Mr Flower saw the need for the
Selous Scouts to gain effective control of all ope-
rational intelligence at a location removed from
Security Force headquarters in Harare. SFIC was thus
disbanded and most of its intelligence personnel
seconded to the Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence. (12)
Suitable manpower having been its critical
limitation, the demise of SFIC led to a drastic
improvement of the Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence as military intelligence organisation. Hence-
forth Military Intelligence was called on almost
exclusively to provide intelligence for external
operations. This led to the formation of the joint
interrogation team (Mi3 itary Intelligence/Special
Branch) mentioned previously.
While SFIC itself had thus proved to be still-
born, its demise was to the distinct advantage of
the Rhodesian intelligence community as a whole.
9.7 Security and Counter-intelligence
As a result of the limited number of aircraft avai-
lable, the security of external raids presented a
great problem. Any relatively large external opera-
tion necessitated denuding all internal operational
areas of aircraft some two days before the raid for
maintenance purposes. These aircraft would be con-
centrated at either Thornhill or New Sarum, which
were used jointly by both civilian and military air-
craft. Owing to the standard method of attack by
vertical envelopment, the majority of external ope-
rations were conducted by air and the concentration
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of aircraft was thus a sure indication of a pending
attack.
A fact that never ceased to intrigue intelli-
gence officers was that the defence forces of the
insurgent host countries were invariably put on
alert before an external raid by Rhodesia, indica-
ting at least prior knowledge of an impending
attack, even if not of the target itself.(13) While
various decoys were attempted, the aircraft problem
remained a sure indication throughout the war.
Within the small white Rhodesian community
rumours spread quickly and it was extremely diffi-
cult to maintain security since all white families
had some connection with the war effort. The general
attitude prevailing was that a white face was secure
and a black one not. With this credulous
attitude, senior Army and other commanders exercised
little caution in distributing classified informa-
tion within the white community. With the influx of
foreigners into the Security Forces, Special Branch,
which was responsible for the security clearance of
personnel, was literally swamped and in any case
found it impossible to clear 'personnel
1 from the
United States of America, Portugal or elsewhere. Up
to the formation of Army Counter Intelligence (ACI)
in 1975, Special Branch was solely responsible for
counter-intelligence. Owing to the continuing lack
of manpower as well as the lack of importance
attached to counter-intelligence and security in
general, Army Counter Intelligence never really
became fully operational but was limited to the
investigation of small scale security breaches.
Throughout the war security as an element of
planning was never taken into serious consideration,
while it continued to be weakened by the employment
and placement of foreigners, some of whom were later
to be identified as CIA agents (in the Air Force,
for example). One example of this ignorance of secu-
rity was the failure to conceal the concentration of
decision makers at COMOPS prior to an external ope-
ration. A second example was the call-up of Special
Air Service territorial members some days before an
external operation.
It is difficult to determine the effect of the
obvious lack of security, but little doubt exists
that the success of at least some operations was
compromised by it.
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9 .8 Conclusion
The central problems surrounding the intelligence
services of the Rhodesian Security Forces may be
summarized in the following quotation:
The central purpose of the various control and
intelligence activities must be directed towards
.the destruction of the clandestine organisation,
and towards nothing else. Thus it is absolutely
essential that all the intelligence-gathering
agencies should be co-ordinated and centrally
controlled in such a way that the political
objective never becomes subordinated to the
military.(14)
Although the formation of the Directorate of Mili-
tary Intelligence and RIC was the result of an
alarming deficiency in operational intelligence,
this tended to divide and weaken the unity of cen-
tral co-ordination. Since the number of skilled men
in Rhodesia was limited, it might have been more
cost-effective to attempt to adapt Special Branch to
the challenges of a Revolutionary War and the
requirements of operational intelligence.
The second, and fundamental problem was related
to the lack of a national, mainly political, stra-
tegy and thus also of a coherent military one. This
aspect has already been discussed in Chapter 2.
When the network of agents and informers of
Special Branch was found to be disappearing, local
administration had also collapsed with the affected
areas. Julie Frederikse correctly states
While Internal Affairs had little control over
the military situation on the ground, it had
near total control of the information flow
from the rural areas.(15)
This removed all official permanent representation
and contact with the local population. 'Security
comes first, voluntary information comes later.'(16)
Without permanent protection at local level,
insurgent forces were free to organise and intimi-
date the local inhabitants at will. Security Force
patrols provided little more than an immediate pre-
sence. It was only with the introduction of Security
Force Auxiliaries in 1978 that the Security Forces
could maintain any such presence. Had a general
strategic concept been followed according to which
areas under government control were slowly extended
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by the use of massive population control measures,
and the involvement of the local population in their
own defence and development, intelligence 'ground
cover" would have been extended concurrently.
Although military patrols within the Tribal Trust
Lands were numerous and maintained limited contact
with the local population, the existing military
forces lacked the manpower, inclination and time to
maintain a permanent presence within these areas.
Increasingly, therefore, Security Forces tended to
extract information by force which could only be
counter-productive in the medium and long term.
It is too seldom understood that an unwilling-
ness to supply information to the government on
the part of villagers is not necessarily a sign
of political support of the guerrillas, as
ideologically or emotionally 'motivated' sympa-
thizers in the West are apt to assume. It may
of course be the result of the success of the
Communist 'violence programme
1; or it may be a
sign of a generalized local support for the
guerrillas. But it may be much more basic and
apolitical; an unwillingness to betray local
boys ... to a central administration viewed as
alien to the village community. Hence the enor-
mous importance in counter-insurgency of invol-
ving the locals in their own self-defence
units.(17)
In spite of the criticism noted above, however, the
establishment of a single effective intelligence
organisation able to meet the challenges of counter-
insurgency warfare is no easy task. Not only are
problems of method and structure encountered, but
also more established ones of vested interest and an
inability to grasp the complexities of revolutionary
war at an early enough stage.
NOTES
1 . To an extent the friction between Internal
Affairs and Special Branch was due to Branch One's
warning that the revolutionary potential in the
Tribal Trust Lands was rising rapidly. Special
Branch viewed this, in part, as a result of adminis-
trative neglect.
2. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts:
Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 18.
3. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country,
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revised and extended edition (Pan Books, London,
1980) , p. 109.
4. To a large extent the blame for the situa-
tion that had developed was placed on the shoulders
of Internal Affairs, see for example the Rhodesia
Herald of 12 Feb. and 5 Apr. 1973.
5. D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for
Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981), p. 8.
6. The extent to which Special Branch was pre-
pared to go in order to forestall the formation of
RIC provides substantive evidence to this effect.
During 1973 Special Branch broke into offices to
obtain copies of a presentation prepared by a senior
Army officer towards the formation of RIC. This
information enabled Special Branch to counter all
arguments in detail the following day when the pre-
sentation was given.
7. MID fell under the Army for administrative
purposes, but was responsible to CIO for all intel-
ligence-related activities. DMI was the military
intelligence adviser to both DG CIO and Commander of
the Army.
8. A further factor that had a negative effect
on the work done by RIC was the extension of opera-
tional areas during 1977. Existing RIC personnel in
Operation Hurricane were further thinned out to
obtain candidates for service in Repulse and
Thrasher.
9. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts,- p, 330,
10. J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vs
the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe. (Ravan Press,
Johannesburg, 1982).
11. The DG CIO appointed an intelligence liaison
officer of the rank of chief superintendant at
COMOPS (equivalent to Army rank of lieutenant-colo-
nel) but since his was only a liaison function, he
could play no effective role within COMOPS itself.
As a 'civilian
1 among military there also tended to
be a communication gap.
12. Functionally a further problem related to
the formation of SFIC was the addition of yet
another intelligence organisation to the total
intelligence community. CIO had increasingly come to
accept MID as a member of this community, if not
wholeheartedly. It was, however, hesitant to extend
its co-operation to yet another military intelli-
gence organisation.
13. This was more the case with operations into
Zambia than was the case with Mozambique. The FAM
were on almost continual standby, presumably due to
faulty analysis of Russian signal interceptions.
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THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979
Insurgent activity had its primary material impact
within the rural areas of Zimbabwe. Only the secon-
dary results of this onslaught, such as increased
urban squatting, were felt in and around towns and
cities. Much of the country, formerly known as the
Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's) was poorly developed by
comparison with the mainly white-controlled commer-
cial and farming areas. This is'still the case today.
It was within these often remote areas that ZANLA
and ZPRA forces established their base areas which
eventually encircled the economic heartland of Zim-
babwe .
By mid 1978 increasingly large areas of Rhode-
sia were no longer provided with veterinary services,
As a result, the spread of tsetse fly was unchecked
and the situation deteriorated to that state which had existed
during the previous century. Following a concerted
insurgent campaign, the rural bus services which
transported about 95% of the country's black popula-
tion between the main urban centres and the TTL's
had virtually collapsed by the end of 1978. Malaria,
bilharzia and other endemic diseases, once under
control, now became widespread. An increasing number
of reports of malnutrition were reported by the few
doctors that remained in rural areas.
After the Elim massacre of June 1978, medical
services in these areas had declined further. Of the
thirteen Catholic mission doctors in Rhodesia
during 1975, only four remained by October 1978.
Nine out of 31 Catholic clinics were closed during
the same period.
During February 1979 the Financial Mail repor-
ted that administration in the Tribal Trust Lands
around Mudzi and Mutoko in eastern Mashonaland, in
the Fort Victoria region and in parts of Matabele-
land had ceased. White farming communities were dwindling in the
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Mutare region, in Cashel Valley and around Melsetter,
Birchenough Bridge and Chipinga, around Rusape,
Headlands, Macheke as well as to the north of
Harare around Centenary and Sipolilo. Added
to the economic disruption of the farming industry,
which earned more than half of the country's foreign
exchange, Rhodesia had suffered a negative real
growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975.
By 1979 the real per capita GDP was virtually the
same as at the time of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in 1965. In the period 1975 to 1978,
employment had decreased by more than 60 000 while
80 000 jobs were needed annually to accommodate
additions to the labour supply.
From the initial figure of a few hundred insur-
gents that had entered the country during 1973/74,
intelligence estimates for late 1977 put the combi-
ned ZANLA/ZPRA figure at over five thousand. By
December 1978 the figure was close to nine thousand.
The internal settlement agreement of March 1978
had been Prime Minister Smith's last real chance to
obtain international recognition and relief from
sanctions while retaining much of the power in white
hands. Following the failure to obtain these objec-
tives, both Bishop Muzorewa and Smith's bargaining
was increasingly weakened by the sharply rising num-
ber of insurgents inside the country. At the time of
the internal black majority elections in April 1979,
ZANLA alone had 13 500 trained insurgents, of whom
9 500 were deployed inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A fur-
ther 12 000 ZANLA recruits were under training in
Tanzania, Ethiopia and Libya, while the Directorate
of Military Intelligence estimated that a further
15 000 recruits were available in Mozambique. ZPRA,
in contrast, had about 20 000 trained personnel of
whom only 2 900 were deployed in the country. The
remainder were in camps in Zambia. A further 5 000
men were under training in Angola and Zambia with an
additional 500 to 1 000 men undergoing advanced/
specialist courses in Russia and other communist
countries. Potentially ZPRA had no lack of recruits.
A total of 17 000 suitable men were calculated to be
available in Zambia and Botswana. Added to these
figures were, according to Martin and Johnson, an
estimated 50 000 muj ibas inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The desperate situation facing the Security
Forces by mid 1979 was aptly summarized in a classi-
fied Army briefing document:
There are at present 3 900 well trained troops
... deployed against 12 400 CTs (Communist
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Terrorists): a ratio of 1:3,2. Adding of SFA
(Security Force Auxiliaries) to troops, the
ratio becomes 1:1,15. In classical COIN (coun-
ter-insurgency) terms, this is a no-win or
rather, a sure lose equation.
Casualty figures for the period 1973-78 probably
provide the clearest evidence of the sudden intensi-
fication of the war from 1976 onwards (Table 10.1).
This was in spite of an overall 'kill rate' of better
than 1:10 in favour of the Security Forces. (If
insurgent fatalities during external raids are
included.)
Further indication of the extent of insurgent
activities within rural areas is provided by an
extensive classified Rhodesian Intelligence Corps
study entitled ZANLA and ZPRA Tactics and Modus
Operand!. Selected extracts on ZANLA reads as fol-
lows:
In some areas a well organised and security
conscious civil administration is working.
Under this system a person is appointed who is
known as the supervisor. He controls twelve
kraals and collects money for CT's (Communist
Terrorists) at the rate of 30 cents per head
each month. In farming areas the average tax
can be as high as $2,00 while teachers can pay
up to $30,00. Under him are three chairmen who
each control four kraals and under them are
administrators who organize the supply of food,
beer and cigarettes for the CT's. In addition
there is an intelligence branch consisting of
one man who controls the movement and activity
of the mujibas in the area and finally there is
a police system which consists of four men to
every village, and whose duties entail the
seeking out and killing of sellouts ... The
supervisors often have such powers over the
area that the Chief becomes only a figurehead.
CT groups travelling through the area are
required to carry a letter of introduction from
the Chairman of one civilian cell to another.
In some instances, the supervisors control the
businessmen in order to obtain supplies as well
as the war and civil administration. They also
hold authority over the CT groups and direct
their movements and discipline them for infrin-
gement of good behaviour ... In theory at least,
every established ZANU area has a defence com-
mittee that knows the number of CTs and local
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militia in the area. The committee trains the
militia in the basic use of arms ... Sometimes
health committees are set up which are respon-
sible for basic sanitation ... CTs have direc-
ted that food crops, as opposed to cash crops,
should be grown, and these are controlled by
the committees. PV's (Protected Villages) are
sometimes raided specifically to abduct locals
to grow these crops for CTs in chosen areas ...
Schools have been reopened in some 'liberated'
areas by the committees who have been issued a
new marxist syllabus by CTs ... The committee
system as a whole is now called Hurunwende,
which means 'government
1 ... Where committees
are not in force, locals have been instructed
to run, in some areas, when they see SF (Secu-
rity Forces), so as to avoid being moved to
PVs ... All secondary schools are to be closed
to prevent men from becoming elegible for
National Service. In some areas CTs have orde-
red locals to do National Service when called
upon, but to desert after training to CTs and
inform on SF training and tactics.
In spite of the localised success obtained by the
Security Force Auxiliaries, the evidently high
insurgent casualty rates resulting from external
operations and the demonstrated efficiency of Fire
Force inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, both ZANLA and ZPRA
could lay claim to physically controlling the majo-
rity of the Zimbabwean population by 1980.
By the end of the war more than 30 000 people
had been killed. The International Red Cross estima-
ted that 20 per cent of the population were suffe-
ring from malnutrition. More than 80 000 people were
homeless. The maimed, blinded and crippled totalled
at least 10 000. According to the Salvation Army, of
the 100 mission hospitals and clinics in the rural
areas, 51 were closed, three destroyed and numerous
others badly damaged. More than 100 000 men in the
towns were unemployed. At least 250 000 refugees
waited to be repatriated from camps in Botswana,
Zambia and Mozambique. About 483000 children had
been displaced from their schools.
By the end of 1979 white Rhodesia had been
defeated.
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GROUP 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 TOTAL
Insurgents
Killed* § 4
Wounded^
. Captured
Security Forces
Killed .
Wounded
Civilians
Killed
Wounded
94
611 1
79
25
78
49
23
263
709
112
26
214
163
217
145
942
91
12
132
105
138
1 244 1
8 086 11
160
112
786
548
769 1
770
505
219
166
855
984
107
2
16
1
3
2
508
302
342
345
520
187
111
6
39
1
3
5
4
024
155
003
686
585
036
365
TOTAL 959 2 704 1 565 11 705 16 606 26 315 59 854
TABLE 10.1: Casaulty Figures: 1973-1978
NOTES
+ These figures only refer to insurgents killed and
captured inside Rhodesia
* No statistics for wounded insurgents exist. These
figures were computed on a ratio of 6,5 wounded
to every 1 killed, i.e. the same as that which
can be deduced from ratios of Security Force
members wounded/killed.
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CONCLUSION
Hurunwende, Shona for government, designated the new
committee system already enforced by ZANLA in the
'liberated' areas. This word stands out as the clea-
rest proof of the inexorable progress of insurgency.
In their psychology, sympathy and thinking, the
local population, scattered over wide tracts of the
Rhodesian bush, had succumbed to the insidious
advances of ZPRA from the West and ZANLA from the
East. Vast areas which had once been under the close con-
trol of the white capital, were now regarded by that
same administration as distant and alien quarters.
Urban enclaves had remained secure in their ignorance
while an assault was precisely marshalled and laun-
ched from the remote borders inwards to the very
outskirts of the cities. Reduced to this beleage-
red state, whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia saw their
territory bartered piece-meal in an anxious
attempt to gain time, but nothing else. There
now no longer remained to them the ground
to negotiate. In their concern to rid the land of
insurgents they had forgotten the residents of those
large reaches who had slowly but inevitably been
alienated from white control. Hurunwende spelt
observance to the dictates of a new regime.
When the war for Zimbabwe came to an official
close at midnight, 21 December 1979, the Zimbabwe-
Rhodesian Security Forces had executed the most
important components of an effective counter-insur-
gency strategy. Despite exhaustive efforts to imple-
ment such measures, very few of these had in fact
proved successful.
To the white population, the threat facing Rho-
desia was an external one rather than that of black
nationalism within their own borders. They failed to
understand that although the initial threat origina-
ted geographically from outside Rhodesian borders,
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once these first insurgents had entered the country
and begun subverting the local population in the
rural areas, the insurgency gained a momentum from
within the Tribal Trust Lands themselves. Security
Forces continued to deal with the threat oblivious
of the fact that the very fabric of government with-
in these remote areas, the support and respect for
local authorities, was disappearing. For all practi-
cal purposes, government control within the Tribal
Trust Lands collapsed when the Department of Inter-
nal Affairs and Police could no longer effectively
administer the area, for they were the only real link
between- the rural black population and Government in
Harare. The restoration of government control toge-
ther with the concurrent destruction of the insur-
gent control mechanisms within these areas should
have been the real aim of Security Forces operating
in the black rural area on a permanent basis. In
their single-minded determination to eliminate
insurgents or punish the local population for
assisting insurgents, Security Forces lost
sight of their essentially supportive role. The
Security Forces and even more important, the white
politicians, remained insensitive to the less tangi-
ble aspects of the conflict. The local population
were in fact the determining factor, not the insur-
gents. Thomas Arbuckle addresses the same phenome-
non when he writes
The real problem is that the Rhodesian military
have misunderstood the nature of the war which
they are fighting. They have failed to realize
that the war is essentially political rather
than military ...(1)
The attitude amongst middle and lower ranking Rhode-
sian Army officers as well as that of Internal
Affairs was not conducive to an effective total
counter-insurgency effort. The general belief that
the insurgency problem was primarily a military
threat derived from experience during the sixties
remained a hallmark of the Rhodesian approach to
counter-insurgency. Coupled with a sincere belief
that the unsophisticated black African was incapable
of choosing between alternative political systems,
Rhodesian Security Forces continued a paternalistic
tradition irksome to the majority of the population.
What was required was an awareness that the war
could not be won only in terms of killing armed com-
batants , but in gaining the active support and
involvement or at least neutrality of increasing
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numbers of the local black population. This could
only have been achieved by first providing the black
rural population with permanent protection, or
enabling these people to protect themselves.
Because they lacked any sound political basis
from which to argue a viable alternative, the
Security Forces, in general, were unable to con-
vince the local population that the existing order
was just, fair and worth defending. Paul Moorecraft
expressed it clearly when he wrote
Politicians proved more adept at explaining why
Africans should not support the guerrillas than
at explaining why they did ... the initial aim
of the war was to prevent power passing to any
black government, no matter how moderate.(2)
In fact, the excessive use of aggressive and unlaw-
ful practices rather led to loss of government legi-
timacy thus easing the acceptance of an alternative
value-system and authority.
Possibly the most important means by which the
Security Forces could have disseminated the advanta-
ges of their own form of government was by the
deployment of Security Force Auxiliaries. These
auxiliaries stood in direct competition to the
insurgent forces, while at the same time providing
local participation. Had any such scheme been attemp-
ted earlier and not been restricted by shortsighted
Army attitudes regarding the loyalty and general
disciplinary standards of such forces, the Auxilia-
ries could have secured ever-increasing rural areas
for government control in the same slow invasive
manner so typical of insurgent forces. At the time
of the scheme's institution, however, the military
and not the political advantages of such a project
were evaluated and found wanting. In the light of
these apparently limited Auxiliary cabilities, the
scheme at best received stop-start and half-hearted
support. But, most important of all, Army commanders
realized too late the potential of a politically
matured local militia from the people themselves.
Instead increased emphasis was placed on
the elimination of insurgent forces in neighbouring
countries and eventually on the punishment of these
host countries for the active assistance accorded to
both ZANLA and ZPRA. This tends to vindicate the
argument that Security Forces perceived the threat
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as being of an essentially external nature. The
general viewpoint that insurgent fatalities held the
key to the successful conclusion of the conflict
fitted in comfortably with this perception.
Operations aimed at eliminating concentrated
numbers of trained insurgents prior to their entry
into a target country do constitute a primary
element in counter-insurgency strategy. However,
these operations are no substitute for a total
and balanced counter-insurgency strategy. The war
for Zimbabwe was not lost in Zambia or Mozambique,
but within the Tribal Trust Lands of Rhodesia. It
was in these areas that the imbalance on the Rhode-
sian counter-insurgency programme is best illustra-
ted when measured against the comprehensive doctrine
of stability operations.
As detailed in Chapter 6, American doctrine
clearly states the need for a complete and balanced
combination of environmental improvement (i.e. rural
development), population and resources control and
counter-insurgent (i.e. military) operations. When
measuring the Rhodesian performance against these, a
clear assessment can be gained of the racial precon-
ceptions that permeated all levels of white/black
interaction, specifically in the rural areas. Coun-
ter-insurgent operations were conducted to the
exclusion rather than the support of environmental
improvement. Population and resources control, a
means to the end of regaining and re-establishing
government control, became an end in itself: the
object simply being to facilitate counter-insurgent
operations. Stability operations, and specifically
civic action could have contributed immeasurably to
the consolidation of government controlled areas,
yet the limited Rhodesian response could be termed
no more than armed propaganda. At no stage was
attention at high level seriously directed towards
redressing grievances exploited by the insurgents to justify
their criticism of the existing white administration. Had Rho-
desian authorities been sensitive to the localized and most
directly relevant complaints within the Tribal Trust
Lands, and had all available forces been deployed in
an expanding area defence, rather than a mobile
counter-offensive across the entire country, the
concept of stability operations would have contribu-
ted significantly to the consolidation of government
control.
Instead, by the overly aggressive use of tac-
tics such as the purely intelligence orientated
pseudo methods, Security Force actions tended rather
to be aimed against the local population than in defence
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of them. In the short term, pseudo operations were
successful in obtaining information leading to nume-
rous insurgent fatalities, yet in the long term the
extent to which these methods were used resulted in
an undeniable loss of legitimacy and credibility by the Secu-
rity Forces vis a vis the local inhabitants. Again the *
aim, as in the case of Protected Villages, was to
facilitate the immediate detection and elimination
of armed insurgents to the exclusion of other, long
term, objectives.
In the case of Protected and Consolidated Vil-
lages resources were allocated to the resettlement
of rural inhabitants, but for the wrong reasons and
in the wrong places. Instead of halting the further
spread of subversion and thereafter slowly increa-
sing those areas under government control, the esta-
blishment of these villages was seen as an impedi-
ment to insurgent logistical routes. Little long
term emphasis was placed on the 'provision of impro-
ved living conditions as compensation for the dis-
ruption of a rural existence. Aimed at increasing
the vulnerability of the insurgents, the strategy
lost sight of the real objective, protecting and
gaining the support of the local population. Instead
of attempting to involve inhabitants of these villa-
ges in their own defence, the strategy was primarily
seen as a method whereby depopulated areas could be
created for Security Force operations.
The same confusion regarding method and object
is even more readily discernable in the history of
Rhodesian border minefield obstacles. The initial
concept, the erection of a barrier against cross-
border movement along the border between Operation
Hurricane area and the Tete province of Mozambique,
was itself ill-founded and frought with problems in
execution. The further extension of the scheme along
several hundred kilometres of virgin bush questions
the existence of sound strategic analysis at Joint
Operation Centre level, and a national counter-
insurgency strategy at the highest level. Particu-
larly in view of the extremely limited resources
available to Rhodesia in the defence of such exten-
sive territories, the allocation of substantial man-
power and financial priorities to the construction
of these obstacles was without sound motivation.
Such resources would have been far better invested
in environmental improvement of government control-
led areas, itself an extremely expensive programme.
Similarly, efforts were seriously misdirected
within the Rhodesian intelligence community. Regret- "^"
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table errors were made in identifying both the loca-
tion and intensity of the insurgent threat during
the period 1972 to 1973. Much of the blame is, how-
ever, to be placed on political insensitivity to
warnings pertaining to the gravity of the threat.
Having determined their inability to meet the chal-
lenges of gathering intelligence in a revolutionary
environment, sustained attempts were made, and
resisted, to establish a new organisation that could
meet these challenges. Rapid and determined increase
in the functions, personnel and co-operation of
Special Branch with all Services involved in combat-
ting the war, would possibly have resulted in a much
higher standard of operational and strategic intel-
ligence than resulted from the establishment of both
the Directorate of Military Intelligence and RIG. In
view of its broader approach to the problem of coun-
ter-insurgency Special Branch was furthermore better
suited to the revolutionary environment than a more
restrictive military intelligence service.
The lack of a coherent counter-insurgency stra-
tegy at national level could be cited as an impor-
tant reason for the absence of a unified high level
command structure. Only the latter could have enfor-
ced compliance over all government activities
directly related to the counter-insurgency campaign.
Even had such a national strategy been formulated,
COMOPS alone could not have enforced compliance.
After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote
... there was no laid down military strategy
applicable to every operational area. Brigadiers
were given their operational areas to command
and thereafter each one did his own thing ...
as did the Police ... as did the Special Branch
... as did the Internal Affairs ... they all
blamed the politicians for the disasterously
developing state of affairs, and, needless to
say, the politicians blamed everyone else.(3)
Despite this lack of a national strategy by which
the various Joint Operation Centres could fight the
war, it is, however, possible to typify the general
military strategy as employed in Rhodesia.
Rhodesia had in fact opted for a mobile, coun-
ter-offensive stategy rather than one of area
defence. Although large numbers of troops were
deployed in static or semi-static defensive roles,
these forces were generally not deployed within the
Tribal Trust Lands.
The emphasis in Rhodesian Security Force
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operations was placed on gaining the highest possi-
ble kill ratio.
Rhodesian Security Forces strategy is shaped by
a particular constraint, the lack of troops
made available for deployment on offensive ope-
rations in the bush. Consequently, the Rhode-
sian strategy has consisted of finding and
destroying the larger guerrilla concentrations,
breaking these up with small units of highly
mobile troops, who, immediately after such an
operation, are shifted to other lucrative tar-
get areas.(4)
The lack of Security Force consolidation of any
area was a basic shortcoming in the strategy. Any
strategy aimed at keeping the enemy off-balance can
only be temporary, as in the case of external opera-
tions, and must ultimately be an element towards a
broader goal.
... lack of a Security Force permanent presence
in many Rhodesian Tribal Trust Lands is proba-
bly the most serious fault in the Security
Force strategy, for it means small guerrilla
groups are able to garner popular allegiance
easily as there is no alternative for the local
people to turn to for protection. (5)
Thus, by following a mobile counter-offensive stra-
tegy, Rhodesian Security Forces precluded the type
and numbers of recruits that could be trained for
this task within the strict budgetry restraints that
existed throughout the war. In the second instance,
the Security Forces, by own choice, could thus not
compete with the insurgents for the establishment of
base areas inside the country. Only with the advent
of the Security Force Auxiliaries in late 1978, did
this emphasis change.
In the final year of the war a number of middle
ranking Army officers in fact attempted to convince
COMOPS to adopt an area defence strategy. During the
military preparations for the April 1979 elections,
a terrain appreciation was undertaken by the Direc-
torate of Military Intelligence with the aim of
determining which areas of the country had to be
held in order to ensure a victory for Bishop
Muzorewa. Circulars were distributed to all inte-
rested parties, specifically the farming and mining
communities, and industry. The data received was
transposed on a map from which the key terrain that
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had to be held was determined. (See Figure 11.1)
Accordingly, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was classified
in three categories; vital Assets/Ground (VAG),
Ground of Tactical Importance (GTI) and other
ground.
a. VAG. Vital Assets are those, the capture
damage or control of which by the attacker
will result in, or significantly contribute
to, national defeat. The ground on which the
Vital Assets are situated is known as Vital
Ground. .
b. GTI. GTI is Good Tactical Ground on which to
"Fight the battle to defend the Vital Assets/
Ground.
c Other Ground. Other Ground is those areas
which are not classified as VAG or GTI. This
does not include areas of GTI superimposed
on VAG.
In practice VAG corresponded with the economically
important terrain of the white population. All Tri-
bal Trust Lands bordering on VAG fell into this
category. The remainder of the country was not con-
sidered to be of immediate strategic importance and
was temporarily to be abandoned by Security Forces.
In the run-up to the internal elections Security
Forces were deployed internally as follows:
a. Domination of GTI to enable the election to
take place
b. Protection of VAG, largely by domination of
adjacent/overlying GTI
c. Temporary abandonment/occupation of other
ground, depending on the tactical situation.
Externally the following tasks were carried out
a. Disruption of terrorist reinforcements and
resupply ...
b Dislocation of terrorist command and control
c! Destabilisation of host'countries to weaken
their support for terrorists.
The strategic concept as embodied in VAG and GTI was
in actual fact the product of a number of ideas one
of which was known as the corridor approach. This
had envisaged the identification of insurgent infil-
tration routes and the subsequent step-by-step
elimination of them. Instead of attempting to cut
insurgent infiltration routes into the country,
250
Conclusion
\
Vital Asset Ground
Figure 11.1 Vital Asset Ground
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Security Forces would have worked their way down the
infiltration corridor from its deepest point in Rho-
desia consolidating areas as the operation progres-
sed.
Both VAG and GTI stood in sharp contrast to the
strategy of mobile counter-offensive which had fai-
led. Although neither strategy was accepted early
enough to significantly influence deployment pat-
terns , they marked a total reappraisal Security Force
strategy. The acceptance of VAG and GTI by COMOPS in
December 1979/January 1980 for the first time led to
a national military strategy whereby COMOPS influen-
ced Joint .Operation Centre deployment in the broader
national interest.
The same problem addressed above can be viewed
from a different angle, that of relative mobility
and the political/military impact of a strategy of
mobile defence. Insurgent strategy, specifically
that of ZANLA, was to infiltrate as many groups as
possible into Rhodesia, in the knowledge that large
casualties would be incurred. The aim, however, was
to enable hard-core cadre members to reach the Tri-
bal Trust Lands where two-thirds of the black Afri-
cans lived. Ultimately base areas were to be esta-
blished in these areas from where the struggle would
be intensified.
Once ensconced in the TTL's (Tribal Trust
Lands) by means of an effective doctrine, the
guerrillas use them as secure bases from which
to launch attacks on neighbouring white farms,
road and rail communications, schools, council
offices, black owned stores and beer halls,
attacks which have the political purpose of
destroying government authority. This guerrilla
strategy is primarily a political one as oppo-
sed to the Security Forces' mainly military
strategy of search and destroy. An important
element in the guerrilla strategy is utilisa-
tion of the Rhodesian Achilles Heel, poor man-
power distribution to short-circuit Security
Force mobility.
As mentioned above, the country had been experien-
cing a severe recession at the time that the war
entered its most critical phase. Although the Repu-
blic of South Africa aided Rhodesia on an increasing
scale, this was not enough to offset the effects of
a troubled economy. Military strategies such as Pro-
tected Villages, a cordon sanitaire and external
operations required vast capital investment and
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expenditure. This capital was specifically needed
for socio-economic development projects in the rural
areas. Denied access to the world money markets,
these projects were often beyond the means of a
relatively small although sophisticated, economy.
Nevertheless, even had Rhodesia retained access
to these funds, had their approach to the war been
more supportive than punitive, and had population
and resources control measures been instituted in
time, at root white Rhodesians were circumvented by
their own political creed.
The whites had no strategy other than beefing
the status quo and maintaining their privileged
position.
Ndabaningi Sithole
By a determined refusal to effect any transfer of
real power, and an inflexible assertion of white
minority rule, the government of Ian Smith alienated
the black majority, driving the populace to the
expedience of communist subversion. The Rhodesian
Front party in fact refused to accept that the threat
of rural insurgency was serious enough to warrant
restructuring the distribution of political power.
Rhodesian strategy was shot through with a
fatal negativism. There was little real faith
in positive political reform as a war-winner.(7)
Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in
1974, and were then able to host insurgents directed
against Zimbabwe. Rhodesia had not initiated a
meaningful transfer of power before the independence
of these bordering countries precipitated the inten-
sified onslaught from 1976. Had she done so this
would have constituted a crucial initiative in pre-
senting a defensible alternative to Marxist ideology.
Government was at first unprepared, and then
too late, to take this decisive step forward so that
Security Forces lacked a far-sighted political stra-
tegy that would have allowed them to formulate a
central military strategy. From this, in turn, they
could have defended the legitimacy of the existing
order to themselves, the local population and the
enemy.
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